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FOREWORJ) 
This report presents details of the ASSESS II* Spacelab 
Simulation Mission sponsored jointly by NASA and ESA. The report is 
in three main sections. The first two cover background. organiz4tion, 
and implementation of the project. while the last sections cont4ins 
conclusions relevant to Space lab planning and discu$sion Qf activities 
that led to the specific conclusions. 
Information for this report was obtaine~,,::,from detailed /~ 
records of the official Observer Team employed by the MARV~X 
Corporation. Material was gathered by participation in all phases of 
the project, interviews and discussion with each project participant. 
an extensive mission debriefing, and the mission documentation. 
*ASSESS is an acronym" for AiJ:'borne Science/Spacelab Exper.iments System 
Simulation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the 1980 time period, an advanced space transportation 
system will be used to conduct scientific experiments in the space environ-
m,ent using a laboratory (Spacelab) carried into orbit by the reusable Space 
Shuttle. Spa~p.lab is being developed and constructed in Europe under direc-
tion of the European Space Agency (ESA). The Space Shuttle Orbiter is being 
built by the United States und.er management of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). Spacelab is designed to be a versatile laboratory 
capable of accommodating a variety of experiments. The pressurized Spacelab 
module provides a shirtsleeve environment in which up to four Payload Special-
ists can operate experiments using basic resources provided by the laboratory. 
NASA, Ames Research Center (ARC) has developed over many years a very 
efficient system for accommodation and operation of a wide range of experi-
ments for airborne research using a variety of aircraft. The ARC approach, 
which is characte.rbed by deep involvement of the individual Principal 
Investigators in development and operation of the scientific payload, has 
been very attractive to experimenters and is enthusiastically supported by 
the scientific community. It has similarities to the approach considered for 
Spacelab. Many Spacelab planners have felt that, with emergence of the \\ 
Spac.elab program, it is time to consider simpler and less costly techniquE:\s 
for manned space endeavors, and that the ARC approach in managing a payload 
is a desirable basis for development of payload operational concepts aboard 
the Shuttle/Spacelab. Thus, NASA management initiated the ASSESS Program in 
1972 to evaluate and document management and operational practices developed 
and employed by the ARC Airborne Science Office (now the Nedium Altitude 
Missions Branch) as these practices might apply to Spacelab (refs. 1-5). 
To test the validity of the ARC approach to Spacelab, several missions 
simulating ·aspects of Spacelab operations have been conducted as part of the 
ASSESS Program.. From 1972 to ~975 six Spacelab simulation missions were 
flowrt. Four relatively simpl~s!l)luflations were conducted aboard the Lear Jet. 
aircraft (refs. 6-10) and two nXf·fe/complex aboard the CV-990 "Galileo 11" 
(refs. 11-16). Each mission was designed to evaluate potential Shuttle/Spacelab 
concepts in increasing detail. The first four missions studied the operation 
of th~ payload by members of the Principal Investigator team associated with each 
experiment. The last two missions, one on each aircraft, explored experiment 
operation by a limited number of carefully selected experiment operators 
(Payload Specialis~s). These missions were managed at ARC. The second of 
these missions, using the CV-990 (fig. 1), in June 1975 was conducted jOintly 
with the European Space Agency. It was the first extensive Spacelab simulation, 
and has become known as ASSESS I. The success of that mission (refs. 12-16) 
led to a second such mission (ASSESS II) with flights in May 1977, which is 
the subject of this report. For this second joint mission, emphasis was 
placed on development and exercise of management techniques planned for Spacelab 
using management participants from NASA and ESA who have responsibilities for 
Spacelab 1 which will be launched in 1980. 
2 
ASSESS II BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION 
'-:-, 
2.1 Project Background 
Initial approval to conduct ASSESS II as a jOint mission sponsored by 
NASA Office of Applications (OA) and Office of SpaceFlight (OSF) and by ESA 
came in late 1975. Final approval was obtained in March 1976 and "launch" 
occurred 14 months later on May 16, 1977. 
Both NASA and ESA set ~~\management organizations according to Spacelab 
plans to test and evaluate :i:"llterface activities,. NASA/MSFC was assigned 
responsibility for the payload and appointed a Mission Manager. NASA/KSC was 
given responsibility for Launch Site Payload Processing, NASA/JSC was assigned 
Flight Operations, while ESA/SPICE handled all activities in Europe. All 
organizations worked closely with NASA/ARC where the integration and flight 
prOGram were conducted using the CV-990 Ai13borne Laboratory. 
c 0 
Operational costs of the mission were shared between NASA and ESA. 
Experiments from the U.S. were totally funded by NASA. In Europe, basic 
experiment costs were nationally funded, with ESA providing additional funds 
necessary for the special requirements of the ASSESS mission. 
The project studied the full range of Spacelab-type activities including 
the following items of special interest: 
2.2 
Management interactions; 
Experiment selection; 
Hardware development, including design for centralized controls; 
Payload integration and checkout: 
Mission Specialist (M/S) and Payload Specialist (pIS) selection and 
training; 
Mission Control Center/PayloadcOperations Control Center reactions 
to ground and flight problems; 
Real-time interaction during flight between Principal Investigators 
(PIs) and the flight crew (MIS and PiSs): 
Retrieval of scientific data and analysis; 
Documentation. 
Mission Obj ec1h ves }J • 
To maximize the utility of the ASSESS II Program for Spacelab, the follow-
ing objectives were established: 
a) Science related 
Evaluate experiment selection procedures; 
Maximi~e science data. 
(J 
b) Management 
Study proposed NASA and ESA/SPICE Spacelab payload management 
concepts and interface relationshi~s; 
Evaluate Mission Manager, Mission Specialist, {nd Payload 
Specialist roles in mission planning and implementation; 
Evaluate participation of PIs in mission planning and implemen-
tation; 
Evaluate utili~~tion of an Investigators' Working Group (IWG) in 
mission planning ~nd implementation. 
c) Analytical Integration and Mission Planning 
! •.. ,.1 
Evaluate the methods and effectiveness of performing analytical 
system engineering, mission flight definition, and payload 
interface identification and control. 
d) Payload Specialist Selection and Training 
Evaluate methodology of Payload Specialist selection and 
training; , 
Determine practicability of using a PI as a Payload Specialist. 
e) Mission Specialist Selection and Training 
Evaluate methodology for selection and assignment of a Mission 
Specialist; 
Evaluate the }tission Specialist responsiblities relative to the 
STS systems and the payload. 
f) Ground Operations 
Understand and gain an appreciation of integration activities 
pertinent to Spacelab payloads; 
Identify ground operation~/)and testing requirements for efficient 
experiment integration and checkout; 
Evaluate Mission Specialist, Payload Specialist, and PI involve-
ment in experiment ground operations. 
g) Mission Planning and Flight Operations 
Assess methods and degree of real-time experiment/mission 
planning for Spacel~b missions; 
Evaluate concept of proxy operation and maintenance of experiments 
by pISs during flight opurationsj 
Evaluate poce concept and operating procedures. 
h) Oocumentation 
Develop and evaluate minimum cost documentation approach consistent 
with Spacelab payload requirements. 
~\ 
2.3 
{',~ 
~\..\ 
Project Guidelines o 
To fulfill the objectives of ASSESS II, the following guidelines were 
dev'elope.d: r; 
'- Na.",inlUm Spacelab reality withintunding limi~ and the limitations 
illherent with aircraft operation; 
- Ten-day mission with payload crew confined to the aircraft and contiguous 
. living quarters (see fig- 2) with one aircraft flight planned for 
each 24-hour period; the total of the aircraft flights and confined 
periods between flights to rc::present a si1181e Spacelab missiOn; /) 
- Payload creW to consist of two European Payload Specialists to operate 
the E\.tropea.n ~pel:'ilr\ents. t",'O u.s. Payload Spec.ialists to operate the 
NASA e~peri"l\\ents, and one Nission Specialist; no cross-training 
between NASA and :eSA e..,-perinlEmts e~cept for the ESA medical e~peril1lent 
r;, illVolving all Payload Spe.cialists; 
- Conltnu\\icatl.ons with the ASSESS Spacela? d~ew to conforrtl to actual Spacelab 
communications procedures as far as practicable.; communication to be 
established between the ground ~\t\d theai~craft throughout flight periods. 
- Space.lab-like experiment control panels to be pl:'ov:tded>in the aircraft 
nto ce.ntralize pIs management of e..",periment operations; 
- 'the aircraft flight crew (pilot, copilot. flight et\gineer, and navigator) 
,not t~~e included in the simulation e~ercise. 
- A few urtconstrained 'personnel (called ghosts) to pa.rticplilte in the 
flights to assure continuous operation of aircraft experiment support 
.-:;: systems} ,~here :it "'as not pl;'actica.l to change them for opera.tiou frol\\ 
a centrali~ed.position. 
I; \. 
'2.4 Nission l-tanagement 
2.4.1 ~lanasement Structure and Responsibilities 
«(~, 
Figure l shows the management structure. w'titch. with the e~ception of the 
~tSGl corresponds closely to that planned for early Spacelab missions. 
In NASA Headquarters, the progrant was cosponsored by the Office of 
Applications (OA) and the Office of Space Flight (OSF). The participation of 
the Johnson Space Center (JSC) to handle flight opet'ations and Kennedy Space 
Center ~SC) to handle launcll site operations. W~lS nndel:' the jurisdiction of 
OSF. The U.S_ portion of the payload was sponsored by O/\;~ where tIle discipline 
,offices took pa:t"t in the :tuitial activities to select the paylQad e~periments. 
A Pro grant }tanaser waS selected in OA to gUide the project_ A ~tission ~Ianager 
was selected at NSFC to handle ove'i,:'all project manasment. Since the project 
was initiated and conducted at the Ames Research Center (ARC) utilizing the 
Ames CV-99Q 1\iroo.rne Laboratory, i~ was .. necessary- that ARC participate strongly 
with JSC,J\SC, and NSFC'tQ carr~f ~ut the mission. 
// :;/ 
In EurOpe. ESA activated a neW organization called SPICE, located at the 
nFVLR labor,atory, Porz-"'~ahn, Germany, to handle ~periment integration and coordi-
na.tion act;tvities in Europe, This organization is planned for Spacelab all.d. was 
established in time to function for ASSESS II" A Program ~latiager was appOinted 
at SPICE and under him a Payload Nanager was selected who develQped the ESA 
portion f,if the payload in Europe and worked closely with the NASA ~tission ~lanager 
durin!; integration at').d flight. operations in the U.S. . 
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Figure 3. ASSESS II Management 3tructure 
Mission Steer1ng Group 
A Mission Steering Group (~lSq) was established at the beginn1ng of the 
Pt9ject with representatives from every m~jor participat1ng organization. 
The "~~G was uniq,ue to ASSESS. and is not planned for Spacelab. Participating 
NASAlIeadquarters program offices were represented along with MSFC, JSC, KSC. 
ARC, ESA Headquarters, and ESA/SPICE. the NSG was cochaired by the NASA 
Program ~lanager from the Headquarters Office of Applications and the ESA 
Program Manager from SPICE. 
Functions of the MSG were to provide overall guidance to the simulation 
in order to acl1ieve maximum benefit for Spacelab planning. Accordtngly, the 
MSG established the mission guidelines and provided an overall management 
forum for the resolution of intercenter/agency responsibilities. 
2.4.3 Mission Manager 
Tha Mission Manager at ~$FC was assigned complete responsibility for 
the pay.load. His office was to be the single point of contact between experi-
menters and the project. Initially, the manager of Spacelab 2 from the Spacelab 
Payload Prpject Office at ~fSFC was assigned to mal'lage ASSESS II. An Assistant 
~Ussion Manager, who had participated in earlier ASSESS missions, was also 
appointed from the Spacelab Payload Project Office. About four months before 
flight (January 1977), the ASSESS II mission management responsibility was 
transferred to an ind;ividual at 1'1SFC who had been assigm,ed to handle all OA 
Spacelab projects. it SPICE, ESA elected to have the ~Ame individual serve as 
both the Program Manager and the }fission Manager. He was aided by a deputy 
from ESTEC who functioned as Payload Manager and worked closely "with the 
European experimenters throughout experiment de'\~elopment, integration, and 
flight operations, " 
2.4.4 
" 
'\ 
Mission Scientists and Investigators' t~orkil'lg Group 
MSFC appointed the Chief of the Solar Science Branch, Space Sciences 
Laborato:ry as the Mission Scientist and the Chief of the Optical Physics 
Branch of the same laboratory as his assistant. The Assistant l1fission Scientist 
had served in the same capacity on ASSESS lit ESA appointed a staff astronomer 
from ESTEC, who had served as a Payload Spetialist on ASSESS I, as their 
MiSSion Scientist, but did not appoint an assistant. 
An Investigators' Workiug Group (ll~G) was establ.ished early in the ASSESS 
II Project, and was made up of a PI from each experiment. The mission Scientist 
from MSFC chaired the IWG with the ESA Mission Scientist as cochairman. Functions 
of the IWG were to provide a forum for PI discussion and to make recolnrnendations 
concerning science plans and prio:rities for the mission. NASA and ESA IWG members 
provided recommendations to their respective managements for Payload Specialist 
selection. 
2.4.5 Mission Specialist 
The ASSESS II mission was the first trial by NASA to identify and assign 
a Mission Specialist (H/S) to serve in a Spacelab-type activity. After 
substantial difficulty, a role was established and agreed to as follows: 
8 
To act as the inflight alter ego of the ~fission Manager and to be 
generally responsible for coordination and conduct of combined 
payload operations during flight; 
To be the single interface between the Payload Specialists and STS 
flight cre\.;' (pilot/copilot); 
To be responsible for all aircraft experiment-support systems such 
as power distribution, central data system, etc; 
Upon approval of the NASA Program Nanager, to be trained to act as 
Payload Specialist and oper.ate e;Kperiments during the flight mission; 
To work with the POCG, NeC, Payload Specialists, and Flight Commander 
(pilot) to solve inflight problems caused by equj.pment failures 
and/or flight conditions leading to changes of science priorities. 
A scientist/astronaut from JSC was assigned to serve as H/S. Although 
he reported administratively to JSC, 'he w'as assigned to report directly to the 
Nission "Hanager at NSFC in accomplishment of the above assi.gned responsibilities 
for ASSESS II. The M/ S,WBS an as tronomer \"ho had previously served as a 
Payload Specialist during an earlier ASSESS Spacelab simulation (ref. 9, 10). 
A second scientist/astr'p!'~Pu.t from JSC was appointed as a backup. He also was '/ 
an astronomer and had served' as PiS on the ASSESS I mission (ref. 12-16). 
2.4.6 Payload Specialists 
Since the payload was about evenly divided between NASA and ESA, it wa~ 
agreed that the fr~ght crew would consist of four Payload Specialists (p/Ss), 
two fronl the U.S. and two from Europe, and that the ESA piSs would be responsible 
for the European experiments while the NASA piSs would handle the U.S. experi-
ments. Thus, with only minor exceptions, there would be no cross-training 
responsibility. This segregated arrangenlent was chosen mainly to save travel 
costs for training and reduce individual commitments. 
In the U.S. two piSs \.,ere selected from JPL. One was a radar technician and 
the other was a physicist who was also the PI for one of the payload experiments. 
No PI proposed candidates were selected for backup. Instead, also to reduce costs, 
the Assistant r-assion Nanager from NSFC, an aeronautical engineer, was assigned 
a second role to serve as the single backup pis for the U.S. 
In Europe, ESA selected fOllr PiSs, illitially plann:i.ng to identify two 
as prime piSs and two as backup. The four piSs were: a graduate student in 
physics from the University of Southampton, England; a staff astronomer from 
ESTEC Nho was formerly an airline pilot; an electrical engineer from DFVLR; 
and a physicist from DFVLRo The plan of selecting t\.,o as prime piSs and two 
as backup was altered somewhat be.fore the mission actually got underway at 
ARC. (The final nrrangement is discussed under Mission Implementation.) 
Payload Specialist responsibility was to serve as the direct representa-
tive of the PI in opet'ating the experilllentf~ during "Spacelab" flight with the 
goal of obtaining the best data possible. Thus, the pISs trained extensively 
for their assignments. During the "Spacelab" flight they operated their 
respective experiments to obtain high quality data according to plans determined 
before each data-take period. When necessary, they adjusted and repaired 
experiment rn.'1lfunc tions, using skills developed during tlHdr training periods, 
and communicated directly with the PIs via the roce during the flight mission. 
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3. }fISSION IMPLlmENTAl'ION 
This settion details the events during implementation of the ASSESS II 
prpject, and provides support for conclusjolls given in Section i.. 5igni-
fic(lnt events during implementation of the project are shown on the ove'rall 
schedule, figure 4. 
3.1 Flight Payload 
3.1 •. 1 Experiment Selection and Funding 
In NASA, the Office of Applications (OA) decided to select experiments 
for ASSESS n from ongoing e)(;periment programs. with emphasis on experiment 
prototypes destined for Spacelab that had previously flown on the CV-990. 
'fhifilvas done particularly to save costs of instrument development, but also 
to takE~ advantage of the ASSESS progrllnl to further d.evelop experiments 
for approved applications programs. This eliminated the use of an Announce-
ment of OpportUnity. The OA Discipline Offices (see figure 3) were called 
upon to propose experiments. Final selection turned out to be a difficult and 
time consuming process. 'rhe OA ASSESS II Program Nanager finally achieved a 
full baseline experiment selecUon about three months (June 1976) after offi-
cial approval of the project, but funding was extremely tight and it was 
recognized that one or two experiments might have to be dropped. The base-
lined experimenters began .work in earnest to modHy ..:.heir experiments for the 
ASSSSS II "Spacelab" payload, but interactions within OA continued to delay 
full solidification of the NASA payload. Some e)(;perimenters slowed their 
efforts due to unresolved funding problems, and it was not until December 
1976 that funds were finally d:f,stributed, almo.st nine months after NASA Head-
quarters project approval, and only five months before launch. 
Approval and funding for the experiment from GSFC was still being held 
up after eleven Dlonths (until February 1977) for lack of an interagency 
decision regarding the data to be obtained. By that time all levels of manage-
ment, as well as the PI, agreed that the exper:f.ment had to be dropped unless 
immediate approval was obtained. A decision was finally made to go ahead, 
but, as a result of the inordinately late decision, that experiment was in a 
crash mode of activity lintil the flight period. 
In Europe, I~SA issued an Annollncement of Opportunity in December 1975 
following preliminary project approval. The proposals were screened by the 
ERA science departments and reviewed by a special board. Final payload 
selection was announced by ESA in Al'ril 1976, one month following final ASSESS 
project go-ahead. Funding of the European experiments was handled on a 
national basis with l~SA ptov:i.ding additional funds over and above the hi'sic 
experiment costs to support activit:i,es peculiar to the ASSESS II Spacelab 
simulation. 
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Figure 4. ASSESS II Sdwdule 
3.1.2 Experiment Descriptions 
The experiment payload consisted of ten scientific and application 
experiments - five from Europe and five from the U.S., plus one engineering-
type experiment from ESA/ESTEC to measure EMI characteristics of the payload. 
Table I lists the experiments, showing the sponsoring organizations, the 
basic measurements performed, and a brief description of the instrumentation 
usedo Particular note should be taken of the Experiment Designator; these 
designators will be used throughout this report in referring to individual 
experiments. Table 2 provides a brief background of the experiments. 
All of the experiments except the CTM had flown in aircraft previous to 
ASSESS IIo The CTM experiment had been used in a ground installation. The 
MED experimenter had obtained data from several subjects aboard a long commer-
cial flight, but ASSESS required centralized design and periodic attachment 
of the self-carried units to the ADDAS interface. The IR telescope, AWS, 
and EMI from Europe had flown on ASSESS I. LIDAR, LAS, and AEES had flown 
on light aircraft. The other three experiments from JPL and LaRC had flown 
before on the CV-990. However, without exception, all experiments underwent 
significant modification in preparation for ASSESS II. 
The infrared astronomy experiment involved three organizations from 
three countries - the telescope was supplied and managed by the Paris Observatory 
at Meudon (France), while two separate detectors from Germany (l-1PI) and The 
Netherlands (Groningen) were adapted to it, to be operated selectively by 
beam switching. The medical experiment from Germany acq\Uired added scientific 
cooperation from NASA/ARC during latter phases of the project. 
Figures Sa through 5j show the sensing and data handling components of 
most of the ASSESS II experiments. Items of particular interest are indicated 
in the illustrations and are discussed for each experiment as follows: 
IRA (Infrared Astronomy) Figure Sa shows the Meudon telescope with both 
the Groningen and Max Planck detectors attached. The Groningen detector was 
mounted at the Cassegrain focus and moved with the telescope. The MPI detector 
was mounted at the Coude focus and so did not move with the telescope. 
Both dewars were pumped during flight to achieve liquid helium temperatures 
of 2K or below at the detectors. A 'l'V camera was mounted on the tracking 
telescope to provide the signal for the automatic tracking electronics. 
AWS (Airglow Wave Structure) Figure 5b shows the two AWS TV cameras· 
looking out either side of the aircraft along with associated equipment. 
Signals from the cameras were recorded at a slow frame rate on the video tape" 
recorder. A small monitor was provided to aid in focussing the cameras. 
LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranginj) The laser transmitting and receiving 
optics for LIDAR were mounted in the forward cargo compartment (no photograph 
available), with data handling equipment in a separate rack in the main cabin 
(fig. 5c). In the original design of this experiment for a light aircraft 
the optical paths were open to the atmosphere. The CV-990 installation required 
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Table 1 - ASSESS II Experiments 
Experiment 
Designator 
Organi.zation Heasurement Instrumentation 
lRA* 
*NOTE: 
Paris Observatory -
?-feudon, France 
University of Groningen -
The Netherlands, and 
Paris Observatory -
Neudon, France 
Nax Planck Institute for 
Physics and Astrophysics -
Garching,. Germa~y 
Characteristics of galactic 
cold clouds and H II regions. 
30-cm open port Cass.~grain telescope. 
4-channel photometer. 
Bands: l7-20}.lID 
30-48 }.lID 
70-95 lJID 
114-196 jJm 
Detector: bolometer at 1.6 K 
Spectral features of forbid- Tilting filter spec.trometer. 
12.8 lJUl (Ne II) den transitions (Ne II, Ne III, Bands.: 
H2 , and S III) in H II regions. 15.5 }.lm (Ne III) 
28.0 lJm (H2) 
18.7, 33.6 ~m (5 III). 
Bandwidth: 0.1 cm- 1 
Detector: bolometer at l.5 K. 
IRA was considered a Single infrared astronomy experiment, even though 
The telescope was supplied by the observatory at Meudon. One detector 
of Groningen, producing data of interest to both Meudon and Groningen. 
by Max Plank Institute. Beaffi-Sk~tching optics directed signals to one 
it had multiple sponsorship. 
was supplied by the University 
A second detector was supplied 
detector at a time. 
l 
r 
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Experiment 
Designator 
A1~S 
LlDAR 
"HED 
CTM 
ENI 
Organization 
University of Southampton -
Southa~pton, England 
DFVLR, Institute for 
Fhysics of the Atmosphere -
Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany 
DFVLR, Institute for 
Flight ~ledicine - Bad 
Godesberg, Germany and 
NASA/ARC 
Ca~l.:ldimonte Observatory -
Naples; University of Leece 
and University of Florence, 
Italy 
ESA/ESTEC - Noordwijk -
The Netherlands. 
~ 
Table 1 continued 
Neasurement 
Radiation from stratospheric 
OR clouds. 
Nass concentration of aero-
sols below aircraft along 
extended. flight paths. 
Heart rate and body tempera-
ture in flight and electro-
encepholograms during sleep. 
"'\d::==-~ 
Absolute solar flux and temp-
erature distribution in upper 
solar atmosphere (chromosphere) 
from spectra in 1QO to 200 
~ band. Emission of earth 
atmosphere in same waveband, 
for reference. 
E}IT characteristics of air-
craft systems and individual 
experiments. 
~. 
Instrumentation 
Image-intensified, integrating near C 
IR TV camera systems. Left and right 
viewing from passenger windows. 
Optical ( A = 1.06 ~E) distance 
measuring radar (LIDAR). Return 
amplitude proportional to mass concen-
tration of scattering aercsols o 
Detector: photodiodeat ambient 
temperature. 
F/Ss instrumented with aPl'ropriate 
sensors and small tape recorders. 
~lichelson interferometer, non-collim-
ated. 
Detector: germanium bolometer at 1.6 K. 
Calibration source at 77 K. 
Switch sun to calibration source at 
10 Hz. 
Sun viewing via stabilized mirror. 
Field of view: 2° x 2° • 
IDil measuring equipment. 
Spectrum analyzer - dc to 500 MUzo 
r 
[ 
I:; 
Experiment 
Designator 
SAR 
LAS 
Organization 
NASA/JPL - Pasadena, CA 
NASAl JPL - Pasadena, CA 
NASA1JP~ - Pasadena, GA 
TABLE 1 tontinued 
Heasurement 
Ra.dar maps of terrain for earth 
resources feasibility study. 
Spectral lines emanating frem 
tracE atmospheric gases in the 
100 to 200 GHz range. Concen-
trate on the 167 GHz line from 
chlorine monoxide. 
Energy absorbed by 0 3 from nadir 
directed PUlSES from a C02 
laser to determine atmospheric 
ozone concentration. 
Instrumentation 
Two synthetic aperture mapping radar 
systems: X-band (3-cm waves); 
~ pulse o'i~--L-'.5-llS, 50 kvl peak. 
L-band (la-cm waves); 
pulse of 1.25 lIS, 5 kw peak. 
Dual polarization antennas. 
Heterodyne radiometer/ spectrometer; 
dual signal channel: 
#1 IF, 100 - 300 }~z, 36 channel 
filter bank produces line shape; 
#2 IF, + 5 MHz, 256 chann~l Fast 
Fourier Transform spectrometer. 
Vie~~ng: _2 0 and +30 0 (reference). 
Dual C02 lasers; chopped beams directed 
3° f'orward of nadir; one laser tuned to 
03 absorption, other to 03 window. . 
Doppler shifted returns mixed with 
unshifted laser power to give IF. 
Photo~ixers: HgCdTe at 77 K. 
Experiment 
Designator 
IRR 
liliES 
Organization 
NASA/LaRe - Hampton, VA 
NASA/GSFC - Greenbelt, }ID 
Table 1 concluded 
Heasurement 
Radiation absorbed by or 
emanating from atmospheric 03io 
the 9 - 12 ~m bp~d for lateral 
concentration and altitude 
profile determinations. 
Nonitor usage of emergency RF 
-and microv!ave communications 
bands. 
Instrumentation 
He terodyne IR radioxr.e ter I spec trome tel: ; 
dual signal channel: 
fll IF, 100 - 1000 NHz, atn,ospheric 
l-7indo\Ol; 
1.:2 IF, 150 - 2150 NHz, 4-channel 
filter bank produces line shape.' 
Solar viet.,Jing (03 absorption) via 
stabilized rr.irror; nadir to 45° 
viewing (03 emission) via external 
mirror. 
Photomixers at 77 K. 
Emergency locator transmitter channels: 
121.5 MHz 
243.0 l-lliz 
406.0 l-ffiz fixed frequency, nadir 
receiving; 
0.4 - 12.4 GHz swept frequency, 
nadir or horizontal 
receiving. 
Table 2 - Background of ASSESS II Experiments 
Initial 
EJ..-periment Development 
Date 
IRA 
(Neudon 1974 
telescope) 
(Groningen --
photometer) 
(Hax P 1a,nck 1975 
spectrometer) 
AWS 1972 
LIDAR 1976 
l-JED 1970 
eTN 1976 
ENI 1974 
\1, 
'\ 
SAR 1969 
NLS 1975 
(:-
.:<.~ 
LAS 1974 
IHR 1976 
ARES 1976 
Previous 
Flights 
1974-76 
( Caravelle" 
and CV-990 J 
ASSESS I) 
1975 (CV-990, 
ASSESS I) 
1976 (Balloon 
and light air-
craft) 
1975 (CV-990, 
ASSESS I) 
1976-77 
(light air-
craft) 
1977 (Com-
mercial jet) 
None 
1975 (CV-990, 
ASSESS I) 
1970-77 (CV-990) 
1975-76 (CV-990) 
1976-77 
,! (light air-
F' craft) 
1976 (CV-990) 
,1 
1976 (light 
aircraft) 
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Nodifications for ASSESS II 
Improve computer control. 
", 
Add internal calibration source. 
Change wavelength of passband. 
Add second TV camera :md disc 
memory. Extend controls 'to 
Spacelab rack. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Add backup laser. Change 
optical design. Add AnDAS inter-
face. 
Nodify equipment to fit Spacelab 
rack. Add AnDAS interface. 
Remove reference detector. 
Simplify signals. Extend 
controls to Space1ab rack. 
Automate Signal selection. 
Add tape recorder. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Automate to reduce PI duty cycle. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Add AnDAS interface. Nodify gas 
flm\' sys tem. Change to closed-
port operations. 
Redesign laser package, power 
suppl.ies, cooling, and gas £10\\,. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Delete experiment data system., 
Add AnDAS interface. 
Extend controls to Spacelab rack. 
Reconfigure for CV-990. Dele,te. 
spectrum analyzer. 
a. Infrared Astronomy Experiment 
Figure 5. ASSESS II Experiments 
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b. Airglow Wave Structure Experiment 
Figure 5 continued 
c . LIDAR Data Handllng Equipment 
Figure 5 ontinupd 
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provision of a s~itable transmitting window to preserve cabin pressurization. 
The experiment ",/ilS also electromagnetically shielded with screening to reduce 
-", EMI radiation measured during the ESA integration at Porz-Wahn (sec. 3.4.1) • 
. ,The tIDAR equipment included a backup laser that could be remotely switched 
. into the experiment from the pIs operatinB position. 
~lliD (Nedical Experiment) Aside from sensors and small tape recorders 
worn by the payload crew, the airborne p01:;tion of the medical experiment 
consisted only of the monitor and ADDAS interface unit shown in figure Sd 
at the pIs position. The pIss periodically plugged their sensor systems into 
the control rack to monitor the measurements or feed inputs into the ADDAS 
system to provide recorded quick-look data for the PI. 
CTN (Chromospheric Temperature Measurement) Main controls for the C'fH 
experiment were mounted on one of the Spacelab racks as shown in figure Sd. 
The remainder of the equipment was mounted in the aft cabin as shown in 
figure 5e. (The dewar which housed the detector is not shown.) The dewar 
was pumped during flight to maintain a liquid. helium temperature of 2K or 
lower at the detector. Other principal components of the experiment are 
indicated in the photograph. 
,EM! (Electromagnetic Interference) m-tI sensors, consisting of 15 current 
sensors and four voltage sensors, were located at various test points leading 
to the experiments and in the aircraft power supply. These probes were sampled 
sequentially and signals were frequency analyzed over the range from dc 
to 500 ~mz using the equipment shown in figure Sf. 
SAR (Synthetic Aperture. Rada.!2 Figure 5g ShO'''8 a photograph of the 
radar generators and control electronics which WllS taken while the equipment 
was in a test area. The transmitters were located in tho aft cargo hold 
during flight. Radar o1n.tennas were located on the rear door of the aft cargo 
compartment. Data was recorded on optical recorders (not shown) for later 
processing. 
NLS (Hicrowave Limb Sounder) MLS equipment is showu in figure Sh. The 
radiometer/spectrometer was podtioned at an angle to the window to avoid 
viewing the wingtip. The very low level output microwave signal was amplified 
by a special low-noise amplifi{;r. Nost operating functions for this experi-
ment were controlled by a m:f.nicomputer locoted in one of. the Spacelab racks. 
LAS (Laser Absorption Spectometer) The main components of the LAS 
experiment are shown in figure 5i as mounted in the forward cargo compartmerlt. 
The unit contained two lasers (a signal and a reference laser, the wavelengths 
of which were absorbed and passed by ozone, respect:f.vely), the optics for 
transmitting and receiving, 811cl a dew<l<.r contained detector for each beam. 
l~e detectors were cooled to 77K by liquid nitrogen. 
1HB.. (Infrared HeteE~,cJYlle Radiometer) The IHR experiment is shown in 
f:tgure Sj. This experiment, like the LAS, contained two lasers and dewar 
21 
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d . Chromospheric Temperature Measurement Control 
a~d Medical Monitor Panels 
Figure 5 continued 
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e. Chromospheric Temperature Measurement Experiment 
Figure 5 continued 
f. Electromagnetic Interference Experiment 
Figure 5 continued ORIGINAL P GE 
OF P R UALlTY 
o 
o 
o 
g. Synthetic Aperture Radar Experiment 
Figure 5 continued 
h. Microwave Limb Sounder Experiment 
Fi~ure 5 continued 
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i . Laser Absorption Spectrometer Detector System 
Figure 5 continued 
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j. Infrared Heterodyne Radiometer Expert ent 
Figure 5 concluded 
• - • ,,-.:",...........r;'ift:;';7.....,.., - -'''- r ,-
_ • .' Itt. ' 01 ~ l i, • 
ERMANIU 
STABILIZED MIRROR 
ELECTRO ICS 
LASER COOLI G U IT 
LASE R AND DETECTOR 
HOUSING 
cont~ined detectors. However, unlike the LAS, the IHR lasers were used as 
local oscillators in a heterodyne sense such that the local oscillator laser 
signal and the received signal were mixed to produce an intermediate frequency. 
Laser frequencies were chosen to be absorbed and passed by ozone. Detectors 
were cooled tonK by liquid nitrogen. This experiment was also used to 
view the sun. using a stabilized mirror to direct the signal. 
AEES (Airborne Electromagnetic Environment Survey) Antennas for th~ 
three fixed frequency receivers were mounted on passenger window blanks in' 
the right rear of the aircraft, while those for the swept frequency receiver 
were mounted in the nadir general purpose pylon. Because of the high 
frequencies involved, the swept receiver was mounted in the rear cargo 
hold adjacent to the antennas. All other radio frequency related components 
were mounted in the Spacelab rack number 2. 
3.1.3 Payload Configuration 
Figure 6a shows the configuration of the payload as it was mounted in the 
CV-990 aircraft cabino Additional equipment for some experiments was located 
in the cargo compartments (fig. 6b). A photograph of the payload looking 
aft in the aircraft cabin is shown in figure 7. Particular attention is 
called to the five Spacelab-type racks installed in the forward area to 
centralize controls of experiments. This was the main operating:(area for 
three of the four piSs.. \\ 
General features of the Spacelab-type racks built for this mission are 
shown in figure 8 0 The.se racks, while patterned after Spacelab racK design, 
had to be somewhat shorter to fit Within the CV-990 cabin. The pullout writing 
surfaces included a shallow drawer in which the PiSs could store frequently 
required references and log books. Some experiment components in these racks 
were mounted on drawer slides to allow front side access to internal parts in 
case of equipment problems. Figures 9a through 9c show photographs and equip-
ment layouts for these racks o Guidelines applied in developing the layout 
of experiment components in the racks were the following: 10 The center of 
gravity and overturning moment of each rack had to be within specified limits, 
2. the components for a given experiment were grouped as closely as possible, 
and 3. experiment groupings were arranged to permit each pIs the best possible 
access to the experiment controls for whiqi,h he was assigned responsiblity. 
Using these guidelines, the analytical.infegration processes (section'3.3.2) 
initiated layouts for these racks. Achieving the final rack layout shown 
was an iterative process that continued up to the time of final installation. 
Figures 9a through 9c also indicate the areas of responsiblity of piSs 1, 
2, and 4 respectivelyo The MED experiment was the basic responsiblity of 
PiS 4. although the experiment required all of the flight crew to plug into 
the MED panel periodicallyo Rack 2 contained equipment to be operated by both 
PiSs 1 and 2, but this area of physical interference led to little difficulty 
in operations. 
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pIs 3' s sole' experiment responsib11ty was 9peration of the IRA (aside 
from participation in the MEn experiment mentioned above). The extensive IRA 
equipment was contained in five CV-990 standard racks grouped a.round the 
telescope as shown in figure 6a. It was decided early in the ASSESS II I' 
project not to alter this arrangement which had originally beep used for ASSESS 
I, because of the cost involved to move the necessary control equipment to 
Spacelab racks. It was logically grouped for pIS 3 operation of the IRA 
experiment so his main position was as shown in figure 6a instead of at the 
Spacelab racks with the other pISs. 
3.2 Management Operations 
The management organization for ASSESS II, shown in figure 3, appears 
complex with a large number of organizations involved. However, with the 
exception of ARC participation in ASSESS II and the Mission S~eering Group, 
which is not planned for Spacelab, the remainder of the ASSESS II management 
organization closely represents the re,lationships presently envisioned to 
carry out a Spacelab ndssion with a combined NASA and ESA payload. 
Mission tolanagement 
The Mission }1anager concept for payload management is planned for Spacelab, 
and the application of this concept in ASSESS II was the first experience in 
exercising the concept throughout an entire Spacelab-like mission. 
Serious efforts were made to handle all aspects of mission operations in 
a Space1ab-like manner. the Nission Manager at NSFC assumed overall responsiblity 
for the payload. System Level Payload Integration* and payload flight operations 
were carried out under MSFC management. Launch site integration, analogous 
Spacelab level III, II, and I, was managed by KSC. JSC set up a Mission Control 
Center at ARC and managed flight operations. 
ESA/SPICE managed the ESA portion of the payload. Hhile SPICE represen-
tatives worked hand-in-hand with U.S. participants to acquire and clarify 
interface data for final payload integration at ARC, they also worked closely 
with the European experimenters to prepare their experiments, and conducted 
an integration and flight operations simulation of the ESA portion of the 
payload before delivery to the U.S. 
The Mission Manager initially appointed to the ASSESS 11 program was also 
the NSFC Mission Manager assigned to Spacelab 2. From the start, pressure 
of Space1ab 2 activities was such that he virtually had no time for ASSESS II 
*Note: For the ASSESS II project as herein reported, System Level Payload 
Integration is ana1agous to the plan for Spacelab 1 to integrate and test 
the entire payload at MSFC prior to its shipment to the launch site at KSCn 
Some refer to this stage of integration as I.evel IV integration and this term 
is also used in this report for brevity~ 
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related activities. Thus, th~ ~ISFC Assistant Mission Manager assumed responsi-
bility for most ASSESS II activities with the Mission Manager participating 
in only highest level decisionso The Assistant Manager filled in well, but 
did not have sufficient authority to handle all problems effectivelyo Support 
for planning of ASSESS II slowed significantly and the final analytical 
;i.ntegration was seriously deficient. (See secUon 3.3.2.) MSFC'Management 
assigned a new Mission Manag~r in January 1977, but by that time many of the 
experimenters were bypassing~ the Mission Manag~r's staff and dealing directly 
with ARC to solve their integration problems in order to meet schedule. 
The Mission Manager's staff was supported by personnel assigned from 
various divisions and branches at MSFC. The table below summarizes Mission 
Manager and staff effort used by MSFC to carry out their responsibilities. 
Mission Management 
Science 
Engineering 
Mission Planning 
Ground Operations 
POCC 
18 man-months 
12 
1 
9 
20 
19 
79 man-mon ths 
A support staff of 15 participated in the first analytical integration 
(section 30 3.2). The support dropped to a few key people between analytical 
integrations, but was augmented when the new Mission Manager became active. A 
tot3~ Qf 13 MSFC people participated during Systems Level Payload Integration 
eff\">rt at ARC (section 3.4 0 2). 
Early in the ASSESS II project (~~rch 1976) MSFC drew up a list of Mission 
Manager" s responsibilities. These are given as follows: 
- Determines compatibility of experiments in aircraft; 
... Groups individual experiments and their objectives into conunon payloads; 
- Does detailed planning of experiment placement into aircraft; 
- Plans and executes design and fabrication of experiment interface 
hardware; 
- Determines experimenters' data requirements, negotiates and schedules 
progranuners for tasks, determines data distribution dUl;'lnl'lS'.nd 
post flight; . 
Develops Mission SaJled!"tl~;. ", " 
;r.ssues Mission Operations Pl,~t1~ 
- boes all interfacing with ESA~lanagel\ient and experimenters; 
- Selects and trains all Payload Speeial1$ts; 
Issues Premission Progress Rei~o:rts; 
Conducts Flight Readiness Review; 
- Postflight mission followup; 
- Designs all conunon experiment control consoles. 
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Hany of the above Mission ~1anager responsibilities which rela.ted to 
hardware and flight operations had to be handled jointly between ~tSFC ant!, ARC, 
since ARC had responsibility for the aircraft and its operation. However, no 
written delegation of specific tasks was made to ARC, and as the project 
moved into the implementation phase, responsibility for hardware interface 
definition was not clearly established. As a result, much of the interface 
identification was not accomplished, and this led to significant operational 
problems. 
Issuance of the Mission Operations Plan was proposed ,.to be done by the 
Mission Manager, but WClS assigned to JSC by the Headquarte:(s Program Manager. 
JSC issued the document under a revised title called the Mission Implementation 
Plan. 
Of the other proposed Hission Manager responsibilities, selection and 
training of NASA and ESA 11/8s was handled independently by NASA/NSFC and E8A! 
SPICE until the pISs came. together at ARC for total payload integration, at 
whic:h time the NSFC nd.ssion men took charge of the pIs activities and flight 
operations. Project management progress reports were not issued. However, 
mission updates were presented by the Nission Manager at each of the five MSG 
meetings and at the two formal lWC meetings. 
At ARC, 114.5 man-months were expended to support planning and operational 
functions fOl· the payload as follows: 
Support 
of MSFC 
payload Management 36 
Engin~ering Design 14.5 
Data Systems 14 
Shop Fabrication 15.5 
Electronics Support 11 
Inspection/Safety 2.5 
Flight Planni.ng 1 
94.5 
Support 
of KSC 
0.5 
6.5 
4 
1.5 
12.5 
Support 
of JSC 
3.5 man-months 
1 
3 
7.5 man-months 
KSC expended a total of approximately 22 man-months, and used a three-man 
launch site integration management team. They were supported by ARC, who 
provided essentially all of the effor.t to accomplish integration analogous to 
the contract launch support effort planned at KSC for Spacelab. 
JSC also provided a three-man team t:o manage flight operations through the 
Nission Control Center at ARCo Flight operations necessarily require'd strong 
support by ARC for flight track planning. The JSC effort totalled approximately 
12 man-months. JSC issued the Nisoion Implementation Plan in February 1977. 
42 
m 
m 
ID 
U 
,Uithin NASA, the paylQad mission management effort at HSFC and ARC totalled 
173.5 man-months. The KSC effort combined with ARC support to handle launch 
site integration l~as 34.5 man-months, and the JSC effort together w:l.th ARC 
support to manage flight operations was 19Q5 man-months, for a NASA total of 
227 .. 5 nlan-months for payload planning and operat:lonal fftnctions., This total 
does not include PI activities, some additional support at ARC to provide 
facilities for the ASSESS project, and aircraft maintenance not properly charge-
able to the above functions., 
The ESA management effort at SPICE was conducted through their Payload 
Nanager as shown in figure 10. SPICE arranged to have DFVLR construct a CV-990 
mockup, complete with cr.ew living facilities and a POCC, at the DFVLR laboratory 
Porz-Wahn, Germany" DFVLR also provided major support effort to integrate and 
test the ESA experiments there and to conduct simulated flight operations. 
ESA concentrated a five-man team at ARC beginning with the arrival of their 
e}:perimentsD Essentially all ESA payload intt:'lrfacing was handled through the 
ESA Payload Manager, with an ESA objective of shielding the European experimenters 
from complexities of multi-oreanizational responsiblities within NASA. Thus, 
fOrI1Jill requirements to and from ESA experimenters were handled through a single 
ESA interface. ~rQtal European ;i,nvolvement through SPICE (not including ex.peri-
menters) ,,18S reported to total about 35 man-months,,-
Mission Steering Group 
A precedent had been established on earlier ASSESS missions whete a 
steering group was used to set simulation guidelines for overall conduct of the 
mission. Thus, for ASSESS II it was a logical development to create an NSG, 
and it was made up of representatives from all participating organizations. 
With the payload divided almost equally between NASA and ESA, it was agreed 
that the group would be cochaired by the NASA and ESA Program Hanagerso Five 
MSG meetings were held during the course of the ASSESS II project, and because 
of the sigql~ficant :interest in the function of this group, minutes of the five 
meetings ar'& included as Appendix Ao 
During early phases of the project the MSG operated smoothly and success-
fully. 1-tission guidelines and objectives ~lere established and roles of the 
various participants were clarified. It must be recognized that the ASSESS 
II mission was breaking new ground relative to Spacelab management, and, 
\Jhereas much discussion had taken place regarding Spacelab management, this 
mission was the first real attenlpt to organize and completely carry out a 
comprehensive simulation of Spacelab-type activities with participants who 
were to be latel: involved in Spacelab. Thus, as expectl~d, some issues regard-
ing roles and missions of various grO\lps were sensitive;, and substantial 
jockeying and negotiation occurred, since it was generall~~ recognized that 
precedents could be established which would carry through to Spacelab'. 
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Hajor issues addressed by the }!SG were: 
Mission objectives; 
}fission guidelines; ,'\ 
Management structure and responsiblities; 
Division of the payload between NASA and ESA; 
Division of pis respon~iblity between the NASA and ESA portions 
of the payload; 
Review and agreement on the overall schedule; 
Selection and role of the Nission Specialist; 
Guidelines for nlission documentation; 
Division of Mission Scientist responsiblities between ESA and 
NASA during flight operations. 
Most of the above topics ~"ere aired and a consensus of agreement ,qas 
E)stablished within the NSG ,qithout significant problems. However, the /1 
selection and role of the N/s and the guidelines for mission documentatioC_~\ 
became issues of contention. A complete impasse developed between MSFC 
and JSC on the N/s issue and the problem ,,,as finally solved independently 
by the NASA Program Nanager ,.rho worked 11 solution through NASA Headquarters 
organi;:::ational channels and finally achieved MSFC and JSC concurrence 
(see section 3,,3.4.1). 'rhe documentation issue 'vas considered important 
since a major objective of the mission had been established to achieve an 
efficient documentation pattern for Spacelab. It was difficult to foresee 
the total project documentation needs early in the project, but the NSG 
nevertheless established an overall documentation plan as a guideline 
(see section 3.6)Q 
In general, the opportunity afforded by the NSG for all participants to 
review progress and discuss problem areas ",'as ,.,elcomed by everyone. It 
appeared that the MiS and documentation discussions ,.,ere fruitful even though 
neither of these subjects was fully resolved by the MSG. Some participants 
stated that this was the only means by which they were aware of total mission 
activitYQ However, there is a fine line between the best intentioned plan 
for a steering group to establish guidelines and provide a forum to address 
problenl areas, and a }Iission Nanager' s responsiblity to implement the mission. 
Even though the NSG was set up only for ASSESS and is not planned for Spacelab, 
the question of the usefulness and desirability for such a group for Spacelab 
mission came up for consideration. 'rhere was strong disagreement on this point 
which is discussed further under Conclusions (section 4.3). 
Nission Scientists and the Investigators' Working Group 
'rhe IWG meetings were the only opportunities for PIs to meet together for 
reports from the mission management staff as to plans and progress, and for 
the PIs to discuss their mutual problems. ESA/S1'ICE ?nd NASA/HS}?C initiated 
ear.ly independent meetings of the European and U.S. 1'Is about one year before 
flight to acquaint them wi th initial plans for the proj ect. No formal record 
of those meetings 'vas made. Later, t,vo basic nw meetings were held that 
.... _~_ _ _. .... .. ' .. _ .. "5 
all PIs were expected to attend. Specific action items were addressed and 
Ir.inutes of those meetings were prepared. 
The first basic IWG meeting, held at Porz-Wahn in July 1976, was a 
well attended meeting. Nission management presented elements of the "entire 
payload and mission operation. Plans had been developed sufficiently by that 
time to show an early layout of experiment hardware in the CV-990, an early 
version of possible flight tracks, and 1Jmany other details which resulted in 
lively discussion both among the PIs and between the PIs and mis.sien manage-
ment planners. A number of problems were identified and many solutions were 
negotiated. One case of cooperative experiment endeav1;'I,r between European and U.S. PIs resulted. J 
It was at this meeting that the PIs were inforrued'that, like Spacelab, 
there would be no flight checkout of any experiments on the CV-990 prior to 
the constrained flight period representing a Spacelab flight. Thus, they were 
committed to successful integration and thorough ground checkout to insure 
flight success o Also, at this meeting an executive session of the PIs alone 
was conducted under the chairmanship of the NASA and ESA !-1ission Scientists 
to establish their recommendations to management for the NASA and ESA Payload 
Specialists. Credentials of each proposed pIs were aired, and the PIs discussed 
the required capabilities to handle each experiment in conjunction with pis 
background and experience. Results of this exercise were considered inconclusive, 
since the PI sponsoring a given pIs was biased in his favor, ,and it was difficult 
for other PIs to gain a balanced judgment of the proposed pIs's abilities and 
aptitudes. 
The second and final H/G meeting was held at NSFC in December 1976 follow-
ing concentrated effort by mission management to establish firm payload 
integration and flight planning information. Unfortunately, the increasing 
problem w~th availability of travel funds resulted in poor attendance by the 
-PIs. Only one ESA expe1;imenter (LIDAR) was able to attend, and the ESA experi-
menters were generally represented by the ESA Hission Scientist. While he 
did an excellent job representing their interests, there was little opportunity 
to address their problems first hand or react to the plans being pursut~d. 
In general, the IWG meeti11gs were very successful. The early partial IHGs 
held in Europe and the U.S. were appropriate, and a fruitful exchange occurred 
between mission management and the PIs~ There was no real need to expend 
resources to bring all the PIs together at that early point in time. Two full 
meetings of the IWG seemed about right for the mission and they were scheduled 
at optimum times. The only serj,ous deficiency in the nvG approach for ASSESS II 
was the lack of attendance at the second meeting held in December 1976. By 
that time a more extensive intelichange with the PIs should have occurred. 
FU1;therJ 1details of the two basic nvG meetings are given in the minutes 
~~ich are reproduced as Appendix B. 
In add2tion to chairing the rWG meetings, the Hission Scientists also 
very actively participated in the process of collecting information for the 
Investigator Requirements Documents (IRDs). Both the U.S. Mission Scientist 
and his assistant traveled with the mission management team during the first 
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round"of visits to the U.S. expel:imenters for IRD information. The Assistant 
~~ssi~n Scientist was particularly effective because of his earlier experience 
on ASSESS I. In the 11\1) update effort carried out in conjunction with the 
July IWa meeting,in Por~-Waht\, both the U.S. and ESA Nission Scientists took par~.·The ESA Nission Scientist was the key ESA representative during the 
late:r round of visits to the European e>:perimenters conducted in November 
1976, and he did an c>:cellent job in assisting the PIs and in negotiating a 
number of problem areas toward solution. 
3.3 l>1ission Development 
303.1 Investigator Requirements Document 
The llm represented 11 ne,,' approach to interfncing between mission lIUl.nage-
ment and thePIso Previous space flight endeavors have .. uSlmlly involved an 
extensive series of documents to identify and. ~ie dO\o111 e~'"Periment needs betNeen 
the experir.tanter nnd spacecraft management. FOJ:--Spacelab, a plnn has been 
estnblished by NSFC t() collec,t all interface infod/.Ution in one well organized 
document and to reduce the administ;fttive burden o~ the. P! to a minilllum. 
'rhus, fer ASSESS II, the ~RD was Cl:aiit~d to serve this purpose. (For $pacelab 
t.hl' document :is now being called an Experiment Requirements Document - ERD). 
'fh~ }ussion Hauager's staH very hurriedly created the first IRU in a question 
and answer format. IRb subject areas were intended to cover every PI require-
ment irom actual hardware data int:erfaces to operational data needs during 
flight operations and even furniture requirements to ac{!ommodate the 1'1 and 
his staff. This first attempt to create an efficient document of this type 
was judgeg to be reasonably satisfactory, but with many shortcomings that 
needed to be improved. 
The 1Rl) outline ,,,as quiti:'. complete and a good attempt was made toward 
the questions in a mannel: to help the PI. Hi$sion management recognh:ed that 
tace-to-face discussions would be reqltircd to complete the I;IDs, but they 
mailed out the document to the PIs as n first step to ac:,quaint them with the. 
INlterinl. The space provided in tile docum~nt to ans, ... er each question resulted 
in a bulky appearance, which elicited a negative reaction from many PIs upon 
first exposure since the job of answering all the questions looked formidable. 
Some e...'tperimenters made a good effort unilaterally to" provide the needed data. 
Others put the IRD aside after cursory review and concentrated th~ir efforts 
on more apparent. e~pe:rim~nt hardware developnlent pt·obl~ms. 'I 
Two rounds of visits were made to nearly all PI laboratories to gain 
understanding of the e$perinlent requirements and arrive at solutions. An early 
attempt to obtain IRD~ information \.,.as (,~ .. u:ried out by a NASA managel1\ent team 
who visited the u.s. 1)18 in JUne 1976 in preparation for the £i'tst analytical 
integration effort in July. In Europ~"al\ IRD was sent to each experimenter 
and then the ESA/SPICE l'rogram Nanager visited inuivid\l8l lnboX'atories to 
expedite IRD action. The resultant IRDS wet'e sent to the. Hission Nanager at 
NSFC in preparation fot: analytical integration. 
A second and fiual round Qf discnssions , ... ith each PI i1\ the U.S. and in 
Europe, using Il{.l)s of some\ihat revised !;ormat, WllS c.arried out in Novembe.r 
1916 b)' a NASA management t<'am (pItlS ~)ll ESA repr~seuta tive ill Europe) in pt'e-
, 'J 
'paration for the second and final analytical integration activity. This was 
a very concentrated effort to complete the IRDs. Discussions,:were extensive 
and tedious, but extremely important since the information established would 
not only set the pattern of actions to be taken by the experimenter at his 
laboratory to p:r:epare for the flight mission, but would also establish the 
pattern of actions to be taken by mission management in preparing to accom-
,modate ,the experimenters upon arrival for inte,gration and flight. 
Several key problems became apparent as the meetings with each experi-
menter began to open up crucial areas. Some experimenters, especially those 
who were little experienced in operations away from their own laboratories, 
did not appreciate the multitude of interface items which had to be settled 
for benefit of their own successful experiment operation and conduct of their 
affairs during integration and flighto In many cases, initial hurried attempts 
to address complex issues soon settled down and it usually required not only 
extensive discussion with the PI but also substantial support from his staff 
~s well to establish understanding. Completeness of the material covered 
by the IRDs did an excellent job of opening many subjects to the experimenters' 
attention and forced earlier planning than might have been the case. Some 
complieaticn was introduced by forej.gn language difficulties when th-= li.S. 
~issioll management team visited European experimenters' laboratories, but 
this was not serious. 
A significant shortcoming of the IRD format was the overlap in infor-
rna tion req ues ted in the various sec tions. This 'r:esul ted in considerable was te 
of time during the field visits. Also, it became increasingly obvious that 
interpreta tion of the nm language varied subs tan tially, no t only on an 
individual basis, but particularly bett.een engineers on the. mission management 
side and scientists on the PI side. Substantial improvement of the 1RD format 
and wording of the specific questions are needed to make such a document effici-
ently useful for Spacelab. All experiments differ in their requirements -
yet it is desirable to have only a Single document format for general use with 
minimum redundancyo This is difficult, and it is to be expected that such a 
document for general SpaceL"lb use will improve wi th experience. 
It became painfully apparent that interviewer expertise in each technical 
area of carrier vehicle operation was needed in every meeting (i.e., me.chanical, 
electrical, data handling, safety, etc.) Perhaps the most serious omission 
was not to include a di. ta expert during any of the visi t.3 to the experimenters' 
laboratories. As the later integration effort developed at Porz-Wahn and ARC, 
this was an area of siflnificant difficulty, and even though the problems tolere 
such that total solutions probably could not have been fully achieved in advance, 
a better understanding during the interface discussions would certainly have 
been beneficial. 
The two rounds of IRD discussion seemed about right for the ASSESS II 
project, and even though much information was still lacking, understandings 
had reached a point where added or revised materiAl could have been gathered 
by telephone discussion. Although some further communication occurred with 
experimenters to address specific problems, the IRDs were not updated o While 
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the two sets of IRDs from the first and second interview efforts were never 
consolidated, these documents were the basis for the two analytical integra-
tions conducted in July and December, 1976. After that, with no further updating, 
the IRlls quickly became obsolete. EXperimenters dealt directly with individual 
project managment personnel on a more informal basis (usually by telephone or 
TWX) to solve interface problems. Thus, the IRD approach which started quite 
well,was never carried to completion on ASSESS II, and no full record of 
interfaces for each experiment was avaj.lable for reference:) 
Mission management was criticize,d by some of the experimenters because 
the IRDs were not cleaned up and fed' back to the experimenters for their approval 
and use. As a result, the longhand ~~rsions were quickly duplicated and ret-
urned to all experimenters a few months before launch, but much of the material 
was hardly readable and no further interaction occurred with the experimenters 
regarding the IRDs. 
In spite of the IRD difficulties, there seemed to be general agreement 
that the IRD approach is sound. Recommendations for improving the IRD process 
are given in section 4.4.2. 
Analytical Integration 
The two analytical integration efforts conducted in July and December 
1976 were accomplished at NSFC by ad hoc groups enlisted at NSFC and supported 
by representatives from KSC, JSC, and ARC. 
The first analytical integration effort took one week. It was well 
staffed and organized into five teams to address integrated mission planning 
(flight path planning), mission operations (POCC planning), payload specialist 
operations, ground operations (mai.nly preflight payload integration), and flight 
vehicle payload layout~ NSFC applied 15 people.to this effort supplemented by 
one from KSC and t\110 from ARC. The preliminary information about the experi-
ments then available from the Ilills permitted a good start in general planning 
for the mission and pinpOinted areas where further information was needed. 
With the initial input of ARC flight planners to set bounds for aircraft 
operation, and the PI desires expre~)sed in the IRDs for experiment objectives, 
the flight planning group developed a variety of proposed aircraft flights, 
both day and night, to acconmlodate nearly all requirements. In conjunctlon 
with these plans, general time lines were developed for the payload flight crew 
(payload specialists) to carry out the necessary activities to prepare and 
operate the experiments, to obtain data, and allow for necessary periods of 
eat, sleep, and other personal requirements. Initial planning was accomplished 
for POCC operation. A fi~st layout was prepared for physical accommodation 
of all experiments on the aircraft. Also, a good preliminary plan w~s worked 
out among HSFC, KSC'~ and ARC for integration of the payload on the hangar 
floor (corresponding' to Spacelab Level IV integration) and integration of the 
payload onto the airl.:raft (corresponding to a combination of levels III, 
n, and I for Spacelab) 0 
,~ __ ._ .. __ ~9 . ___ ._ .. _____ .. 
The second analytical integration at ~1SFC in December 1976 had the benefit 
of much better inputs from the just completed second version of IRDs resulting 
from a new round of discussions with the experimenterso Unfortunately, however, 
less manpower was available at ~FC for the second analytical integration 
than for the firsto Thus, results of the second and final analytical integration 
effort we:re limited. The teams were organized much like the first effort. MSFC 
was able to assign only eight people to the task, supplemented again by a 
representative from KSC and. four from ARC. By tM.s time a Mission Specialist 
fr.om JSC had been identified and he, along with the two U.S. pISs from JPL, • 
actively pursued flight crew planning. 
General results of the second analytical integration effor.t were: some 
refinement of payload tntegration activities, additional planning for the 
proposed flight tracks, further planning for payload'configuration in the 
flight vehicle, extensive layout and operational planning for the POCC, and 
detailed preliminary planning for the HIs and U.S. pIs timelines. Some effort 
,,,as made to identify documentation requirements for the overall project, 
but that effort was very limited. 
Some work was done during the second analytical i'ntegration to establish 
plans for data transmission from the flight vehicle and to arrange for quick-
look data processing in the poce, but little effort was expended until much 
later to insure proper data interfacing and processing between the instr.uments 
and the onboard data processing system. No data system experts were brought 
jnto the IRD effort except very briefly during the IWG meeting in Europe. As 
stated earlier, no data experts participated in the IRD tours, therefore the 
information was inc.omplete so that total analytical integration of this area 
was not possible. 
In summary, the two analytical integration efforts were successful as 
far as they went. It would have been better if the early large effort could 
have been spread to the second analytical integration period when IRD data 
then available would have permitted a greater depth of planning which by that 
time was sorely needed. Further concentrated analytical integration effort 
was also needed as flight time Clpproached, but. was not applied. The result 
was lack of completed flight and ground operations requirements documents from 
the Mission Manager to those who needed them until the need time had passed. 
lvith integration solUtions necessarily being worked out on an individual-
to-individual basis, total configuration of the payload was not identified 
in sufficient detail for flight vehicle integration. This led to some time 
consuming problem solvj.ng during flight vehicle integration. For ASSESS II, 
the payload was small enough so that most safety and configuration details 
which had not been fully identified could be successfully worked out on an 
ad hoc basis as payload installation proceeded. For Spacelab, analytical 
integration requirements obviously should be carried only to the extent neces-
sary, and some level of informality is probably appropriate to save cost. 
However, the limited analytical integration effort and lack of payload inter-
face identification on ASSESS II led to extensive informality whichre.sulted 
in significant problems for almost every experiment. 
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3.3.2.1 Flight Planning for Disparate Objectives 
The PIs were requested to enter in their IRDs the flight track parameters 
, that they desired for their experiments during data-take periods, including 
all relevant requ.irements that would allow them to collect a complete package 
of, scientific dat~'during the ASSESS II mission. Parameters to be included 
were altitude, heading, profiles, patterns!, desired objects of observation, 
etc. This was done, but with considerable variation in the level of detail. 
Only four PIs gave priorities among the possible flight tracks they desired, 
and only one gave exact coordinates for gI:ound target overflights. In this 
section, the difficulty!n satisfying diverse mission objectives is illustrated 
by a comparison between the PI flight requests in their IRDs and the flights 
which mission management finally was able to provide. While the ASSESS II 
experience in this regard was unique to aircraft operations, Spacelab can be 
expected to face similar difficu1ties, even though for different reasons, 
if the payload objectives cannot be well match~d. 
ASSESS II flight tracks can be categorized into those that required maxi-
mum altitude and exact heading (astronomical objects and solar viewing), those 
that required maximum altitude independent of heading (upper atmospheric 
physics), and those which had less severe al titude and heading l"equirements 
but requiI:ed overflight of specific ground coordinates (nadir viewing experi-
nlents). Requirements to fly each of these flight track types were pxoesent in 
ASSESS II planning. Combination of the first and last type of objectives 
(astronomy and gxoound targets) was particularly difficult to achieve and led 
to most of the compromises of PI desires for nadir viewing. Astronomy was 
aSSigned high l:>riority, thus overflights of specific targe.ts could not always 
be accomplished. Tables 3 through 6 shm~ experimenters' desires versus final 
flight plans. 
It must be rec.ognized that, as a starting point, the PIs were given complete 
latitude in requesting desired flight requirements. and this was proper to 
establish maximum bounds for flight planning considel,"ation. Obviously, flight 
planners could not possibly accommodate all the requests and, using priorities 
established by mission management, they arranged the flights to allow the 
greatest possible opportunity for data retrieval. Thus, in some cases there 
was wide disparity between the original PI request and the actual flight 
opportunity. 
The IR astronomy PIs (Neudon, Groningen, and NPI) submitted a list of 
IR targets in the IRDs with viewing pl.'iorities, but openly negotiated that 
they be allowed to add other objects of more consuming interest during the 
pl,"eflight pe'tiod so long as the added objects had basically the same celestial 
coordinates (right ascension and declination) as those in the ol,"iginal list, 
so that previous plans would remain approximately valid. Accordingly, add-
itional target nnmes were submitted as late as December 1976, with specific 
IR targets in the galactic plane not named until after the second analytical 
integration (table 3). The planners were able to incoporate a reasonable 
number of first and second pdority targets into the flight: plans (the prime 
calibration sources, Jupiter and Nars, weI:e sinlply not available during the 
mission). Real-time flight planning (sect:i,on 3.5.1.1) modified viewing times 
in.several instances and introduced two unplnnned activities for "targets of 
OPPol."tunity" • 
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U ~ ~ Table 3 - Desir/ed vs. Actual Observations -- IR Astronomy 1 
Targf/!ts I\~~, .... !./ Scheduled Viewing Time ;j >:1 
m 
~,.: 
i:: 
» 
. 
1 
-- -
-_ .. , 
Priority Requested 
"> Requested Analytical Actual 
D . ~ 
in IRDs later Integration Flight 
, 
1 Jupiter 
D 
~ Nars 
t+-l7 235 min 265 min 
N-8 40 40 
GalactiC plane 110 135 
U K-350 65 65 G-45 40 25 
Sagittarius A 
0 p-Oph Arcturus R-Cr-A 90 90 
n 
MonR2. 
S-140 70 70 
S-88 
S-235 
0 ON-l W-75 
DR-2l 
u ! 2 Saturn 185 180 NGC-7000 
IC-1396 25 60 
n NGC-7027 IC-4l8 
W-3 
D G-333.6-0.2 3 NGC-l068 
D W-5l Venus 0 10 Sun 0 10 
0 
m 
u 
u 
52 0 
- ...... UCtPII 
Table 4 - Desired vs. Actual Observations for Solar Viewing Experiments 
Experiment Altitude - km Flights 
Desired Actual Desired Actual 
'I ,-
eTM 6.2 10.2, 10.8 As many as 2 fUghts 
possible. 
IHR 4.6-12.3 10.2 Two flights One. flight 
with low instead of 
sun elevation. two. 
10.8 One flight One flight 
with Mgh as requested. 
sun elevation. 
Table S - Desired vs. Actual Observations for Atmospheric Physics Experiments 
Experiment Altitude - km Flights 
Desired Actual Desired Actual 
AWS As high as >9.3 All night 5 night 
possible. flights. 2 night-to-day 
Turned. off at 
dawn; could not 
operate Oll 
day flights. 
aTM Any. ::'9.3 Day & night. S night 
2 night-to-day 
2 day 
. 
MLS >9.3 ~9.3 Day & night. S night 
generally 2 night-to-day 
2 day 
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Two PIs expressed a desire to view the sun. eTM wanted all sun flights, 
:if that had been possible, to dete1;'mine the temperature of its chromosphere, 
and IHR wanted three sun flights to use the sun as a light source to study 
ozone in the earth's atmosphere. Table 4 shows their desires compared with 
what they were able to fly. CTM finally obtained only two sun viewing hours 
out of the "total of 46 data-take hours. 
The desires of PIs interested in physics of the upper atmosphere are 
listed in t.ble 5. Their requests were easily incorporated into the flight 
plans since neither aircraft heading nor geographic position was imPil?irtant. 
Howeverr, as originally planned, AWS could not be operated in ambient'1ight 
levels that approached dayli.ght intensity, and therefore had to be turned off 
during 13 of the 46 data-take hours. 
Requests of some of the PIs with nadir viewing experiments were cunsider-
ably compromised. This was primarily because priority weighing for astronomy 
:in most cases precluded the inefficient flight patterns necessary Lo divert 
over exact geographical sites not on the astronomy track, and particularly 
the inefficiency of performing vertical profiles over the geographical target, 
unless the target overflight occurred near the beginning or end of a flight 
period to eliminate the necessity to climb back to altitude. 
Requests of PIs with nadir viewing experiments and results of integrated 
missi.on flight planning are listed in table 6. Few of their desires were 
fully incorporated into the flight plans. The IHR PI desired to study the 
diurnal formation of ozone in the Los Angeles area, and to calibrate his 
instrumentation he needed to do an altitude profile over a ground site simul-
taneous with release of an instrumented balloon (table 6a). Three overflights 
were correlated with ground-truth balloon releases, but no simultaneous altitude 
profiles were included in the flight plans. Three flights were requested in 
the Los Angeles area. The same track ,qas to be flown each time, but at differ-
ent times of day. As shown on the table, the IHR type of track over Los Angeles 
was scheduled only on flight eight. Transit flights over Los Angeles were 
scheduled on flights two and six, but they could not be made to match the IHR 
requirements. Thus, the IHR ground-truth calibrations were compromised, and 
ozone measurements over a heavily populated and industrial area (Los Angeles) 
were limited. 
The LAS PI was also interested in ozone measurements over the Los Angeles 
area, as well as in four other areas (table 6b). His desires were consider-
ably better met than those of the IHR PI. Four of the five areas of interest 
required direct traverses and could be included. The pattern flight requested 
over the Los Angeles area was finally fitted into the last flight. 
The AEES PI specified tht:ee prioritized groups of cities to be monitored 
primarily during daylight hours (table 6c). Not all of the cities could be 
included, and only LO$ Angeles and San Francisco were measured during day-
light. 
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Table 6 - Special Flight Characteristics - IRD Requests VS o Actuai Flights 
a. IHR EXPERlltENT 
Targets A1 ti tude - km Horizontal Pattern 
Requested Actual Requested Actual Requested Actual 
-
LA industrial Flight 2 9.1-12.2 10.7 Downwind at 0200, not 
area plus 0500, 0800, downwind. 
open farmland and 2200 hrs. 
and water for 
reference. 
Flight 6 
" 8.8 " 0100, not downwind. 
Flight 8 
" 10.7-5.2 " 0850, not 
in 1.5 km overwater. 
steps. 
Flight 9 
" 9.4 " 1400, patterns for LAS. SAR, 
and LIDAR. 
Ground truth Flight 1 Profile 11.3 only No special One pass. 
Boulder, CO request. 
Ground truth Flights 3, No special 10.1, 10.7, No special One pass. 
Great Falls, MT 4, & 5 request. 10.7 request. 
Table 6 continued 
b. LAS EXPERIMENT 
Targets Altitude - km Horizontal Pattern 
Requested Actual Requested Actual Requested Actual 
Los Angeles, Flight 2 All data 10.7 "'East to \'1est One south-to-
sunrise to 0200 hrs. under 10.1 with immediate north pass. 
sunset. retrace. ~ 
Flight 6 
" 
8.8 
" 
One north-to-
0100 hrs. south pass. 
Flight 8 
" 
10.7 down 
" 
Approx. east 
0850 hrs. to 5.2 in to west, no 
1.5 km steps retrace. 
Flight 9 
" 
9.4 
" 
As requested. 
1505 hrs. I 
Kitt Peak No flight. 
" 
Single pass, 
Observatory +10 km. 
-
San Diego Flight 6 
" 
8.8 One pass. As requested. 
San Joaquin Flight 8 
" 
9.4 No special One pass. 
Valley request. 
San Francisco Flight 8 " 5.2 No special LIDAR pattern. 
Bay request. 
General: Achieved. 
unpopulated 
areas, over ) 
clouds, over 
water. 
Table 6 continued 
c. AEES EXPERIMENT 
Targets Altitude - km Horizontal Pattern 
Requested Actual Requested Act:ual Requested Actual 
0 
priority 1 Los Angeles ~ CA Flights 2, Above 7.6 Achieved, No special 
6, 8, 9 except requests. 
profile 
on flight 8. 
prioritY.2 San Diego, CA Flight 6 Above 7.6 8.8 
~::::.. 
Portland, OR Flights 3,4 Above 7.6 11.3'~ 
., 
--) 
Phoenix, AZ Not flown '. 
priority 3 Denver, CO Flight 1 Above 7.6 11.3 
Salt Lake Flight 3 Above 7.6 10.2 
City, UT -
, . 
Albuquerque, Not flown 
RM 
-" 
l 
I 
\ 
I ~ 
l':lO 
I 
i' 
priority 1 
priority 2 
priority 3 
priority 4 
priority 5 
priority 6 
1 ' 
Targets 
Requested Actual 
Salt Lake Flight 3 
Desert-Utah 
Death Valley- Flight 8 
CA ~ 
Ocean surface Flights 6&7 
features 
LA basin Flight 9 
Salt seeps- Flight 3 
Montana & Montana 
North Dakota only 
Crop identi- No flight 
fication-
Kansas 
Table 6 continued I 
d. SAR ElCPERlMENT 
Altitude - ~~j . Horizontal Pattern 
c . 
'~~ 
Requested Actual Requested Actual 
7.6-1202 10.2 Pattern As requested. 
specified. ~ 
~ 
7.6-12.2 9.4 Pattern As requested. 
specified. 
7.6-12 .. 2 10.2 Pattern Not over 
specified. specified area. 
7.6-12.2 I 9.4 Pattern As reques ted. specified. 
-;.-;:.;' 
7 .6-li~~2 10.1 Pattern As requested. 
specified. 
7.6-12.2 Pattern 
specified. 
Table 6 concluded 
s.~ 
e. LIDAR EXPERI}ffiNT ;J~, 
I ~~ ~> /, 1,-.5 
t toot 
l Targets Altitude - km Horizontal Pattern -8.,; 
I - ~~ Requested Actual Requested Actual Reauested Actual ~~ 
Ground truth- End of Above 0.3 & 2.7 {o;'i.thin 5 km As requested. 
Henlo Park, flight 2. under 5.0. of target. 
CA. At least 
once-beginning I 
and end each 
l.n flight. \.0 
Ground truth- Flight 5 ,1:\ " 11.9 Single pass, Two passes. 
Colstrip, HT any heading. 
~ 
San Francisco Flight 8 " 5.2 4-leg mapping 3 of 4 legs 
pattern, as l'f;'quested. 
downwind. 
Los Angeles Flight 2 LA " 10.2 " Single pass 
or San Diego Flight 6 LA " 8.8 " Single pass 
Flight 8 LA 
" 10.2 - 5.2 " 
Flight 9 LA fI 9.4 Box pattern Box pattern 
around city. as requested. 
Flight 6 SD Above 0.3 & 8.8 Single pass. 
under 5.0. 
Tucson, AZ No flight. " " 
The SAR PI specified six targets, assigned each a priority, and provided 
exact coordinates of the pattern desired to be flownovt~r each of the targets 
(table 6d). Most of the SAR t~rgets were incorporated into flight plans. 
However, the priority 3 overwater flight requested was not accomplished because 
neither of the two overwater flights scheduled included the ground-truth sit~ 
specified in the ~IRD, so were of little interest to the PI. 
The LIDAR experimenter, whose instrument detected aerosols below the air-
craft, wished to study the industrial environments of San Francisco and Los 
Angeles or San Diego using Tucson, Arizona as a nonindustrial reference, and 
to calibrate his instrumentation by comparing airborne observations with those 
made by ground based LIDAR systems in Menlo Park, California and Colstrip, 
Nontana (table 6e). Aircraft altitude constraints for LIDAR were severe because 
laser safety considerations placed a lower limit of one kilometer on operational 
altitudes, and preferable altitudes dictated by instrument sensitivity were 
less than 4.a km at night and 3.0 kIn d4ring the day. Resultant flights for 
the LIDAR PI were a 5.2 km daylight flight over the San Francisco area in a 
pattern approximately as desired, and a proper box pattern over Los Angeles 
during daylight but at 9.4 km. The Tucson, Arizona reference measurement 
could not be included and the Colstrip, Montana calibration was flown at 
11.9 km ins tead of the lower al ti tude reques ted. 
Tables 3 through 6 indicate the complexity introduced into flight planning 
when the payload includes experiments from unrelated scientific disciplines. 
In general, PIs had to settle for less than they desired because, after extensive 
flight planning trad~offs, it was impossible to include all facets of the 
PIs' requests into the flight tracks, Only the }~S PI achieved most of his 
objectives in the flight plans primarily because almost any flight path at 
high altitude, day or night, was suitable. Some PIs got complete data packages, 
but had to settle for fewer targets (IRA, SAR), or less time on prime target 
(CTM, AWS). Some data packages were compromised due to lack of desired ground-
truth calibration (IHR, LIDAR) and one data package was severely compromised 
by not repeating a flight pattern at appropriate times (IHR). 
3.3.3 Paylo~d Specialist Selection and Training 
All of the piSs were interviewed by the ASSESS II Observer Team and each 
ESA pis was required by SPICE to submit a report about his experiences. Infor-
mation from these sources as well as general observation of activities by the 
team has been used to prepare the following sections and the discussion in 
section 3.5.1 covering operational effectiveness of the piSs. ThUS, the 
discussion regarding selection, trainins, and operations by the piSs represents 
their point of view as well as that of the observers. 
An early ground rule was established for ASSESS II that ESA would 
select piSs specifically to operate the European experiments and NASA would 
select piSs to operate only the V.S. experiments. That decision was driven 
by funding limitations which precluded inftercontinental travel for experiment 
operational training, but secondarily, there was hardly enough time in the 
schedule for pis training on all the experiments, and also there was a real 
question as to whether it made sense to dilute pis expertj.se too widely over 
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many experiments. Only the European medical experiment involved all the 
pISs and it "Nas 'agreed that the U.S. pISs would train for that, begiuning 
with the integration period at ARC. 
" All pIs nomiJ;lees for ASSESS II were required to meet Class III aviation 
flight crew standards c That was the only basic requirement. With the ground 
rule of separate responsibilities fdr the ESA and NASA PISs, ESA and NASA then 
each selected two pISs for flight so that, with the MIs, the payload flight 
crew totaled five. The selection and backup philosophy differed significantly 
between ESA and NASA as discussed in the following. 
3.3.3.1 Selection of ESA Payload S~ecialists 
\' 
',\ 
ESA pIs candidates were nominated by partic::lpating PI organizations, 
DFVLR, and ESA. University of Southampton, England nominated two, DFVLR 
in Germany nominated six, and ESA nominated one. The PI and ESA nominations 
were made with operation ,of particular exp~riments in mind while DFVLR cho~e 
on the basis of generalized background qualifications (IR astronomy, solar 
physics, a~mospheric physics, or medicine). Fluent English was considered an 
essential qualification. 
ESA used three basic selection criteria as ,follows: 
Practical laboratory 'experience in the areas of electronics, optics, 
cryogenics; or astronomical observations; 
Scientific background appropriate to payload operations, sufficient 
to interpret data and make appropriate decisi~ns; 
Flightworthiness, i.e., adequate physical well-being, team membership 
adaptability, and response to flight environment. 
Flightworthiness was determined by a series of medical and psychological 
test.s carried out. by the DFVLR Institute of Aviation Medicine and Luftnansa 
(German Air:j.ine) Medical Office for Flight Personnel. The standards applied 
were thos~ for Flight Engineers, taken to be the position most closely appro~­
imating that of a pIs. Results of the flightworthiness testing resulted in 
low ratings for three of the candidates. 
'" " The European PIs in an IWG meeting attempted to apply the first two 
criteria to recommend pIs candidates to ESA management, but the spread in 
rating for each candidate l-iaS wide as reflected by the fact that one PI would 
rate a certain candidate "best" while the next PI rated him "worst". Neverth~ ... 
l~ss, PI recommendations were given considerable weight in pIs selection. 
ESA management, using the results of the medical and psychological tests 
along with recommendations from the European IWG, selected four pISs; a 
physicist and an electrical engineer from DFVLR, an astronomer from ESTEC 
.and a phy$;lcist from the University of Southampton, England. The decision 
as to which of the four would be prime and backup piSs was deferred until 
integration of the payload at ARC., 
, 
~-- ~ _ ... ~"'-;"L. \..._~"~~_"""""""'A-....",._~ __ ~"",-,, __ ._~~.,, ___ ~_~. __ ._~_...:.:. . ....;,~ .... 
Selection of NASA Payload Specialists 
In NASA, mis5ion ma.nagement invited each of t.hE:' PIs to nominate pISs. 
t-!o.restriction was wnde as to thl;! number to be norrinatcd. The LaRe "PI for 
lHR made an inhouse nomination, nnd the AcES PI from GSFC nOMinated 
a contractor 'l,'eprcscntative <'{orking on his expt;:riment. At JPL, sponsor of 
the other three C.S. experimonts, an organized laboriltory allpro<!ch ,.;ras used 
to advertise fer 11 IS candidate::;. Thi rty-one candida tes applied and JpL 
managclr.cnt nart'o"rcd the numbL'r to fout', of t.Jhotr. t\~0 \<1C r \0' nomj,nated for prime 
pIs positions and two as backup. At this point, the NASA Program Nanager 
and }Iission Nam.lger jointly decided that only t\.J(l U.S. PISs ,,,auld be 
chosen, and that the AssistHnt Nission Nanager from NSFC would serve as 
the 'backup U.S" pIs. This eliminated the t\vO JPL backup candidates. The U.S. 
Hom considered the rena :Lning nomineC:!s,. b\.l t almos t simul ta.neously, the GSFC and 
LaRe nominees '.,'E:n;: "~i thdr(;1'''11 leaving ot11y the t~~o f,'rime JPL candids tes. The 
AEES cxpe:rin .. ~nt from GSFC had still not been authorized for the payload at 
this time and wight have to be \~ithdrawn, $0 tl'at the AEES PI could not support: 
his nominee. In addi.tion~ limhation of funds precluded directly paying .a 
.. contractor's salary to p<.tl,ticipate as a Pis, so the non-NASA nominee proposed 
by GSFC t,'ould have had to be eliminated on that basis apart from the other 
raasons. 'fhe 1.aRe nOlninee mlS also withdra\vu for lack of resource support. 
Unfortunate-lv, these ttvo \"ltl,drm.mls eliminated viable candidates proposed by 
PIs indepe~d~nt of the ability to perfo1~1 as pISs. 'fhus, mission management 
merely accepted the two JPL prime candidates and nssigned the Assistant ?-fissiop 
Hanager as backup. One of th~ JPL candidates selected was PI on the LAS 
experiment. All ,.;rer~ tvall qualified so thHt, apart from the unplanned selection 
process) there ,,,ns gener"l accep tnncc of the final t"esul t. 
3.3.3.3 )?aylo~d Specialist Training 
The NASA and ESA training approac.hes \vere similar in tha teach consis ted 
of an initial study of expedment theory, followed by hands-on hardware 
training at the PI lab ora tori;Js and finally, experiment and payload sys tern 
training during integration. The ESA pIs training cmcompassed about 1150 
hours each for four partl.tipants. Thl? two prime Nt\SA pISs trained approx-. 
imately 900 hours each; the bnckup only about 500 hours. 
Several factors caused significant differences bet\.Jec.'r1 the NASA and 
~SA training activities. In NASA, three of the five experiments ,~ere. at 
JPL where both prime rlss were located. ThUS, productive and efficient 
involvement could take place on short notice. Because one pIS was also the 
PIon one of the JPL experiments and the other had partiCipated in construc-
tion and opera tion of another of the JPL experiments, they \vere already well 
trained on two of the. five U .. S. experiments. The AlmS experiment from GSFC 
,.,tas not authorized early enough for any training at the PI laboratory. 
training f01,' that experiment took place during the integration p~riod. 
In Europe, only one of the four piSs ~"as directly involved in the back-
ground history of one experiment - n~l1H"ly~ the University of Southampton 
pIS :who t-.1as responsible for con$truction of the AHS experiment. There ~vas 
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a longer period available to the ESA piSs for training since they were 
selected about six weeks earlier than the U.S. PiSs, but a more significant 
difference was that the ESA payload integration and operation prior to ship-
ment of the experiments to the U.S. provided almost eight weeks of concentrated 
training for the ESA piSs at SPICEo 
The general training philosophy and schedules for piSs in Europe were 
established by ESA/sPICE. All piSs were scheduled to receive training on all 
Europe~n experiments so that each pis would have a primary and secondary 
experiment operating responsibility. Subsequent to initial general training, 
the piSs ccnsidered prime for particular experiments received more detailed 
training on those experiments to the extent required to achieve operating 
; proficiencyo The training schedule was arranged so that all four pis candidates 
received concurrent initial training at the PI laboratories. Prime operational 
training generally followed on a personally scheduled basis. 
') 
The Es~p/Ss attended an initial two day orientation at ESA/sPICE during 
which the training philosophy and schedule were established. ESA management 
had requested that the PIs supply each pis with pert:i.nent information on the 
background of their experiments for study prior to the first visits to PI 
laboratories. ESA left all other details of individual training programs to 
the PIs. The ESA piSs all reported that the original packages of background 
information contained much more material than was necessary for subsequent 
opera'tion, and that they unwittingly spent too much time studying it. Also, 
they reported that they encountered considerable diversity in efficiency and 
usefulneas of training programs at the various PI laboratories. Only one 
experiment (LIDAR) was sufficiently complete so that the instrument could be 
fully operated. It was installed on a light aircraft and several flights 
were made for training purposes. All other experiments lacked one or more 
important components unti.l just prior to shipment to SPICE for integration. 
The piSs reported two instances where language comprehension proved to be a 
training obstacle. ESA piSs were unanimous in rating the period of European 
experiment integratiou activity at SPICE far superio~ to visits to PI labora-
tories for training p~rposes. 
Initial NASA training philosophy included considerable cross-training 
for the piSs. However, when funding became a problem, plans for cross-training 
were reduced to only what could be accomplished at little or no additional 
cost. Prime experiment training plans were formulated at the introductory 
U.S. IWG meeting held in September 1976. General agreements were reached on 
duration of training and dates, where travel was involved. The exact dates 
for travel to PI laboratories were later arranged via consultation of the pis 
directly with the PI. Also, mission management held a two-day orientation 
meetihg for the U.S. piSs at MSFC to initiate the training process, and to 
provide them with suitable background material for home study. 
Prime pis training on the inhouse JPL experiments was arranged in a rather 
casual way and on a time-available basis. A little cross-training was included. 
Travel was involved on only two occasions; once to the IHR laboratory and once 
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for both PiSs to fly aboard the CV-990 in fall 1976 when the payload had two 
of the planned ASSESS II experiments aboard o Some cross-training also occurred 
while the piSs were with the CV-990 mission (approximately two days). The 
AEES experiment was not funded until February 1977 which precluded training on 
that experiment until Systems Level Integration at ARC. 
The extra assignment of the NASA Assistant ~tlssion Manager as the backup 
pIs required extensive travel for training, and presented a serious conflict, 
since he really did not have er.ough time to do justice to either responsibility. 
However, he was able to visit JPL for training on MLS and SAR, and got valuable 
inflight training by accompanying prior CV-990 missions when the payloads 
included earlier versions of the ASSESS II experiments. He made one flight 
with SAR and three flights with }~S and IHR. The early CV-990 flight training 
can be considered analogous to training on high-fidelity trainers which might 
be made available prior to Spacelab flight. 
Several factors probably made the NASA home laboratory training more 
effective overall than in Europe. The NASA pISs were both already expert in 
the operation of one of their experiments. The experiments operated by one 
pIs were conceptually similar (LAS, IHR), and the laboratory training 
took place shortly before the shipment of the experiments to ARC when they 
were complete and approximately in their final flight configurations. Experi-
ment similarities lessened new operational concepts and information to digest. 
The training situation (experiment configuration) was much more realistic with 
the instruments in final configuration. 
Beginning with the System Level Integration at ARC, almost every mission 
related activity involved the PISs. This was the first opportunity for the 
pISs to work with the entire payload and served as excellent training. Both 
the ESA and NASA PISs were used extensively for integration and operation of 
the payload. At ARC the ~l/s was present from the beginning along with all 
the p/Sso The MIs was very experienced and exhibited strong leadership 
qualities. He had participated with the ESA pISs at SPICE so that he was 
already well ac.quainted with their activities, and it was natural for the 
payload crew to pursue their training very rigorously as a team under his 
leadershipo 
During System Level Integration the pISs worked closely with the PIs 
who, at this stage, were responsible for integration and operation of their 
instruments. For Launch Site Payload Processing involving integration of the 
payload onto the aircraft, the responsibility was reversed, and the pISs were 
assigned prime responsibility for experiment integration and operation with 
the PIs participating only as needed. These two integration periods along 
with the ESA integration for ESA piSs, provided by far the most fruitful 
training for the entire flight crew. 
At the onset of ARC integration activities, ESA had made a decision 
identifying the prime and backup piSs. Nevertheless, all four ESA pISs parti-
cipated together to provide assistance and to achieve further training as 
well o 
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Mission independent training consisted mainly of safety briefings con-
ducted by aircraft operations personnel at ARC prior to the flight period,. 
involving both a safety lecture and onboard aircraft safety discussions. 
The mission independent training had very little analogy to Spacelab since 
Spacelab flight will entail much more mission unique training not applicable 
to the ASSESS program. Conversely, the experiment training was highly analogous 
to that expected for Spacelab. 
The different apProaches to payload training as well as the difference in 
total training time between the ESA and NASA PiSs seemed to result in no differ-
ence in performance. The PiSs as well as the PIs all expressed confidence in 
the ability of the payload ,crew to satisfactorily handle the experiments at 
the final Flight Readiness Review. Any differences in ability among the piSs 
seemed more directly related to individual capability and personality traits 
rather than to a lack of training. 
In general, the overall PiS training was considered to be very good, and 
the only critical observation made by the piSs was that it would have been 
helpful if they could have participated early in operational design consid-
erationsoThis same observation was made by the PiSs after the ASSESS I mission. 
3.1.4 Mission Specialist Selection and Training 
3.3.4.1 Mission Specialist Selection 
The selection of a M/S was a very difficult and sensitive process. 
Responsibilities of the position ~"ere the subject of extensive debate both 
privately and at management meetings during the early phases of the ASSESS 
II project. This paralleled a larger dispute on the same subject for Spacelab 
itself. The real question centered around the extent to which a representative 
of the STS organization should be involved in payload activities o It was 
recognized that some inflight responsibilitjes will exist in Spacelab for STS 
supplied payload support systems such as the central data system, power system, 
etc. Similar systems exist on the CV-990 so that the same problem had to be 
faced. Efforts to settle this issue in the ~lSG reached an impasse and, as a 
result, the NASA Program Manager initiated a solution through NASA Headquarters 
administrative channels (OA and OSF) which ,,,as accepted by the l-fission Manager. 
Responsibilities thus assigned to the M/S are given in sectj.on 2.4.5. 
The long delay in settling the M/S role postponed M/S nomination until 
December 1976 when JSC appointed a scientist/astronaut with expertise in 
astronomy to serve as M/S and a second scientist/astronaut with similar back-
ground as backup. 
Nis~ion Specialis t Traini.M 
Both the prime M/S and the backup M/S had experience on earlier ASSESS 
missions, which, coupled with their extensive background and training as 
astronauts in the JSC program, equated to a high degree of training already 
accomplished for ASSESS II. 
The prime N/s started participation in the second analytical integration 
activity at NSFC in December 1976 inunediately following his assignment. 
While neither he nor the backup N/s spent time at PI facilities, they quickly 
developed an understanding of the experiments and the mission objectives. 
The N/s participated actively with the ESA pISs during one of the two flight 
simulation periods at SPICE. Hoth he and the backup MIs trained on carrier 
systems by accompanying a previous CV-990 mission (three flights). (The back-
up HIs received no other specific training.) During the integration,period at 
ARC, the ~l/s participated in all operational activities and worked closely 
with all the pISs during their activities. In fact, he took on a leadership 
role for pIs training activities for which every pIs later expressed appreci-
ati,on. 
The N/s achieved proficiency in all responsibilities assigned to him 
except the central data system o He operated the power system, the surface 
temperature and atmospheric '-later vapor radiometers, the video camera and 
recorder system for cloud cover data, the ENI monitor sys~am, and the ozone 
monitoring system. His late selection permitted only limited training on the 
complex central data and housekeeping systems where "ghost" participants were 
added to the payload crew, in accordance with the mission guidelines, to assist 
the HIs. AlthQugh an interactive data system terminal was available at the Nls 
station, it was not practical to extend all the controls for these syst~ms to 
his operating position, so that it would not have been possible for him 'to 
handle these systems even if he had achieved full proficiency. 
3.4 Nission Integration 
Two discrete steps were planned by NSFC mission management far integ-
ration of the ASSESS II payload in preparation for flight. Analogous 
to their plan for integration of a Spacelab payload at MSFC, they proposed 
an ASSESS II System Level Payload Integration in a test area at ARC under 
jurisdiction of MSFC. This would be followed by Launch Site Payload Processing 
onto the aircraft under jurisdiction' of KSC, analogous to the levels In~ II. 
and I planned for Spacelab by KSC. 
ESAlsPICE made an 'l :,ldependent decision to bring the European experiments 
together at SPICE for integration and operation because they felt strongly 
that this step was necessary to work out experiment hard'-lare and operational 
problems before their lines of conununication and support became too long and 
costly in the U.S. Conversely, ESA felt that once they had accomplished 
integration of their portion of the payload in Europe, very little time would 
be required to integrate their pOl,"tion of the payload into the whole at ARC. 
In fact, they preferred to skip System Level Payload Integration and go d:lrectly' 
to Launch Site Payload Processing on the flight vehicle to save their time and 
cost. 'rhe NSFC Nission Hanager insisted on ESA participati.on in the System 
Level Integration in order to assure operation of the entire payload before 
turning it over to KSC for Launch Site Processing, but did agree to a shorter 
than initially planned period for European payload preflight integration at 
ARC. 
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3.4.1. ESA Payload Integration in Europe 
The .ASSESS II integration of the ESA portion of the payload at SPICE 
follol-led the fOrIl',at which they plan for Space1ab. C:SA/SPICE arranged with 
DFVLR at Forz-Wahn, Germany to COllstruct a full scale mockup of the CV-990 
cabin to accommodate the European instruments (figures 11 and 12). Se.rious 
attempts were made to provide power and data handling systems similar to the 
planned C\I-990 installAtion. They contracted with the A}{C AlmAS computer 
contractor. to participate throur,hollt the SPICB integration to work prosramrning 
and data hl:mdlinr, problems. They borrowed ARC flight data hardware to assure 
Il d~lt\l system interface as much like the flight system as possible. DFVL}{ 
added HvinS quarters to the simulator to accommodate the "flight crew". A 
screen room was built to solve mlI problems, and a full scale POCC was 
provided. ARC arranged to send a safety engineer to Porz-Wahn to advise ESA 
on experiment safety problems o 
Activities at SPICE/DFVLR during the period from January 15 to March 15, 
1977 included: 
Completion of experiment development and integration; 
ESA acceptance testing; 
EMI characterization and corrective action where necessary; 
- Development and integration of experiment software; 
Experiment integration on system level; 
- Flightworthiness verification; 
!nterexperimen t cOlllpa tibili ty tes ting; 
- Mission simulations; 
Training of flight and ground support personnelo 
Experiments were brought sequentually into the acceptance testing/EM! 
testing area during the first month. Functional testing and some development 
changes were carried out first. Each experiment was then subjected to EMI 
testing with concomitant introduction of electrical grounding or screening 
alterations to meet minimum EM! requirements in accordance with Spacelab 
standards as measured by the ESTEC/EM! team. 
After sucr~essful acceptance testing, experiments were integrated into a 
30-foot long :i~ction of the full scale mockup of the CV-990 cabin. The config-
uration of el;)ch experiment was approximately as planned for the eventual 
airl.!'j:'lJft jns~~allation, but distribution of the experiments in the mockup was 
some~hat different than planned for the aircraft. Relative positions of the 
ESA experiments' were correct, but physical separation was much less than in the 
final flight configuration where the ESA expe~iments were interspersed with 
NASA experiments and the ADDASo However, the interconnecting cables had been 
cut to fit the aircraft installation so that problems associated with cable 
length were addressed except for the effect of EM! problems later introduced 
at ARC by the balance of the payload. After completion of payload testing in 
the mockup, two flight simulation periods of three days each were conducted" 
During each period the crew was confined to the CV-990 mockup and the adjacent 
living quarters, and contacted the "ground" via the fully manned POCC. Thus, 
a full rehearsal of activities anticipated during the mission proper at ARC 
was carried out Using the European complement of experiments. 
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Numerous dif~iculties were encountered in attempting to implement soft-, 
ware development and the central data system interface verificationo In addition 
to lack of complete data interface information in the IRDs, another major 
reason for the. data handling difficulties was that insufficient time was allowed 
for the data system contractor to assemble and check out the system used at 
SPICEo The components had never been operated as a system, and systems of such 
complexity have their own. operational idiosyncrasies which had to be discovered 
and understood by the operator in addition to attempting to carry out the 
payload checkout activities o When problems arose during this period both 
the data sys.tem and the particular i~xperiments were suspect. Hardware problems 
delayed significant software development until about the middle of Februaryo 
Integration of the experiments provided valuable pIs training, but the 
principal training activity was accomplished during the two mission simulations 
carried out March 1-3 and 6-9. During the first period the prime ESA pIs 3 
and backup 4 were confined to the CV-990 mockup and living quarters together 
with the NASA lotls who had been invited to participate. The other two pISs 
performed communication tasks in the POCC. During the second confined period 
the pIs assignments were interchanged so that prime 4 and backup 3 were 
confined 0 The ESA Systems Engineering Manager took over the M/S role and was 
confined with the payload crewo 1o1ission simulations were timelined according 
to the preliminary flight plans that had· been developed by MSFC analytical 
integration activities o 
During the periods not devoted specifically to checkout and payload 
integration at SPICE, ESA pISs in conjunction with PIs developed written 
operational procedures for each experiment. The mission simulations, which 
introduced timeline activities for the first time, brought about considerable 
refinement of the operational procedureso 
In order to address safety i.ssues early, an ARC safety engineer was sent 
to Porz-Wahn to participate in the ESA payload integration effort. Many minor 
and several major safety problems were identified there and solved. A few 
were recognized and deferred unt:ll final integration at ARC where aircraft 
installation geometry had to be consideredo However, this early attention to 
the flight safety area, when lead time was available, was successful and 
i; eliminated the problems at a latl~r time when they probably would have been 
critical. 
The ESA simulation was conducted using European 50-Hz rather than 60-Hz 
power to be used later in the UoS o since only a small 60-Hz generator was 
available. Following the ESA Simulation, each instrument was operated indepen-
dently on 60-ltz to assure satisfactory operation with UoSo power 0 
System Leve~ Payload Integration 
System Level Payload lntegl:ation was the intial payload activity at ARC 
and accomplished total hardware and software integration with the "Spacelab" 
inte.rface elementso This "'as the first time the entire payload was assembled 
as an entityo Integration was performed (figure 13) using a combined NASA/ESA 
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Figure 13. Payload Integration and Checkout Area at ARC 
· P checkout team' '~Ilder the dir~ction of the MSFC Ground Operations Manager Q 
While.the G~ound, Ope~ations Manager was in cha.rge of the overall activity, 
each PI had direct responsibility for his own experiment to insure that it 
operated ,and interfaced p1"ope~ly With th~. balance of the system. He was 'expect-
ed to provide the test requi_rements and; whatever stimulation equipment was 
necessary for his experiment'o The M/Sand the pISs along with the ~SFC and ARC 
support groups were avail~ble; in addition to his own staff; to help him as 
required. This approach was analogous to the MSFC plan for system level pay-
load integration of the Spacelab 1 payload at MSF,Co / 
(J < 
r, 
30402 •. 1 Level IV Payload Checkout Unit 
The payload checkout unit (PCU) employed on ASSESS II was far from a 
high-fidelity simu~ation of the carrier, but it did provide for considerab~y 
more thart mer,e interface tests in the way of simulating the carriE!r environ-
ment o " Simulated carrier systems (time codes, INS signals, etco) were provided 
to the experiments that would receive them in flight;ca central data process-
ing unit similar to the ·aircraft system was used to process those signals that 
it 'would handle in flight; and the payload was nominally configured as it 
would be in flighto All systems were operated and signal channels were veri-
fied. Where possible, reaL'signal sources were used to produce prime data 
channel signals equivalent. to those expected in flight. 
Electric power distribution in the PCU was handled through a small 
distribution panel similar to the one in the flight vehicleo The number of 
circuits was less than in the aircraft which meant that exact simulation of 
pow~r distribution could not be madeo However, only minor difficulties in 
interexperiment transient interference resultedo Electrical power used in 
the,,P.CU was commercial power with excellent waveform, in contrast to the 
,relatively poor waveform provided through electronic converte~s on the aircraft. 
This difference of fidelity caused no known problemso . 
The aircraft inteI;,com system was also simulated for PCU operation. 
Headsets identical to those used in the aircraft were available" The intercom 
system was not used as much as it should have been because of inadequate audio 
power and because it was simple to communicate directly in the PCU environment. 
Li.ttle was lost by lack of use of the intercom except a bit of training and 
discipline in its useo 
The principal difference between the :eCU and the aircraft system was 
in the, A:i,rborne Digital Data Aquisition System (ADDAS) simulator provided to 
check data interfaces and data processing. Because of funding limitations, 
some desired equipment could not be obtained and the aircraft ADDAS installation 
could not be exactly duplicated. As a result, the simulator required somewhat 
d:f,.fferent programming. than the flight system which precluded a complete check 
of software developed for the flight missiono This was a serious deficiency 
th4t could not be avoided. 
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,.3.4.2.2 Man~gement and Schedule of Level IV Integration 
The gr.ound operation schedule for Level IV integration (figure 14) went 
through a series:::::«?:f.major and finally rather minor iterations between the MSFC 
Ground Operations Manager, KSC, SPICE (who represented the European experi-
menters), and the U~S. experrimenterso Flight da.tes were never slipped, but the 
Level IV experiment integration sequence was changed to accommodate changes in 
delivery d51tes of theUoSQ experimentso ESA/sPICE negotiated"~~date for del-
ivery of all their experiment~ at one time, and they delivered lJs promised 0' 
Standard CV-990 racks had been sent to all NASA and ESA experimenters who 
requested them. Three Spacelab-type racks had also been shipped, two to 
ESA/sPICE for their integration at DFVLR, and one to the IHR PI whose control 
equipment filled the entire space o Thus the various experiments arrived with 
most components already installed or ready for assembly. There were a few 
exceptions which had to be corrected for safety reasons. The control components 
for four q,f the U. S. experiments had to be integrated into Spacelab racks 
1 and 2 as part of the le\'.el IV integrat;i.0n activity. 
The sequence 0; activities for each experiment was: 
Experiment de.livery and inspection; PI specification of instrument 
status including identification of all kn.own problems or open items; 
Physical, electrical, and data system mating to the PCU; 
Specific tests, calibr.ations~ alignments, and software verification 
as specified by the PI to assure him of satisfactory experiment 
operation. 
Integration and ('operation of the ~;'uropean experiments at S)?ICE, together 
with the fact that tl{~y l~ere all delivei'ed simultaneously and accompanied by 
a well organized team of ESA personnel (consisting of four. PISs, and the exper-
imenters' staffs as well as SPICE personnel), led to rapid integration of the. 
EurOPean experiments in about. one week. Conversely, the UoSo experiments were 
delivered sequentially without benefit of any earlier integration effort and 
with only two UqSo pISs to assist the PIs, so that integration of the UoSo 
exper:i.men'ts required about twice as long. 
Following integration and operation of the individual experiments, an 
Experiment Functional and Compatibility Test waS conducted to ferret out EMI 
problems between experiments or between the experiments and the FCU when the 
equipment. was operated as a full payload. This was the first time the entire 
payload was operated together and the te!:'lts required about two daysu After 
the function and compatibility test was completed, a Mission Sequence Test 
was conducted for oJ)e day using the payload flight crew~ consisting of the 
Mis and four pISs, to operate the experiments in sev~ral combinations similar 
to planned flight modes. The purpose of this test was to exercise the actual 
operat:::!,onal timel:ines that had been proposed for flight to identify operational 
and time line problems which might require alteratiOll of plans for the flight 
period 0 The final step in the Level IV integration was a Payload Hardware 
Readiness Review at which operational readiness of each experiment was dis ... 
cussed by the PI. He w'as required to certify experiment status, and document 
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any open items. In turn, the MSFC Ground Operations Nanager reviewed status of 
the entire payload, certified its total status, and passed a complete list of 
open items to the KSC Ground Operations Manager in preparation f,QX Launch Site 
Payload Processingo 
The entire Systems Level Payload Integration was carried out under close 
supervision o;f the MSFC Ground Operations Managero He held a dailY-' meeting J, 
throughout the entire integration period. In addition to overall reference to 
the general schedule, a 72-hour schedule and a daily sch,edulewere formalized 
o "'-' , , f ~ 
I and presented to all participants on a regular daily 'basis. Changes to the ',' C/ 
short term schedules were made and discussed as required. In general (except 
for the first weekend after all the European experiments arrived), the overall 
schedule was bai~ed on a regular 8-hour shift, and it was deliberately intended 
that daily and weekend overtime would be used to insure schedule, success. As 
expected, substantial overtime '-1as required. 
Xn addition to the activity schedules,"four basic working documents were 
used during the integration as follows: 
Discrepancy Report: To report minor problems which could be,' easily 
cQrrectedo 
Problem 'Report: To report major discrepancies such as failed hardware 
or design problemso The form stated'the problem and proposed steps 
I! 
for resol~ltion." 
ill! 
Interim Problem Report: Same form as the Problem Report (above»)~ but J, 
related to test failures o The form stated the problem and provided' 
"for troubleshooting act.;Lvities. 
\ 1 ~'i ., 
Work Authorization Document: Authorized unplanned activities" such as 
special tests. Included instructions and a record of accomplishment. 
Based on initiation of these documents by PIs or PCU personnel, and the 
overall integration schedules, management worked out the daily schedule of 
activities 0 Any matter necessitating initiation of one of the above documents 
became the subject of an "open itel1l" and was worked off in a prioritized manner. 
The Grpund Operations Managev:maintained a complete log of open items and 
noted progress toward their closure in making out the daily schedule of PCU 
activities 0 After an experiment was integrated with the PCU, the PI could 
work on his experiment as required, carrying out planned activ:i.ties or, for 
unplanned activities, through the initiation of one of the above documents. 
In addition to the log of open items kept by PCU personnel, the PIs were 
requested to maintain a daily log of activities. To ensuxe a common format, 
logs were supplied by the Grol,mC\ Operations Nanager. The purpose of these 
logs was to provide a source of background information which would be helpful 
(, 
in resolving later possible inflightproblems. However, as Frs received no 
specific instruction for filling out the logs, entries made were at a level of 
detail drastically less than desired by management. Management was a\-lare\of 
the'deficiencies in these PI logs, but applied 110 pressure for greater complete-
ness as the installation prqceededo 
Open Items and ProblemS During Level IV Integr~tion 
Table 7 categorizes open items encountered during Level IV integration. 
Most of these were truly problems which had to be so·lved, but a few were 
merely required functions or tests such as calibration after the final aircraft 
installationo The disposition of Qpen items was an activity which required 
t~me and, had to be scheduled into the overall ac ti vity. The las t column of the 
table shows a'total of 71 open items identified when the experiments arrived 
at ARGo Some of these plus the additional problems which developed d~ring the 
integration process resulted in a total of 99 open items which were addressed 
and closed during the integration period. Fifteen open items were passed on 
to KSC· for ac~p.on during launch site processing on the aircraft. Most, but 
not all of these, required the, final aircraft configuration for proper action. 
t· The large number of open H:ems upon arrival of the experiments represent 
62~' of all the open items id'e:ntified during Level IV integrationo 41 of 'the 
71 ~pen items identified upon experiment arrival were for one reason or 
another purposely deferred by the PIs until arrival at ARC. Six open-on-
delivery items could only be addressed using facilities available during PCU 
testing. Others were problems which the PI had not had time to close. Data 
problems were strongly related to the LIDAl{ and CTM/AnDAS interface problems 
which had been,encountered during Sl?ICE integration in Europe and were still 
open on arrival at ,ARC. The two facility/data problems passed to KSC were 
related to small subroutines which ADDAS was supposed to per£9rm for various 
PIs. ,; Two of the" ai.ne experiment problems pnssed on to KSC.~olei= missing hard-
'ware components caused by late funding which delayed procurement. 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Level IV integration became apparent 
:ilnmediately upon arrival of the experimeris. Every experiment arrived at ARC 
wi.th some part of it in a configuration different from that H';:entified in the 
interface definitions contained in the IRDs and the resultant drawings and 
sketches which had been prepared as a part of the analytical integration 
process. It was to be expected that some unidentified changes would show up 
"with the cessation of the formal IRD effort some six months before flight, 
bul; the. changes we're extensive. Some changes had been addressed but they were 
mainly problem areas where the e,xperimenters had contacted ARC to achieve 
resolution. No attempt was made by ~ission management to track changes in 
experiment requirements during the. fClur months prior to systems integration. 
Some experiments arrived with deleted components, others with added components. 
In many cases units had been interchanged. None of the changes could be 
judged as unjustified. 
There appea.rs to be some advantage for an experimenter to keep his hard-
ware in a state of f~ux, with change more the 1.'ule than the exception, in order 
to fly;the best possible equipmento This can and should be condoned within 
thelim'its of the schedule and resources to accommoda te changes. Changes 
internal to the experiment may have no significant impa.ct on integration, but 
changes which 'affect interfaces with the vehicle system or other experiments 
must be addressed and ~hould be planned for. 
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Table 7 - Action !tems During System Level Payload Integration 
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Incolnp1ete Experiment Hardware 
Delivery I 
~~ .! 
Open on arrival 19 1 1 0 21 
Closed in Level IV 17 1 1 0 19 
Transterred to KSC 2 0 0 1 3 
Data Systems 
Open on arri.va1 1 2 10 0 13 
Closed in Level IV 10 9 12 0 31 
Transferred to KSC 1 2 2 0 5 
I\. 
" 
Nechanical 
I, 
Open on arr:tval 23 4 0 3 30 
Closed in Level IV 21 5 1 3 30 
Transferred to KSC 5 0 0 0 5 
Power 
Open on arrival 2 0 0 0 2 
Closed in Level IV 9 1 2 0 12 
c Transferred to KSC 1 1 0 0 2 
! 
Cali bra ~,d.ol1'. 
op\~6 on arrival 5 0 0 0 5 
Cl()sed in Level IV 7 0 0 0 7 
Tdnsferred to KSC 0 0 0 0 0 
Summary of Actions 
Open on drr:i.val 50 7 11 3 71 
ClO$ed in Level IV 64 16 16 3 99 
Transferred to KSC 9 3 2 1 15 
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For the ASSESS II project, where only ten experiments were involved and 
substantial ARC experience in integrating airborne payloads was available, 
the prob,J;em of many changes was handled wi th required overtime. However the 
implicafions for Spacelab are much more significant, where many more experiments 
may be involved in a single payload, and delays to accomodate changes will 
be not only difficult to schedule, but also much more costly. 
3.4.3 Launch Site Payload Processing 
Launch Site Payload Processi'1g (LSPP) was managed by KSC a.nd. involved 
installation and checkout of the payload in the aircraft, preparatory for 
flight. ActiVities included: 
Experiment installation; 
Experiment/aircraft interface verification; 
Equipment testing and calibration; 
Compatibility test; 
Mission sequence test; 
An Integrated Mission Simulat;ion; 
Final preparation for launch. 
The entire process was completed during a four-week period by a, team 
composed of KSC, ARC, the N/S, pISs, and experimenter personnel. Significant 
features of the activity on board the aircraft were the considerable amount of 
experimental testing found to be necessary to insure achievement of payload 
objectives, and the large number of hardware and software problems encountered 
during experiment operations. Following integration and testing, special 
material was placed aboard the aircraft in accordance with a formal stowage 
list 'similar to preparation for space flight. This material. included the flight 
data file, tools, test equipment, n~terials, and spare parts. The Integrated 
Mission Simulation was carried out OVf!r a 2-day period as a final checkout and 
training exerciseo This was an all-up dress rehearsal invol.ving the payload 
crew confined on the aircraft, and a fully staffed POCC and MCC all operating 
as if the aircraft was in flight. Finally, a Mission Readiness Review was held 
at which KSC certified to the Nission Manager that all payload requirements 
liad been completed ready for launch. 
3.4.3.1 Nanagement and Schedule 
The Launch Site Payload Pro,:;:ess:lng schedule is given in figure 15. 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
KSC used essentially the same pt'0cedure in managing the' activities as was f 
used for Level IV integration by }1SFCo Eight-hour day's were scheduled. I 
Overtime was used to adhere to the schedull:l. Daily meetings were held to 
schedule and plan immediate events. All onboard m:.tivities were conducted 
under a uniform \York control system in which all tasks were planned, scheduled, r 
and documented~ KSC used the following documents in addition to the daily I 
schedules to control their work. 
Test Preparation She.et KSC language for a work 
authorization document for 
unplanned tests. 
I ' •. J 78 
.. ~_ ...... ____ ._~----..._._,~.jL ... ___ . __ •... _.). "11_.~.,£;j M.' r 
18---22 26---29 
- - + -4- A /C INsn 
CH. IN TAlLATION 
eTM M CH. INSTL . 
I MLS MlCH INsn 
• AWS M CH. INSTL 
• AIiES MECH INsn 
• AEES PYLON tNsn . 
• SAA INSTL. 
I WO K STATION INITL. 
I CP 100 RECORDEA INsn 
IHA MECH INsn 
1 M 0 "AfF? A INSTl . 
I I 
ONFIOUA Sl AACK CABLES 
SL RACK NO IIINSTL 
I SL ACK NO " INsn 
• Sl ACK NO , INSTL. 
• L RACK NO 2 IN TL. 
I SL AACK NO. I tNITL 
• LIDAA MICH. INsn . 
• LAS MECH INsn . 
I NOAA WAliA VAPOR EXP INSTl 
I lA RACK INSTI. 
llDAR AA K INSn. 
I EMI X" INsn 
PI SlAT RAIL IN n . 
2---
FWD r.QMPT CAM RA tNSn 
•••• IAA LlCTRICAl IN TL . I 
• CTM fLICTRICALINsn 
AWl 
SAR lL[CTRICAL IN TL 
lAS ll "C TRICAL INln . 
• IHR U[CTflICAL IN TL 
MEDICAL I!X' IlfCT INSTL 
• EMI E , ElECTRICAL INITL 
• A ES LECTAICAL IN TL 
I I 
PYlA INTEAfACE nST 
I DATA SVST T IT 
INDIVIDUAL U, CALIIAATION 
MAY 
13 111-
MI ION AND 'AVLOAD CA'ATA8ILITV TIITI 
• PYlON CLOS OUT 
"A ¥lOAD ClO OUT 
MISSIONR 
I 
Figur 15. 1.aunch Site Pay h,,,d Pr ceasing Sdwdule 
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Operational Checkout 
Procedure Deviation 
Engineering Change 
Notice 
Problem Report 
Discrepancy Report Tag 
Authorized changes in 
planned tests. 
Authorized adding, deleting 
()r modifying hardware. Usually 
included engineering sketch. 
Major discrepancy. Required 
written description and 
proposed method of solution. 
Minor problem. Required little 
or no description or instructions 
for resolution. 
(, All of the above documents required a sign off for completion by one 
of the three KSC management personnel. 
KSC used a launch site managment team composed of the Launch Site Ground 
Operations Manager, an engineer, and a quality assurance expert. They were 
supported by the ARC aircraft technicians and shop personnel, similar to Space-
lab plans to use a support contractor at KSC. In addition, all the pISs along 
with the MIs were heaVily utilized by KSC to integrate and test the payload. 
Originally, KSC representatives established a ground rule that PIs and their 
staffs would not be involved in integration of experiments on the aircraft 
unless a special problem required their support. This is consistent with the 
rules at KSC, which they expect to maintain for Spacelab, that limit access to 
the flight vehicle to only those people who are mandatory to do the work. This 
access rule was not strongly enforced for ASSESS II, and the PI teams as well 
as pISs and the ARC support personnel often worked together in order to accomp-
lish integration and checkout of the payload. As a result, it was not possible 
to fully evaluate the effectiveness of using the pISs to represent the PIs 
during integration since, without question, the use of PIs expedited the 
integration and testing activity. 
It is expected that heavy participation by the pISs to represent the PIs 
during launch site integration would be of great benefit to the launch site 
contractor, and their intimate familiarity with the payload would negate the 
need for T(!,uch detailed documentatiori. Since the pISs ultimately must fly with 
the resultant configuration, they are properly motivated both from the point of 
view of satisfactory experiment operation l~!ld safety. 
3.4.3.2 Launch Site Paylo~d Processing Actions 
Ideally, Systems Level Integration and Testing (Level IV) would solve 
all problems internal to the experiments and incompatibilities between experi-
mehts, and would exercise all interfaces between experiments and duplicates 
of flight vehicle ha'tdware and support systems o Thus, the mechanical instal-
lation and electrical hookup in the vehicle could proceed directly to final 
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operational verification, compatibility testing, and in situ calibrations as 
required. However, this was hardly the case for ASSESS II, and cannot 
be expected for Spacelab because the fidelity of the Level IV integration is 
limited by the fidelity of the Level IV integration device (PCU)o For ASSESS 
II, the PCU fidelity was not high, primqrily because it was not cost effective 
to construct an extensive Level IV checkout system for, a single mission. 
Compatibility testing after installation aboard the flight carrier 
introduces several areas for consideration that do not exist during similar 
testing in Level IV integration. These are: 1) the effects of payload opera-
tion on flight carrier systems; 2) the effects of flight carrier systems opera-
tion on the payload; and 3) the possible effects on payload operation of 
shifting from PCU ground supplied power to flight carrier power. 
In considering the first area for ASSESS II, mission management, along 
with cognizant aircraft systems personnel, reviewed payload operation and 
decided that specific tests for the effects of payload opp.ration on aircraft 
systems would not need to be carried out. l'he aircraft systems were suffici-
ently protected to negate any forseeable problem. There was general concern 
in the second area among the PIs because opera.tion of aircraft systems has 
occassionally had adverse effects on experi~ent operation and some of the 
experimenters were aware of a potential problem. However, only the AEES 
PI requested specific tests, and the Mission Manager took the position that all 
interested Pl;s would be allowed to monitor their experti~ent operation during 
aircraft/AEE;S testing. No incompatibilities were found_iiuring the AEES tests. 
d In the third area, the Mission Manager d~cided that the PCU and aircraft power 
were sufficiently similar in voltage, frequency, and waveform so as to make a 
test of total payload operation under aircraft power unnecessary. 
Because of the extensive experience at ARC with experiment to aircraft 
interfaces, these compatibility areas were of minor concern for ASSESS II. 
However, Orbiter and Spacelab systems are new, so that somewhat greater concern 
and testing will probably be required; more from the point of view of the effect 
on the carrier systems rather tllan the possible effect on the payload. 
Table 8 summarizes the total items handled during LSPP, and Table 9 
det.ails the 15 items which were passed from Level IV integration to LSPP. The 
following is a categorization of the types of action required to address 
all the items, accord:f.ng to the documentation used by KSC: 
-_.,"""--. ~" 
36 Problem Reports - major discrepancies, three were 
inherited from Level IV; 
37 Engineering Change Notices - alteration of hardware; 
22 Test Preparation Sheets - authorized unplanned testing, 
four were inherited from Level IV; 
12 Operational Checkout Procedure DeViations - changes in 
planned tests; 
15 Discrepancy Report Tags - ndnor problems 0 
122 Total 
81 
JI 
I( 
/! 
-::-~' 
T~ble 8 - Action Items During Launch Site Payload Processing 
Open on delivery' 9 3 2 1 
D~ta syste'rns 19 8 7 o 
Hechanical 24 12 18 2 
Power 6 8 8 1 
Test changes 10 1 1 o 
Open at launch o o o o 
, , 
Totals 68 32 36 4 
---
15 
34 
56 
23 
12 
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140 
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Table 9 - Problems Passed from Level IV Integration to Launch Slte 
Payload Processing 
Experiments 
LAS 
LAS 
MLS 
AEES 
MEUDON 
MED 
. IHR 
IHR 
CTt<! 
Interfaces 
EMI 
ADDASiLIDAR 
Problems 
i' 
Shroud required for optics protection. Shop fabrication 
not finished before start of LSPP. 
Replace gas cylinder to start flights with full supply. 
~ \ 
Connector support required. Shop fabrication not finished 
before start of LSPP. 
Strip chart recorder not delivered before start of LSPP. 
Problems in loading experiment computer program. 
Cable too short. Fabrication not finished before start of 
LSPP. 
Filter delivery from vendor did not occur before start 
of LSPP. 
Calibration information required from PI. Not available 
before start of LSPP. 
PI required recalibration of stabilized mirror in flight 
configuration. 
Power-on transients between AEES and several instruments. 
(Not resolved in Level IV, but did not occur on aircraftQ) 
AEES sensitive to SAR radar transmiss'ions during Level IVa 
(Level IV facility not adequate to properly address the 
problem, did not occur on aircraft.) 
Intermittent data transmission problem not solved at 
SPICE or during Level IV operations. 
~--.--------""'------~--------------------------~{-'~--------------------------~----~ 
Payload Carrier 
ADDAS 
ADDAS 
Safety Related 
IHR disc file malfunction. 
Software required to program cloud cover TV record for IHR. 
(ADDAS workload caused the effort to be passed on to LSPP 
period. ) 
J------------+,;.-----------------------------------.',--------4 
EHI Change to lock nuts required. 
83 
The total of 122 formal act;,ions required is less than the 140 items 
shown on Table 8 because' some actions took care of more than one type of item. 
During the first two weeks of experiment i~sta11ation, a number of 
unplannf;d tasks were required dl~e to incomplete identification of payload 
requirements. These tasks included increased tests and calibration in the 
final flight configuration which were beyond the requirements initially identi-
fied by PIs in the IRDs o They were approved to maximize science return. 
)", Not all of the 140 items faced during LSPP can be classed as problems, 
\('':'c-;c ·~i.nce some which were passed from Level IV and 0 thers ,that came up during 
:! LSPP were minor chores Q The two inheri ted AEES EMI problems (table 9) 
merely disappeared with the shift to the aircraft environment. 
.' ";, 
Table 10 lists the major LSPP experiment operational problems. While 
orily eight major. problems are identified, they were each critical to the experi-
ments and in most cases were time consuming in their solutiono These major 
problems occurred in spite of extensive Level IV and SPICE testing, and are 
probably the types of problems to be expected during final integration of a 
Space1ab payload made up of many experiments. 
For A$SESS I~~ no checkout flights by the payload crew were permitted, 
but standard ARC Ihrcraft safety requirements dictated that a brief series 
of "pilot proficiemcy tests" be carried out before carr.ying passengers aloft 
for a regular flight missionQ Two vibration related payload problems were 
detected after these flights that might otherwise have occurred during the 
"Space1ab flight" period o 
" Table 11 lists the significant problems which occurred during LSPP which 
probably could have been solved dUT.ing Level IV if the PCU had been of suffi-
\' cie.nt1y high fj.deli ty 0 While for Space1ab the Level IV PCU will be of higher 
fidelity, this list illustrates the types of problems which can occ.ur from 
inability to fully duplicate the flight systems and their characteristicso 
It is appropriate to discuss briefly the importance of qui<.;k reaction 
shop facilities and staff to support the integration activiti,es. This 
capability is required by all levels of integration, as was so evident in the 
support provided by DFVLR during SPICE integration in Europe and at ARC for 
Level IV integrationo However, it is particularly important for launch site 
payload processing, because at this time eVe~y problem compounds the cost 
through overtime or lost time as the whole operation moves more toward serial 
activities performed by a large contingcmt of people. The ARC sheetmetal 
and electronic technician support, with their many years of experience, 
displayed a flexible and effective approach to problem solving during crisis 
scheduling to meet the flight date. Individual work orders were not required, 
but ratheF were' grouped under a, l;:).anket order for the mission, coupled with 
accurate .... ~ime and cost accountil';. Verbal directions were sufficient, coupled 
with ske'{ches as neeJed, and f0110wed up by responsible safety inSPection and 
sign off~ Spacelab payload processing facilities will need that kind of support 
to solve last minute problems, and it can be done efficiently, and at lOtol cost, 
:,t,f formality is replaced by flexibility, coupled wi th well identified assigned 
responsibility to avoid requirement for a chain of approvalso 
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Table 10 - Principal Launch Site Operational Problems 
() Experiment Problem Action Taken 
" 
IRA/Neudon Computer program for Same problem occurred during 
telescope control oper- SPICE integration and during 
ated erratically. peu testing. Manufacturer's 
representative serviced equip-
ment, but did not completely 
eliminate problem. 
Coud~ focus mirror servo Technician realigned and did 
out of alignment. improve operation, but lacked 
,; IR source for proper verification. 
1---" 
AWS One TV camera produced AWS technician readjusted, but 
unstable picture. did not completely solve problem. 
L1DM Data transmission to AnDAS Component manufacturer's 
Qccasionally out of representative serviced equip-
synchronism with desired ment, but d;!.d not completely 
format. solve probZ.1~m. 
ern Noisy lock-in amplifier. Replaced by backup equipment. 
\_, Data coupling equipment CTM technician readjusted, ( 
inoperative. solving problem. 
LAS High noise level on Provide effective grounding 
signal cables. , for signal equipment in 
cargo area. 
AEES Scanning receiver failed. Returned to manufacturer for 
. ,-;;:.- ---.:::" repair • Reinstalled at last 
moment before flight period. 
-
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Table 11 - Launch Site Problems Related to Lack of Fidelity in Earlier Testing 
" 
Experiment 0 
- or Problem Action Taken Conunent 
Facility 
. 
'. Facility Grounding resistance Add grounding straps Low resistance grounding 
between racks and to all racks. system used in PCU. 
mounting rails too high. /j 
'LAS/AnDAS ADDAS power signals Relocate cables with Cables not in similar 
interfere with LAS "greater separation. positions in PCU o 
signal channel. 
Facility Unbalanced loads on Redistribute loads. No analog in PCU to 
power converters. separate converters. 
LIDAR Cables to cargo area Reroute cables. Lack of physical 
too short for planned fidelity in PCU. 
route. 
IRA Power noise on Separate cables. Cables unrealistically 
signal cables. far apart in PCU. 
e 
IRA Physical interference Add safety guards to Problem did not arise 
CTM with crew movement prevent personnel in PCU because of easier 
IHR around standa.rd racks. contact of protrud- personnel flow -- lack 
LIDAR ing items. of phys:i,(,?'~.\~ideli ty 
c in PCU/ ~\ 
! 
-- -
Not no'); i.eed J Facility Sharp edges on Smooth edges. t·" PCU \ 
Spacelab rack drawers. beca,ust\ P j ,,-chairs not 
accurately placed. 
Facility Spacelab rack panel Redesign light Circuit in PCU not 
lights actuated power circuit; add suitable for use in 
grounrl-fault isolation transform- aircraft. 
interruptors. ers o 
MLS Sensor placed Reposition rack Not evident in PCU 
incorrectly with rearward. for lack of w:tndows. 
respect to wIndows. 
I 
'. 
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3.4.3.3 Special Tests and Calibration Requirements for Experiments 
For ASSESS II, the original lnanagement concept was that PIs would provide 
all requisite equipment, including artificial sources, for calibrating and 
checking performance of their equipment o This created problems during LSPP 
for two reasons. First, to provide satisfactory artificial sources can be 
costly and all the experimenters were very cost limited, but second, in most 
cases tl:\e PIs did not th:tnk far enough ahead to request special U test requirements 
in the lRUs. Probably, if the IRD effo:r::t-,had been continued as the project 
progressed toward flight, more of the requirements would have been identified 
early enough to permit planned solution. However, experience of KSC personnel 
led them to provide sufficient schedule time to handle unplanned requirements 
which the PIs developed o 
Many of the experiments were sky-looking and a realistic method of 
calibration is to use sky sources. This type of test appeals to PIs because 
it is relatively cheap for them "md provides a direct check of experiment 
sensitivit;yo However, in most Cclses the final flight equipment configuration 
must be used for valid results. !'Therefore, such tests are best performed after 
launch site integration. Such tE~sts could be performed with high fidelity 
simulators, o'r even during flight, but that would use valuable flight time other-
wise better scheduled to obtain scientific data. For ASSESS II, a decision was 
made to use sky sources for the c.alibrations, and Table 12 summarizes these 
testso They requ;i.red four days ~iuring which the aircraft was parked outside 
and oriented to make specific sky targets available to the experimenters. 
Fortunately, good weather prevailed so that the sky targ~ts were visible. 
Mi.ssion Simulation Tlest 
The all-up integrated l<1ission Simulation Test covered a continuous 31-hour 
pe,riod, and was considered a very valuable activity, not only to check out the 
entire system, but particularly as a training exercise for everyone involved. 
This was the first and only opportunity for the entire operation to be exerciseu 
as an entity before the "Spacelab flight" 0 The test consisted of detailed 
activities as planned for two aircraft flights scheduled for the actual flight 
period, except that the aircraft. was parked on the hangar apron. Communications 
were hard wired to the aircraft in addition to a radio link. The full cycle 
was exercised including payload preparation for flight, simulated payload flight 
operations, sleep cycle between data take periods, stowage, and preparation of 
the l)ayload for landing. Some lilroblems 'vere artifidally imposed by management 
to test the systemo 
Although eve'ryone benefited from the training experience, perhaps the 
greatest benefit was derived by the flight crew. Their attempt to work to 
the preplanned timelines was severely tested o The Meudon computer problem 
was still real and required a work-around. The LIDAR data problem had not 
yet been resolved and tried the pis's ability at trouble shooting. The AEES 
scanning receiver started out scanning poorly 8tld finally quit. (This led to 
home laborato'ry repairs prior t(J the later flight period.) Initially the CTM 
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Table 12 - Special Testing Using Nonlaboratory Sources 
Test Requested Comment 
in IRD 
MLS sky calibration No Needed calibration of ene{~g?) de-
tected from trace gases existing 
in earth I s upper atmosphere. 
CTM sky calibration Yes Necessary for adjustment of 
temperature of reference body 
. in experiment. 
Meudon sky calibration No Sensitivity check. 
IHR solar calibration Yes Needed to establish calibration 
factor associated with 1300 C 
internal ~eference source. [ 
'. 
CTM solar calibration No Needed to establish a positive 
means of determining 
when the experiment was guiding 
properly on the sun. 
[ 
IRA Polaris alignment No Needed to maximize optical align-
ment. Convenient infinitely 
distant point source. 
IRA detector sky calibrations No Convenient source of known 
optical characteristics. 
IR intensity calibration. 
IRA Saturn acquisition No Final check of target 
acquisition system. 
AWS calibration No Calibration against night sky. 
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lock-in amplifiers would not lock onto the oscillating mirror reference signal. 
The PIs provided prOper light shielding and achieved successful operation. 
Then it wa~ found that the c~}ntral data system would not accept CTM data when 
~WI was simultaneously sending data. This was not resolved during the test. 
Some °human errors included: connection of 'MED, heart sensors in reverse, which 
recorded a very low heart rate; 'improper setting of one experiment~~~ central ( 
data system interface bias voltages, which showed up as distorted dc{Ea; and I 
failure to close a valve that depleted an experiment I s gas supply for the bal'-
ance of the tests. (Ac~ually tfiis was coupled with an equipment failure since 
the gas system should not have allowed so much gas to escape even though the 
supply valve was not closed.) These problem areas clearly illustrate the 
difficulties faced by the (PISs, and the Hission Simulation ;jest experience was 
extremely valuable in helping them prepare for ~he rigors of later flight 
activities. 
o 
This first a11-\\o experience for the HIs was also valuable. It was an 
excellent opportunity' for him to further develop his own timeline ac~ivities~' 
such as reminders to the crew for start and stop of data-take periods, the 
need to assist pISs during high activity periods, and operation of the experi-
ment support systems. The stowage list was referred to several times, and on 
two occasions assistance from "the ground" w~s required to locate needed, items. 
POCC aud HCC operational procedures benefited significantly from the Sim-
ulated }!ission Tes t. Also, several facility type problems were discovered 
and corrected. as a result of the test. PI discipline on the communication 
links was poor at the beginning, but improved with training during the test 
period. 
3.5 _"Spacelab" Flight 
Nine aircraft flights were distributed over ten successive days to simul-
ate a total Spacelab~ssi6n. The payload flight crew, consisting of the four 
pISs and the, HIs, were' confined to the aircraft and the attached living quarters 
for the entire period e-x;cept for brief moments to refill dewars. That process 
was handled outside the aircraft on the ground where the~e WLlS more adequate 
space. For Spaci:!lab, such refilling is not planned, since hold time for dewars 
will Cover an entire Spacelab flight period. 
Some support equipment aboard the aircraft and one experiment (IHR) were 
not automated to the extent planned for Spacelab. Therefore, "ghost" operators 
were used to maintain and operate the central data system and the gyro-controlled 
mirrors used for IHR and CTN and to reposition mirrors internal. to the IHR. 
The ghost operators interacted minimally \"ith the Spacelab flight cre~~, and 
pl:\rformed tasks which would normally have been autqmated. 
3.5.1 Payload Operations 
The nine aircraft flights (data-take periods) totaled 53 flight hours, of 
... hich 46 were at altitude and therefore useful a8 data-take time. Preestab-
l':'shed timelines for pis preparation and operation of eXperiments were used as 
bas..:lines for pre-data-take periods aud data-taking operations of the payload. 
Daily briefings and dc:.;briefings were conducted Si:!fore and after data..;'take 
J) 
peTibds, from t;hEi ~ICC for flight operations and from the POCC for payload 
.... 6p~:ration8. As a dat~~-ta~e period p,roceeded, ~ayload problems and flight 
, \' 9:ondition~ neQ,ess'itated 'realtime changes from the preplanned experiment 
'opera;ing ,~eriods. Communicatiqn was planned with the payload crew during 
J:;light as well as, during grouhd based pel:iOdS, but the radio conununication link 
during flight ,~as generally.poor. The N/S c.:ooxd:i,nated conununications to and 
from the payload c;!:'ew. Couullunication blackout periods were scheduled into the 
, overalltime.,.line 'to represent. those that will occur with Spacelab. 
" One cha'hge in ESAPayload Specialists was made during the flight period. 
Thi~, cha\\i.ge W'1~ reqti'ested by ESA a,nd accepted by NASA, wherein the P/SA 
backup replacla the primeP/S af~ler flight si,x. It was significant,: only to 
the extent of a d~ang~, in 'l;.he learning curve for that position, which did 
seriously affept experimeiu: operation. 
Generally IDQSt experiments produced acceptable data, but many real-time 
problems occllrred and were addressed by onboard and ground based personnel. 
Cert~in problems introduced varying degrees of alterations to flight plans 
during the flight: period. 
;- The ovet;;ali miss1uI1 a.ctivity schedul~ is shown in figure 16 and a listing 
o.f actual flight time is given in tabl.I.'> 1:1" Basic flight plans were identi-
fied by color followed by" a number desj~gnation to ino1'cate a specific flight. 
ltilllediately following close ot. th~ "Spacelab" flight mission an 
a1:1,...day debriefing was held. Each .. ·::>J:the PIs, piSs; the M/S, and represent-
atives from the various NA~i\ centEU:s and other organizations sununarized their 
1ui-tial impressions of the\ 1~;c6gxam and its implications. Significant comments 
~rom the debriefing are :i"nclor-pt:'l'ated into this report. A complete transcript 
is available at ARC. ' '')./ 
3.5 •. 1.1 Real-~ime Flight Plan~ing 
The nine daily aircraft flight flans developd during the analytical 
integration effort worked out very welJ, and were used. as a basis for specific 
reaJ"'U11l~ flight planning that oCC;:ti'tred during the flight period. Th~ nlOst 
basit/elelnent which altered the original plans was the need to factor in 
real wind directions and velocities, in place of estimated values uDed earlier. 
Other major elements which altered earlier planning were the effects of experi-
ment performarlce, which Shifted PI priorities as the flights progressed, and 
scientific return, which altered target preferences to achieve maximum science 
return. 
The general:,lanned flight schedule is shown in figut'e 16, and was 
followed exceptior fnterchange of flights one and five. Ho'Wever, both of 
these fltghts were of the same basic type so that the daily timelines were 
Ii ttle affec ted. This permu ta cion was nec0.ssita ted by a communica tions 
problem in the scheduling of a ground-truth balloon release for c01:relation 
of ozone measurements by IRR and LASQ 
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~ FLT2 I I SLEEP I I FLT3 J 2-PURPLE 2 
3-GREEN 1 
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Figure 16. Daily Flight and Sleep Schedu1~ 
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Table 13 - ASSESS II Daily Flight Schedule 
-Flight Takeoff Landing 
Date Time (PDT) Date Time (PDT) 
1 May 16 2125 May 17 0301 
2 t-Iay 17 2115 May 18 0305 
3 MCi;;/.i:8 2118 May 19 0328 
4 May 19 2054 May 20 0303 
, 
, i 
5 Ma~',! 20 2039 May 21 0242 
!I 
, 
6 M!;j\\ 22 0044 May 22 0643 
" 
7 May 23 0111 May 23 0713 
8 May 24 0505 May 24 1040 
9 Nay 2S 1412 May 2S 2009 
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Two types of real-time flight planning occurred. The first and most 
significant took place on a daily basis using results of debrieUng of the 
flight crew after each flight. Using computers, the ground based planners 
then developed a specific plan for the next fl;i.ght, factoring in new or altered 
III requirements and updated weather predictions. Nany different groups and 
individuals were involved in coordination of flight plans including logistics 
personnel, we~ ther personnel, air traffic control. PIs, 1>1ission Scientist, 
flight crew~ Nission Nanagcor, and others. The .final pl.an which included a 
route map, n science priority chat't for the payload crew, and a flight log 
and planning chart for the pilots, was passed to the aircraft approximately 
three hout's before flight. The second type of iterative flight change was 
occassiOnally made by the flight crew during actual flight. 'rhis was coor-
dinated with the Nce and raGC, nnd came about because of onboard changes in 
timeline activities usually caused by difficulties :In experiment operation. 
The combination of viewing c~rtain uatronomical targets and overflying 
specific ground targets made it difficult to make fundamental changes in 
specific flight plans. but as the mission progressed and tho PIs assessed 
operational and scientifiC results, they utilized the POCC and NCC system 
to introduce cet'cain changes which sought to enhance scientific return from 
the mission. The most Significant of th0se changes is shown in figure 17 
for the fourth data-tak~ period. The initinl plan for this flight did not 
include the pattern in the Salt Lake area which was to have been flown for 
SAR on flight three. However, because SAR was llonoperational on that flight, 
the pattern W~lS rescheduled for the following day. at the expenst' of n lowet' 
priority SAR ground target, a salt seep in western North Dakota, which resulted 
in the conSiderable change in flight plan shown in figure 17. Other changes 
in plnns involved lesser deviations ft'om thl:' original plans. 
Only tW(l signU:leallt changes in planned tracks wel'e made dur.ing flight, 
and both were made w;ttl} I'QCC approval. The first \\Ins the aborted Salt Lake 
puttern of flight thrt~~, nnd thE' other was during .flight nine where the pIs 
did not have tlH.o\ l.Mi roady to operntE' ~lt tl'E' start of the LAS scheduled tt'ack 
(Wet' Los Angeles. He rcquested that the subsequent LIDAR track be altered 
sligh tly to overfly the i ni tial sec t:lon of the LAS track. 1?OCC gave approval 
and the change was carried out. 
Each flight was planned vct'y I:lccut'at(,~ly and scheduled very tightly to 
achieve high effic'lency of data return, nnd any change usually affected many 
succeeding events. As a result, the LIDAR was not calibrated during the mission. 
Overflight of the I,IDAR gt'ound-ttllth site at Colstrip, Hontana was sandwlched 
be tween IRA ela tn l(1gs a t an al ti tude cons ;l(\Ct'llbly higher than preh'rred. OVN'-
r.t:Lght of the Henlo llark, Calif01:nia LIl>AR slte for calihration ;'lRS scheduled 
once. (on .flight two) b\lt w~\s not m:colllplished due to LIDAR equipment failure. It 
,,,lIs'never rescheduled bectHlse of II eOllll1litment to the already p1ann(;1(\ flight 
tracks and aircraft limitations. Also, as mentioned in section 3.3.2.1, the 
llonindustl'i.al reference area at 'fucson, At'izona '~1:1S not overflown, because it 
cO~lld not be fittt'd :Lnto the .flight planning '''ithout f:wrio\\f; &ffl"Ct:S on other 
payload requirvm~nts. 
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Figure 17. Planned versus Actual Flight Routes 
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3.5.1.2 Payload Flight erew A<;ltivities 
'l~he following disc.~ussion of payload flight crew activiti.es concentrates 
strongly on the unplanned activities nnd the problems encountered rather than 
on the routine tasks', in order to illllstri~tl'l the types of payload crew activity 
to be expected, which cannot normally be planned for before ,flight. 
3.5.1.2.1 'l'imelines lind Open tional Procedures 
A ren.listic l.\l)proach to handlhlg eXI)eriment timelines was used in the 
ASSESS II mission. A complete package was developed prior to the start of 
the miss:lon and was included in the onboat'd flight dutafile. An exumple of 
the planned inflisht pIS time1:.lnes is given in figure 18 .for one flight. 
Similar planned timelines for all flights were isslled by ~ti8sion HL\nngement. 
'rhe operational timeline shows the ~lctivitie3 of each pIs to opernte his grou1) 
of experiments. 'rhe lit,e for the med:f.cnl experiment includes the l.o$s-o£-
signal (LOS) periods. 'l'he Payload Activity Planner tried to avoid desisnutins 
simultaneous prime operation of mOl'e than one experiment operated by u given }) Is. 'l'his policy wos successfully carried 0\1 t except £orft'equcn.t SARI AEgS 
simultaneous prime optyrntion during dny flights ncar the end 0,£ the mission. 
The pJ.l'\lllled inflight tinle1ines were subj ec t to preflish t review tmd 
chunge by the }tission Sc:l(mtists ~\lldPls :l.n aecol'dance with real-time 
chunges i.n f1:lght planning and specific :i.nstrument opel.·atioMl problems. 
These changes were part of the science planning activity fOT the next flight, 
but ,~e.l.·e not formal.ized into datdletl experiment timelineo. Rather t the 
overall agreement was reflected in an ttlte:red science priority chart alld 
.flight path plan which were. read up £t'om the. poce via Hoe voice link to the 
~t/S! who appropt'illtely Ilnnotate.d his copy of the pt.'cmission plans for the 
particular flight. Uy this means, flight objectives were dropped or added 
nnd the science priorities of the paylond crew were altered. 
Subsequently, the PIs and I) ISs worked out ugreements that chanR(\d exper-
iment timelines to accommodate the new requirements. ';}\ese person-to-person 
agreoments were not part of the formal record. In general, the pIs annotated 
his copy of the p.remission plan to reHect the desired cllanges. This informal 
approach '''orked effectively, yet allowed the pIs some latitude for in.flight 
decisions. This was particularly true for pIS 2 who was also the PI for LAS. 
'l'he co-I'l of his experiment rept'osl.mt~d hil\\ :tn th~ l)OCe niHt ~lBl'eed to the 
science plans for euch .flight, but contin\.dns poor perforlllttllCe of h:Ls exper:i.-
ment eventually forced some deViations from planned opl1ratiollul priorities. 
'l'h~'s. pis 2 followed opel.'ntiOlUll. priod.ties throllgh the first four flights. 
During flights ,five thr.ough eight he us(;\d his OW1\ discretiol\ ii' deviuti1l8 from 
plan in attempting to resolve his experimeiltal pt'oblems. !Juring these flights 
the LAS was not operuted in the planned mode. His attention to the experiment 
problems il\te.rfered with Q\ltn:ation of. the IHR, ~n\d tinally llear the end of 
flight dght it was tUl'l\ed c.om\llQt~ly o,t;,f with the 111'8 l'tef:t.:l.sht: consent. 
Other devbtions from pl~ll\lU\d scienc.'Q (1)Ot.util\B pr.ocodur.es incl.uded complete 
shutdown. of expel~imt:!lnts. SAR was shut down duriug flights oue through four 
and tIllAR on flight two. ]loth \.j(~r.c dU(I to equipment f~'dl\.\r.e, llnd the shutdowns 
wer(\). negotiat(\d wlth the Pls. In nnoth(\r. l~a.8e, th'" l? /S was l\aked by thc.' SAR 
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Figure 18. Typical Payload Crew Flight Timeline 
PI to perform certain tests on that experi~ent. The pIS countered that he 
could not comply and also keep his other experiments in the planned opera-
tional mode. Permission was obtained from PIs in the paee to put them in 
standby so that the SAR tests could be performed. 
The use of printed time lines and procedures varied considerably among the 
members of the ASSESS II payload flight crew. The HIs occasionaUyreferred 
to a timeline, but more frequently to the fUght path map and the science 
chart. The pISs seldom referred to a pl.anned timelines at all. 'rhey relied 
on the ~I/Sfor such information. The most frequent questions were "what data 
leg are we coming onto'?" and "how much time to the end of this data leg?". 
The latter question was asked frequently by pIs 1 and pIs 3, both of whom 
operated computer controlled equipment. The use of printed equipment operating 
procedures in flight varied from none at all by pIs 1 (SAR, HLS, and AEES) to 
extensive use for most operations by pIs 4 (tIllAR, C'rH, and A'~S). PIs 2 
used none for LAS, for which he was the 1)1, and only rarely for IHR. pIs 3 
(IRA) began the mission using procedures for most operations, but apparently 
inf1ight training negated the need well before the end of the mission. 
3.5.1.2.2 t-lission Specialist Activities 
The Nissioll Specialist had been aSSigned specific duties relative to 
payload operation when his position was established (section 2.405). His 
major responsibility, to act as the alter ego of the Hission ~fanaget as a 
member of the payload flight crew, dictated that he be aware of the PIS 
activities and provide assistance when needed. He maintained surveillance 
of the experiment support systems as well as the eXperill\ent operations and 
communicated with the Nce and pace, to report on progress during flight. 
He also kept the Hission Scientist fully informed regarding experiment status 
and problems. The pISs were extremely busy most of the time and appreciated 
the communication load being handled by the Nls so they would not be inter-
rupted un1eas a problem required their participation. 
The Nls logged experiment and experiment support system status, coor-
dinated with the pilots and navigator as flights progressed, announced the 
beginning and end of each data leg and any deviations from plan for benefit of 
the Nee/pace. The pISs also found it very beneficial to use his announcements 
to schedul<'l their activities. This allowed them to concentrate on experiml~nt 
operatlolW without constant reference to flight progress. \~hen problems deve-
loped, the N/S negotiated real-t1 nto Rolutions with inputs from the flight 
crew, the pISs and the ground elements as required. 
In some cases the N/s made minor flisht ulteration decisions based on 
payload activity requirements. For example, the tRA experiment automatically 
carried out computer controlled raater scans of the target area. If a scan 
was interrupted, the information it contained was considerably reduced in 
value because it could not be computer avet'aged with other scans. To avoid 
interruption by aircraft turns, PIs 3 almost invariably requested another two 
to four minutes on a data leg to complete his scatt. These requests were 
granted by the WS without consuldng the paee if it appeared thnt the 
remainder of the flight path would not be significantly altered. 
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3.5.1.2.3 Payload ~ecialist Activities 
The pISs were each assigned specific responsibilities for experiment 
operation. The following gives some detail to illustrate how each pIs spent 
his time. pIs 1, who handled SAR, AEES, and MLS, was able to remain at his 
Spacelab rack station much more consistently than the others. Even his exten-
sive troubleshooting on SAR during the first fOlrr flights was on a component 
mounted in the Spacelab rack. pIs 1 was also much more driven by periodic 
duties than the others. The AEES experiment included four tape recQrders, one 
wi th a 24-miriu te tape dura tion and three With 48-minu te cycles. The pIs used 
two alarm bells, which he resut after each tape change, to remind himself that 
a tape change was imminent. Only two activities normally took pIs 1 away from 
his prime station; changing the sweep limits of the AEES swept. receivel:' which 
was infrequent, and the 24-minute AEES tape change cycle. Little commute time 
was involved in the latter activity since the recorder was mounted close by. 
The 48-minute tape change cycle did not take pIS I from his control position. 
pIs 2 spent considerable time at the IHR experiment. The PI occasionally 
requested that the mode of pollutant laser operation be shifted during flight. 
This required 30 to 40 minutes of concentrated work. Also, numerous efforts 
were made by the pIs to adjust operating parameters in an attempt to increase 
the low IHR reference laser power. Fot LAS, poor performance of the experiment 
and consequent troubleshooting efforts by PIs 2 frequently took him away from 
his central position. This was especially true on flights five through eight 
when he concentrated on resolution of the LAS problem. During these flights 
he spent considerable time in the forward cargo area making optical adjustment~, 
on the laser package, with pIs 1 relaying to him the results as indicated by a 
stripchart recorder at the LAS central control position. 
The PIs 3 timeline (IRA) was oriented almost entirely around the IRA 
observations of astronomical objects. In addition to the observations, he 
spent the balance of his tilne doinS either internal calibrations at the start 
of each flight or measuring sky brightness. His operating position was 
centered among the several IRA racks of equipment and the"- telescope. 
pIs 4 (AWS, eTM, and LIDAR) spent more time away from his control station 
than any other PIs. Two major factors brought this about; the right viewing 
AWS TV camera had a pers:istent poor focus problem (eventually both cameras), 
and the eTM centralization of controls was not sufficient for full operation 
of the experiment from the centt'al control position. For AWS, efforts to 
correct the focus had to be performed at the cameras, and he spent much t:l.me 
during the early night flights working with the right viewing camera. Later, 
when both cameras started giving trouble, starting with flight six, he spent 
still morR time at AWS. The experiment was turned off on flights eight and 
nine as planned which relieved the pIs workload. The eTN centralized controls 
allowed the pIs only to start and stop the linear mot:i,on mirror, the oscil-
lating mirror, and the chopper wheel. Any other adjustments had to be made 
at the eTM rack, about 10 meters from the central control position. Also, 
while outputs of the lock-in amplifiers were displayed at the central position 
98 
I 
I 
nn·· pre" 
for quick-look information, the stt"ipc;hart recorder, wldeh required annotating 
if the record W3f.' to be meaningful, \o}[lS at the Cn! rack. Thus, especially 
during datu legs of prime C'.tN intel"Ost, the pIs tended to remain at the Cnt 
rack rather than travel frequently bl1tween it and his SIHlcelab rack station. 
The 1.IDAR requit:l~d only occ£181.ona1 vis.lts, except for the first flight when 
the PIs was soci.ng real-data for thl' first time and he spent some time at 
the noncentrali~ed instrumentation to bo sure he had all controls set properly. 
Effectivenes~'of Central Control! 
It was il1lpract:.lcnl to mount all experiment controls in the Spacelab-like 
racks for ASSESS II. n,erefore l the major controls were centralized at the 
crew posit:lons \dtll ancillary equipmcmt and detectors located thrt)ughout the 
cabin area. The ext~nt of centralized control was such that well into the flight, 
nft~1..l." (;'v("t"ything wns t\lrnl'd on, and if expt.'rimcnts were opel'ating normally, 
the 1'/S C'ouldr~rna:ln quit'" constflntly at his prime opl.".rating station at the. 
Spncolab racks. During turnon of c.xperiments, all three piSs ha~to be away 
from theit' prime sea tiona for periods of 5-15 min\! tes, o.r longer if there wet'e 
problems, to ncC'on~lish turnon procedures nt each experiment station that con-
tnl.lwd t~Omplllwnts not mounted in the Spncelab rllcks. Experiment difficlIlties 
encountered eluti.ns. flight n~quircd piSs to spend lUore time;> than planned 
working wi th llnc:Ulary adJ ustment and can trol devices on the c};pcriments pel' 
se, which were locnted at distnnce.$ up to 20 meters from the ce.ntral control 
station. Although the overall t:llllclincs Wl'l:'e not s:i.gnificnn tly altClred, and 
the science priorities ware not changed, except on 11 few deliberate OCCllS-
sions, the functions within ~1(, blocks of time nllocated to experiment oper-
ation were applied differently than planned to nddress problems. Some of this 
inefficiency of operation could probably hove boon eliminntl'd witll fllrth~r 
redes'ign of the experimen ts th~ln was prnc tical .tot" ASSESS II. 
On Spacelab, experiment design \I1:i11 require centrnliztlt'ion o.E al~ tldjllst-
ment and c.ontrol dovices for experiments on the Spacelab control panels in 
the pressurized module, so that ,~hat:.eve'[ a~tions are l"equired will not 
involve the long dist~1I1CO trnvcrscs oN~essi tn ted in ASSESS II. HOWlwur, the 
problems (ltlcountcrcd On ASS1~SS II illustr.ate thl' dcsirabil:lty of getting the 
pISs involved in the curly design of expedment c(.)lltrol layout to CO$e their 
workload during flight. 
3.5.1.3 
Ntmy of the cxpcdnu,\nt problellls CIll't'llll1tC'red dur:l.ng ASSgSS II nrc typic.ol 
of the. types of pl:oblems to be expoctcd eludng Spncalah opel'atiollS, Ilnd it 
seems npproprint;c to conccntrnto tills discussion Oil thl' problem ar.eas 
ruther than thc t'out:tn(.>. e.xperill1cnt op~rtltiolls for the. benefit of: Spncclub 
planning. '~hile some of the problems llre unique to aircraft operations Qr 
operation within the atmosphel:e~ compsl:'ablc problems may well. be expected' 
on Spucelab. Only l."opruscntlftive- ex\)cd.mcnt pedormance is d:i.SCUSSN\ in 
this section. Appendix C gives added detail for e~lch cxpet'inlent. 
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In general, the payload performed quite satisfactorily during the flight 
mission although there were exceptions. Two experiments were of very marginal 
sensitivity through most of the mission and, although one was finally improved 
somewhat, the overall'\data return from both was very limited. A third could 
not be made to operate satiefactorily within mission constraints, but was 
restored to full capability at the sacrifice of its "Space lab" status. All 
other experiments yielded a substantial science return for the PIs. 
~mny df the experiment difficulties were apparent during the first flight 
period. Also, it became quickly evident that several, though not all, of the 
operational problems could have been avoided with better check-out before 
flight. When the Systems Level Integration team turned the payload over to 
the Launch Site Integration team, they turned over 15 open items, but the 
solutions to those items seemed straiiiltforward, and the payload was judged 
to be in good shape. Again following flight vehicle integration, all open 
items had been closed and the experiments were determined to be flight ready. 
The PIs had had complete access to their experiments for checkout. However, 
some aspect of almost every experiment evidenced less than optimum operation 
almost immediately after launch. 
Of the experiment malfunctions which were related to insufficient pre-
flight testing, perhaps the most serious was with SAR, where the two prime 
experiment data recorders would not function simultaneously with a consequence 
of no initial recorded data return. Repeated efforts by the Pis, with remote 
assistance from the PI in the poce, failed to locate the difficulty. Only 
after a decision following flight four to declare the experiment a failure by 
Space lab standards, and a member of the PI staff was allowed to go aboard, was 
it found that the recorders were improperly powered from two dc power sources 
which opposed each other. The fix was simple, but it was determined that pre-
flight checkout had failed to operate both recorders simultaneously as planned 
for flight, and the malfunction was missed. 
The SAR recorder problem illustrated the need in the Flight Data File for 
some insight within the experiments for purposes of troubleshooting. As stated 
earlier, it is the intention in the Spacelab era tQ leave responsibility for 
experiment operation in the domain of the PI. Accordingly, ASSESS II mission 
management did not request any information within experiments except for safety. 
Much time was spent by the payload crew during the flight mission trying to 
identify the SAR recorder problem in the flight vehicle electrical systems. 
With only a general electrical schematic of the experiment, the problem within 
the experiment might well have been quickly identified and fixed. 
In the case of LIDAR, the pis attempted (after flight one) to charge b~"t­
teries while the instrument was turned on, which blew a fuse. The routine tor 
daily battery charging was included in the pis timeline, but was not exercised 
, during preflight checkout. All data from flight two was lost, after which the 
source of the problem was identified and fixed. 
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For IRA an optics alignment problem became apparent during the first 
flight period and hampered experiment performance throughout the mission. 
During Systems Level Integration a test device was utilized to check the optics 
alignment, but somehow during flight vehicle integration the alignment appar-
ently shifted. The ground based alignment system had been constructed for 
laboratory use and could not be utilized on the flight vehicle. While thf's 
problem can nominally be charged to lack of preflight testing, the omission 
of flight vehicle alignment was deliberately planned. Provision for a flight 
vehicle altgnment device was not practical for ASSESS II, and previous sim-
ilar instlr.l1ation experience had demonstrated that it was n~"1t needed. How the 
change of alignment occurred in this case ;;"as not determined. 
Some additional difficulties showed up during the first flight which were 
associated with the flight environment llnd ctn:.lld not have been easily addressed 
during pref1igllt testing. In the case of AEES, static electricity built up 
and periodically discharged from the antenna mounting plate producing noise 
interference on the signal channel. Grounding of the plate had not been speci-
fied for the installation and air seals around the plate isolated it. \V'hi1e 
the net result on data return did not turn out to be serious, the pIS spent 
inordinate time during the mission trying to identify and solve the problem 
which was suspected to be w~thin the instrument syst~m.. The simple cause 
of the difficulty was discovered following the Space1ab simulation program. 
The ~ILS expedenced a basic sensitivity problem on the first and all 
succeeding flights. The experiment had been well automated, compared to 
its pre-ASSESS configuration, to reduce pIs workload. These changes appar-
ently had an adverse effect on sensitivity that was nQt observ(>d during 
tests at the home laboratory, and it was not planned to repeat these tests 
at ARC. \V'hen the problem surfaced for the first time in flight, it was 
recognized as serious, but the PI was not able to devise a work-around 
that could be implemented by the pIs during the mbsion. After the mission 
the PI was able to improve the sensitivity of the instrument by using a more 
complex manual mode of operation. 
For LAS, early flight experience revealed that no laser signal was being 
reflected from the ground; a prerequisite for proper j~xperiment operation. 
Aircraft motion, or a means to simulate it, was necessary to discover this 
problem. The pIs (who was also the PI for this experiment) made many adjust-
ments throughout the flight period and was finally able to get some return 
signal, but the result was never as satisfactory as desired. 
In the case Q,f AWS, difficulty W,QS experienced illm~illtaining focus on 
the IR cameras. Although they could be focused on the\ground, one of the 
two cameras in particular, lost focus during flight. Despite considerable 
inflight effort to improve the focus, the rls had only limited success. 
Since the ~ameras could be used only at night, at low ambi.ent light levels, 
there were few opportunities to address the problem on the ground during the 
first half of the mission. 
In general, the pIss did an excellent job in performing the routine experi·-
ment operations work, interspersed with concentrated periods of troubleshooting. 
The pISs, as well as the N/S, a,greed that adjustment to the flight environment 
and the routine of operations required about three days. This is a high percen-
tage of a mission period lasting only ten days. Unfortunately, t,he onslaught of 
op~rational problems showed up immediately after launch during initial experi-
ment operations, based on ASSESS experience, and this is the period when the 
flight crew is the least acclimated and pr.epared to address dl,fficulties. 
This same limitation will certainly apply to Spacelab, and probably te:!a greater 
degree with the added requirement for adjustment to z.ero-g. 
3.5.1.4 Onboard Data Handling 
The experimenters for ASSESS II had three choices in handling their data. 
They could provide for data processing wholly within their own experiment, they 
could interface with the central data system (AnDAS) which had significant 
storage and processing capacity, or they could use the CV-990 central data 
system in addition to their own systems. There were certain advantages in 
using the ~entral data system because it interfaced with the aircraft systems to 
obtain ho~s~keeping data such as airspeed, altitude, latitude, longitude, 
ambient temperature, etc. All experiments require certain of the housekeeping 
data for their data calculations, and interacting in real-time with the central 
system for this purpose ,.ras much more convenient than picking up that data 
in printed form after the flight mission for subsequent data processing. 
Another key value in using the central data system during ASSESS II was for 
quick-look by the PI in the POCC as the flight mission progressed. A ground 
rule of the ASSESS II mission permitted transmittal of basic data from the 
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central data system to the POGG and a ground-based computer on a daily basis 
to simulate downlink of data from the, Spacelab. However, a disadvanta~"",~n [ 
using central data system was the necessity to establi"sh a proper 'ii1b~rfacet"""""""'''''''''''''''·''i 
between the central system and the experiment. 
With the advent of minicomputers, there appears to be a tendency to build 
computer capacity into specific experiments. Although this increases exper1-
ment cost, it gives the PI more complete control of his own data handling, and 
the total data system can, theoretically, be perfected in the PI laboratory as 
the instrument is developed for flight, thus eliminating one of the most 
difficult and complex interfaces during integration. The use of an internal 
experiment data processor still leaves the experimenter an option to pass 
either all of his data, or representative data, to the central system for 
storage and possible quick-look opportunity. Storage of data in both the 
experiment: and the central data system to increase confidence of success has 
been a growing practice with other GV-990 PIs. 
Table 14 outlines the method of data handling used by each ASSESS II 
experiment and some indication of difficulties encountered. ESA/SPICE speci-
fically encouraged the European eJo.."Perimenters to use the central data system 
to gain experience both for ESA and the experimenters. Thus, although LIDAR 
and the NED experiments both had internal experiment tape recorders, they 
interfaced with the central data system. The AivS camera outputs '.rere recorded 
on video tape within the experiment. 
102 
~~:~ __ "'" ------- ---~,---"--<~.--- - -
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
t 
r 
, 
I 
l 
o 
w [ 
t 
Experiment 
lRA/Heudon 
lRA/Groningen 
lRA/l-fax Planck 
A\olS 
LIDAR 
MED 
.. 
... 
",." 
.~{ 
'>'--:""17:' 
SAR 0 
t1LS 
LAS 
I~, 
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, 
PI Supplied Central Dat,<:; SyHe[lj '0 
Expet:imeht Data Housekeeping Data Data Display 
Video magnetic tape, _i - i-later vapor overblfrden on CCTV, 
digital magnetic tape, and line printer. .. -
.. 
and minicomputer. 
.' 
I. i 
--
Cassette magnetic tape. - - -
i.....--- \ 
\\ 
- 1 channel, 7 channels, Average spec:tra ~n CCTV and hard 
ana~.og analog copy. 
Integrated video - - -
... 
magnetic tape for two 
cameras sequentially. 
9 channel digital ...... ,Digital ,. - Aerosol spatial distribution, 
magnetic tape .• numerical array on hard copy. 
4 analog cassette 8 channels 4 channels, 2 data to housekeeping ch~qnels, 
tapes (one each PiS), analog, analog CCTV, and line printer. 
4 channels each. 1 digital 
- Digital 7 channels, Fourier tra!?sforms on hard copy. 
analog Stabilized mirror position on 
'<~:,; .. '~; CCTV. 
2 film recorders - - 3 channels, Housekeeping signals on CCTV 
4 channels total. ao.::log and line printer. ~ " 
15 channel digital Digital 1 channel, - ~ cassette t~pe and analog .. mipi(!omputer. 
r"'I 
- 2 channels, 2 channels, Ozene concentr2.tion on CCTV and' ~ analog analog /.;c "-=r=_l.j,ne printer. t: 
II' ~ ~ 
..... 
o 
~ 
LXperiment 
IRR -
AEES 
PI Supplied 
-',,< 
Digital magnetic tape 
and 3 analog caspette 
tapes. 
Table 14 concluded 
Central Data System 
Experiment Data Hou~ekeeping Data Data Display 
Digital 4 channels, Sun azimuth and eIevation, 
mirror position on CCTV and 
line printer. 
- - -
('-
\) 
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'rhe infrarcd telescope systmll (IRA) .,.!:",<;\d a complex itlter3ctioh be.tweeh 
sclf-rontaine.dequ:I.pmcnt and the ce.t\tral«~:';\ra system. The. telcscopc itself 
was controlled by ~\n internal minicomputcr sy~tcm, and the tar$;et picture.s 
wet:e re.ccn:detl on an inttll:'nal video tape uni.t with TV display. The Heudon/ 
01:on1\1So.1\ se.nso't output was stored on exped,munt-colltained digital maglle.tic 
tape on bo th reel-to-ree}, un.d CMse tte recorders (a Separa te. record for each 
PI). Ho\.\sekeeping dat.~'"from the celltrnl dnt~l system was added iltto thcse 
tUl~es. the NF! sensor output wns fed directly to the cantrlll data. system (or 
storagC:l and f>t'ocassing to produce TV displnys of average spe.ctra along with 
hard COllY reproduction for onboard reference. 
Host of thCl U.S. exped.ments had int('r.fuccd \"ith the central dtc\ta systmn 
on prmf:lous CV-990 missions. 'rhis\I\lght be comddered representative of 
ro£Hghts of cxpl'.rimcnts on Spncelub, \"h(~re the prohlems of interfacing wi th 
the. dnta systell\ had beet\ solved previously. In the CilSC of AEES, the very 
~.nte authorization for flight: eliminnLcd uny pos~ibHty of illterfacing with 
the central duta system. fhe:lr main illte}:est :In the central data system was 
aircraft position dlH;u which c.ould bl' cOI:relntt:ld later with their analog and 
digital tapo t'ccords. The LAS hild some (Hu'ly i~ter.face problems wit:h the 
cel'\tral datf.~ syl:H:mn, but these were minot an~t l:o.the.r quickly solvede 
'l'he dat{\rN~(H~ders used 01\ the ASSESS n payload all functioned quite 
well except in the case of SAl{ where t:lw nmjor powct' sup(lly problem pt'ov:lous.1.y 
disuussod prevo\lted l:l'lcol.·dcl~ operation. The IRA video r(!conklt: jm\\\\\od, but 
was soott fixed by the P /S .!loor ti\pe qunli ty apparently pre\>"lclllted loading 
some tapes on the, AEgS, und the AtvS video l'ccot'der req\.tired minor attention 
tmCe dl,lril\S playback to tb(>. poee. 
The ~tl.S minle.omputcr f\.Jne,tiOtlc(\ qUitl~ ,,,ell throughout the misSion, but 
the 1M nlinicolllputor, wh:lch ,~us the newly developed portion of the equip\\lt:mt 
tu contt'ol the telescope, 8~we ctmsid<:>rahil' trouble. 8lwerat unscheduled 
interrupt'lons t\ti~gatcd the dnta c.ycle :1l\d l~uquirQd re$t~\1:t by the P/'d. 
11'ho central dntn syt:;CI.1IIl fn] cored duo to SO\\\O illteL'lH;\l t:imil'lS problems 
on several occnsiOl'\S throughout the miss;i.on, but \I/tlS I.Isuul1y brought bitck on 
Une ruther quickly by the ghost compute\.' opc.tt\tot'. 0,\(1 of these occ.urred 
in ctn.'l'ying out tho Cll'H computit\g pl'osr~lI1\ dud 1\8 the, cady pare of the. miSSion, 
b\\t '''H8 gmu'Il:aUy climit\l\tut\ Hftct' tIll' t:lrst f0\~ fUl'ht:s. Data fOt" the N~n 
exper:t.\l\o\'lt origJ.nated £ro\\\ !:I~nSorH \~orn by ouch PiS, om1 :It '''(15 nccessm:y fer 
them to l)luB intO the c\;mtrul data system l'H .. 'riod:tc,nlly nt their lImil\ control 
,stations to pt'ov1dt' quick-look datil ror the PI. \~;l th tbdl:' very busy schedule 
al\d extensive l\\obility, thoy di.d \lot £ ('IHI dnCt\ to the contl'[\l datu system 8S 
often as the PI de.sirod. 11'htlS, his quick-look data was sparse. atld only Inargin-
nlly adequate. to maintuin surveillunce. of his oxpel"illlencs. H()~eve.r, tupo. 
cassettes wort\ by t'lach piS hud be.elt use.d e.xto\\sively in pt'e.vious progr~\ms 
by the. PI, ~\\ld wore very rel:t.<lblc in totul retri~vul of the NED data. 
Although data ht\\\dHnS interface. proble.ms wt:'l:l~ IlU\\\et'OllS dm:ins eho 
:l.llccsrat:ion po:riods and pat'Ciculm:ly during the curly pm:t of the flight "l1s6io\\, 
in SQllCrlll, data t~~tr:levnl ,,,as Very good from the cillhonrd e.quipn\~nt. 'rho 
pcoblums that did occur illustrat:.e the dlligmlc effort rl\qull:od by the c~peri­
l\limt sta£l; and thla fHght etC\\f. 
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Ground Operations 
3.5.2.1 Payload Operations Control Center 
A Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) was established at ARC for 
management of the payload during the flight period. It was organized and 
operated by MSFC in a manner similar to their plans for Space1ab 1. They 
staffed the POCC with a Payload Operations Director, a Payload Activity Plan-
ner, and an Operations Coordinator, along with the Mission Scientist and each 
PI or his representative from each experiment. Voice communications were 
provided to maintain contact among all elements of the POCC, with the payload 
crew, and the MCC throughout the flight mission. 
A video downlink and a text uplink similar to the system planned for 
early Spacelab flights were also available to the POCC and were operated by 
the MCC. In the POCC, the Mission Scientist coordinated PI science require-
ments and science communications wit.hPOCC management and the payload flight 
crew. 
POCC operations consisted of: 
Updated payload planning on a daily basis; 
Briefing of the payload crew for each day's activities; 
Communications with the payload crew to address problem areas 
and coordinate decisions; 
Daily payload crew debriefing; 
Quick--look scientific data analysis by the PIs. 
The floor plan of the POCC operational areas is shown in figure 19. 
Additional space in a contiguous area included a conference room, a data room, 
and a large office area for the PIs. 
Organization and management for the POCC is shown in figure 20. General 
supervision of the POCC operation ,,,as provided by the Payload Operations 
Director (POD). This position was manned on a 24-hour basis by two MSFC 
personnel. The POD, in addition to overseeing the POCC staff, was the princi-
pal channel for communication with the Mission Control Center (MCC). The 
POD maintained a log of his activities and of all communications. 
The Ope,rations Coordinator was the primary communicator between the POCC 
and the payload flight crew. Thus, it was important that the Operations 
Coordinator be intimately familiar with the payloads. For ASSESS II, the ESA 
and NASA backup pISs were assigned to this pOBition on a r.otating basis. A 
detailed log of communications was maintained by the Operation$ Coordinator, 
somewhat duplicating that maintained by the POD. Two of the ESA backup piSs 
were nonnative speakers of English, and they had considerable difficulty, 
particularly because of the poor quality of the radio communications link to 
the aircraft. As a result, the POD assisted in handling much of the communi-
cation with the aircraft during flight. 
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The Payload Activity Planner (PAP) was primarily responsible for the 
preparation' of flight plans in consultation with the MCC, the Mission Manager, 
and the Mission Scientists representing the experimenters. The position was 
manned by two MSFC personnel nearly 24 hours a day. As described in section 
3.5.1.1, preliminary flight plans were prepared in advance of the total mission. 
However, for each data period both updated weather information and updated 
science priorities were used to prepare a final daily flight plan. Figure 21 
details the various steps and timing in the work of the Payload Activity 
Planners. 
The position of Data t-tanagement Coordinator was handled by one data 
specialist supplied by ARC. He prepared and managed a schedule for use of 
ground based data handling and computation devices by the PIs after receipt of 
down linked data following each flight. He was also responsible for collection 
and retention of all down linked data for ultimate use by the PIs. 
The position of Data Communication Specialist (DCS) was not manned during 
the simulation period to the extent planned. The DCS had been expected to 
handle the recorder for air/ground cow~unications but this task was not just-
ified during much of the flight period because of the air/ground link diffi-
culty. Except fo~ the handling and logging of data following each flight, 
there was little for this staff mombcr to do. 
The. NASA and ESA Mission Scientists rotated assignment in the POCC. The 
Mission Scientist acted as the primary liaison between the PIs and the POCC 
payload managment and activity planning staff. During daily briefings and debrief-
ings with the payload flight crew, the Mission Scientist was in charge of 
scheduled PI discussions with his counterpart pIs, and insured full uttder-
standing of total flight objectives. He coordinated science priorities with 
the PIs arid established the list of pri.orities published by the POCC for each 
data-take period. Most of the planning activity took place during non-data-take 
periods. After each data-take period the NASA assistant Mission Scientist 
prepared a ahort science summary of the results attained by each experiment. 
The PIs participated in POCC planning activities by providing, through 
the Mission Scientist, their requests for priorities and changes in operations 
plans. It had been planned that a member of each PI team would be in the POCC 
during the entire data-take period to track experiment operation and be avail-
able for problem consultation. However, this plan was negated due to the poor 
radio communication link, and it was agreed only that each PI or his represen-
tative need be quickly available if required. A representative of each experi-
ment was present in the POCC for daily flight debriefing, and during these 
periods usually the PI would personally discllss his experiment with the cogni-
zant pIs to the maximum extent that scheduled time would permit. 
A position was provided in the POCC for the t-tission Manager. It was 
purposely planned that he woul.d have no direct operational responsibility so 
that he could maintain an overview and carryon discussions with the variolls 
operations personnel that led to decisions to be implemented by the POCC staff. 
Likewise space was provided in the poce for the NASA and ESA Program Managers 
for observation and immediate consultation in case of a majqr mission problem. 
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3.5.2.2 Mission Control Center 
The Mission Control Center (MCC) was established to manage flight vehicle 
operations during the simulated Spacelah flight mission. Xt was located 
adjacent to, but separate from the POCC. Three JSC personnel staffed the MCC 
while ARC provided support to JSC in direct management of CV-990 flight opera-
ions. The HCC was not closely analogous to Spacelab plans for an Mec because 
orbiter operations will be significantly different from eV-990 operations. 
However, an MCe was included in the ASSESS II project to complete organizational 
interactions and gain interactive experience with the Mission Management concept 
for payload operations. It was manned 17 hours per day with no coverage 
provided during the payload crew sleep period. 
Activities performed by the HCC in its abbreviated version included the 
following: 
3.5.2.3 
Aircraft flight plan development; 
Updating of Integrated Crew Activity PlaD fOl~ each flight; 
Approval of flight passenger manifest; 
Hanagement and coordination of overall mission timeline; 
Interfacing with flight vehicle ground crew; 
Coordination of food service for payload crew; 
Transmission of uplink messages; 
Receipt and distribution of downlinked data materials; 
Participating in briefing and debriefing of payload crew. 
Quick-Look Data Assessment 
During the data-take periods, activity in the POCC was relatively quiet 
due mainly to the communications problem between ground and the aircraft in 
flight. Upon landing, ground communications links were established and the 
postflight debriefing began with each experimenter allotted ten minutes for 
discussion with the payload crew about results from his experiment. This activ-
ity was under close supervision of the Mission Scientist in order to complete 
scheduled discussions Within the timeline. 
During postflight debriefing other simultaneous activity was occurring 
to downlink data. The AWS video signal ,.,as downlinke.d for PI perusal as a 
slow frame-rate Signal which required less than an hom: for the total flight 
; ilrecord. A video monitor was used for this purpose. (The A\.JS equipment could 
also be used to transmit the Neudon video record, but no operational situation 
arose that made this necessary.) Simultaneous with the AWS video transmission, 
telemetry of data was simulated by phYRic.al removal f..rom the aircraft of many 
data records as follows: centr;tl data system magnetic tape, memory disc., and 
houskeeping printout; AEES cassette, reel tapes, and .3:. stripchart; SAR film; 
MLS cassette tapes and stripcharts; mll digital data t;:'hpe; Groningen ca.ssette 
tapes; CTM otripchart; and lRA/Neudon data tape and *lrd copy record. IRA/ 
Meudon video taper, and medical tapes were stored ouboard until the end of the 
mission. 
A compu ta tion facili ty was provided for th~; use by the PIs for limi ted 
data processing of quick-look flight data. Thi~ facility included a basic 
computer capability quite similar to the central di:ita system computer onboard 
the aircraft, two interactive video computer terminals, and a hard copy print-
out unit for each computer terminal. 
--------.-.---------~----,---------. ........... "' .... .....,... 11~ 2311 ~ « • Sf am.-.. ~=o:::::! __ ~_.a.._ _____ ,. ____ .~. _____ • 
Inunediately following the end of a daily flight, ~ach PI submitted a 
request for specific data that he wished to examine fQr quick-look assessment. 
These data requests, in terms of data-slice time, were processed by computer 
personnel, who created a disc file for each flight, containing only the re-
quested data slices. Construction of the quick-look disc file took place during 
the postflight debriefing, and was finished about the end of the debriefing 
period. This new file was then accessed by the PIs for examination of their data 
using the two video terminals located in the data analysis area adjacent to the 
POCC. 
~lile the special disc files were being constructed, both MLS and IHR 
were reading out data directly from a storage disc recorded in flight. 
one on each POCC data termi~lal. MLS received numerical printouts of data at 
one-minute intervals from wtlich a simple plot could be made. For IHR, the 
computer developed plots of/anyone of ten parameters selected by the'PI. 
The t<tedical experiment: obtained a limited one-minute interval printout 
of pIs body temperatures and heart rates primarily as a check on the operation 
of their experiment equipment. 
IRA/NPI obtained a numerical printout of signal strength from which to 
select complete scans of interest. Sonle selected data scans were plotted by 
the computer after a c.ompJex averaging process to smooth the data. The result 
was a group of points representing average signal strength at several wave-
lengths measured by the NPl tilting filter spectrometer. 
'l'he LIDAR presentation calculated by the computer was a matrix of numbers 
representing signal strength as a fUnction of time. In addition, plots were 
calculated and presented on the video terminal. 
LAS obtained a numerical presentation of data for inspection, from which 
Plotso:::et~:d:p::i:~V:i::p:;::e::c:::a::::~:b~:,aO:~n::i::eO:o:~:::r terminals HI 
was used exclusively by cnl. Their program permitted examination of the opera-
tion of the lock-in amplifier by recreation of a st't'ipchart record, tabulation r:l,','f 
of numerical data, and development of interferograms following a fast Fourier til 
transformation of the raw data. The bulk of the time was used in calculation 
and examination of interferograms, each of which took a minute or more to be Ii,-, 
calculatp.d and d:l splayed on the terminal. 'fhose that appeared satisfactory with- I:l 
out excessive noise were preserved for later analysis by making hard copies. 
The Groningen PIon the IRA had his own equipment for examinatiou of his 
signal tapes and stripchart records. SAR did not inspect their experiment out.,. 
puts in the POCC, but rather sent their records directly to JPL for processing. 
The quick-look data processing and examination in the POCCworked out 
very well.· The PIs were very pleased with the arrangement. Of course, data 
examination was of a preliminary nature for the primary purpose of checking 
equipment operation and for consideration of change du~ing the next data-take 
period. Further examination of the data was left for attention at the PIs' 
home laboratories. 
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3.6 Documentation 
A special objective of the ASSESS II mission was to simplify procedures 
and minimize the amount of paper work necessary to accomplish thJ mission, 
consistent with plans for Space1ab. 'fhree aspects of ASSESS II management 
had a strong influence on docum~ntation planning: 1) the centering of 
payload responsiblity in the Mission l>lanager, 2) full PI responsibility to 
develop good and reliable experiments, and 3) direct participation by both 
PIs and pISs in payload integration. These management features were the base 
potential for a low-level system of formal documentation, with fuce-to-face 
discussions and direct support of the best qualified personnel in place of 
detailed procedures and hardware verification required of the PI. 
These considerations led to significant discussions in the Mission Steer-
ing Group, and a Baseline Documentation and Information Fl.ow for ASSESS II 
was issued by the MSG about 10 months before flight. That documentation plan, 
shown in figure 22, represented an early viewpoint of optimistic desire for 
a very few documents to implement the mission. The plan was followed in a 
general sense, but many j.ndividual documents were prepared and issued. Little 
documentation planning and control was pursued by mission management, even 
though the documentation issue ~as a special objective of the mission. 
ASSESS II addressed only the docume1htation requirements necessary to 
integrate and operate the payload. There was no intent, to evaluate flight 
vehir.le documentation analogous to the orbiter system, except as it would 
pertain to interfaces with the pay;J.oad components or their operation. 
3.6.1 Document Classification 
The actual documents issued by the various participants and used in the 
mission are listed in table 15. Top level interagency agreements between 
NASA and ESA Headquarters are not included. Also, ESA documentation used 
for ESA payload integration and checkout in Europe is not included. The 
documentation is divided into three classes as .follm\ls: 
CLASS A Reference Documents - not mission unique 
CLASS B Payload Interfacing Documents - mission unique 
CLASS C I.nterna1 Working Documents 
MuC'h discussion about documentation took place in management echelons of 
NASA as the ASSESS 1I miss~.on progressed. Referring to the three classes of 
documents listed above, little concern existe.d for CLASS A documents, which 
for Spacelab will be issued as handbook-type do~uments and 'wi11 not constitute 
new documents for each mission. Also, there was little concern for CLASS C 
documents, which are internal working documents and do not materially affect 
other organizations. 'fhe CLASS n interfucing documents were of prime interest, 
because they are the type which can create extensive requirements on other 
organizations and compollnd cost. 
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Table 15 - ASSESS II Documentation 
CLASS A - Reference Documents 
STS Rules 
Ground Operations Reference Document 
I.aunch Site Implementation Plan (Part A) 
-.. poce Requirements 
POCC Operations Implementation Procedures 
poce Operations Hartdbook 
Nce Console Handbook 
CV-990 Experimenters' Handbook 
cr~ss B ~ Payload Interfacing Documents 
Payload Mission Rules 
Nission Implementation Plan 
InvE'.stigator Requirements Documents (one per experiment) 
Experiment Drawings and Stress Analyses 
Payload Operation Procedures 
Payload Level IV and Launch Site Ground Operations Requirements 
Document 
Payload Configuration Drawing 
Experiment Installation Sketches 
Experiment: Installation Cable Interconnect Diagrams 
Payload Flight Data File 
Payload Stowage List 
Level IV Integration Implementation Document 
Launch Site Integration Implementation Plan (Part B) 
Operation and Maintenance Instruction 
Payload Flight Definition Requirements Document 
Data Requirements Document 
Detailed Payload Crew Activity Plans 
Payload Operator Requirements and Preliminary Training Plan 
Payload Specialists Training Implementation Document 
Integrated Nission Simulation Plan 
Integrated Summary Crew Activity Plan 
CV-990 Daily Flight Plans 
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Table 15 continued 
CLASS C - Internal Working Documents 
Level IV Integration Processing 
Investigator Log (one per experim~nt) 
Diagrams and Procedures 
Test Procedures 
Problem Reports 
Test Preparation Sheets 
Discrepancy Reports 
Work Authorization Documents 
POCC Operations 
Director's Log 
Payload Planner's Log 
Communicator's Log 
Final Flight Plans 
Science Plan Chart 
POCC Operations Timeline 
Payload Crew Timelines 
Data Slice Requests (one per experiment 
Data Terminal Time Assignment 
Record of Data Offloaded from Aircraft 
As-Flown Data Logs (postflight) 
Science Summary Reports (postflight) 
Launch Site Processing 
Problem Report 
Discrepancy Report Tag 
Engineering Change Notice 
Operational-Checkout Procedure Deviation 
Test 'Preparation Sheet 
~C Opera tions 
MCC Console Log 
Flight Support Work Schedules 
Data Retrieval Log 
as rt!quired) 
_____ ..lL-... 
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3.6.2 Content of Documentation 
3.6.2.1 
Referring to the ASSESS II documents listed in table 15, most of the 
CLASS A documents are obviously handbook or reference type documents 'vhich 
','Quld apply to succe~,sive missions, and ,.,Quld need only minor update from time to 
time. KSC issued a Launch Site Implementation Plan in t~vQ parts. Part A ~vns 
handbook type information describing procedures by 'vhich they proposed to 
handle launch site acthrities. (Part B, found under CLASS B documents, des-
cribed plans for the tipecific payload at hand.) The POCC Requirements docu-
ment listed under CLASS A W'as the NSFC pnylcad Nission }tanager's general 
requirements for a more or less standardized POCC facility which w'ould serve 
all payload missions. The poce Operations Implementation Procedures and the 
rocc Operations Handbook \vere both one time type issuances and could have been 
combined. 
3.6.2.2 
Probably th~ most basic interface documer.ts for the ASSESS II mission 
were the Investigator Requirements Documents (IRDs) issued by the }Kssion 
Hanager to each PI in questionnaire f0rmat \dth space provided for each 
nns~ver. One IRD '(.;oas prepared for e'h'h experiment, and they are discussed at 
l~ngth in section 3.3.1. The objective to create only t,,'\e interfacing doc-
ument bJat\veen management and the. expe.rimente.r a.ppears to have been desirable 
and valid. Significant progress ,vas made during ASSESS II in developing a 
fOl'lUat for the IRDs, but it qui(~kly became apparent that :::'uc1, improvement is 
required in the format to eliminate redundancy and clarify the questions. The 
lRDs \Vere 'vell accepted by the e;:...-per.iml'mte.rs, after tbe initial shock for some 
as to the numbe~ of requirements and int(lrfaces ,vhich ,vere ::.mportant to specify, 
and h;:ld to be addressed st.")oner or later. It should be. noted that the IRD did 
not go into details internal to thl" experiment; the. st~le,~ti.on and use of compon-
ents (except for safety features) ,vas a rx de.ci$il1n. Oper~tional reliability 
,vus his responsibili ty and no justification or analysis ~vas required. 
Unfortunately, the IRDs did not get a full trial during ASSESS II. The 
two specific attempts to establish IRD information, ,,,!lich 'tJ~'l:'e several months 
apart, resulted in t\vO separate IRDs ,dth sottle difference in format and they 
ware not consolidated. ThE' IRD effort \Vas terminated after the second analyti-
cal integration. }Kssion management filled out the IRDs in most cases, based 
on discussions ,.;oith ~;:"'''Perimenters, but the completed documents ,,,ere not fed 
back to all experimenters for concurrance until much later. 
As plans for e;:...~eriment integration developed, it ~"as generally recognized 
that the IRDs should have been continually \tpdated to be fully useful, but it 
was.too late to recover that effort, and the nal::\nce of interface information 
which became available during the las t five months before launch ,vas 1-)andled 
on an fld hoc basis. 
f 
In addition to the actual IRD documents, the PIs submitted appropriate 
drawings and sketches of their equipment to identify physical interfacing 
details. Stress analyses were also submitte~ to satisfy safety requirements 
stated in the CV-990 Experimenters' Handbook. These drqwings and stress 
analyses were really adjuncts to the individual IRDs for each of the experi-
ments. 
The Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) document, developed from the MSG 
proposal shown in figure 22, was intended to be a synopsis of the activities 
planned by all participants to carry out the ASSESS II mission. Its original 
purpose was to provide a single concise source of information for PIs and 
upper management regarding general conduct of the overall mission. Questions 
arose as to whether such a document should be prepared by the Mission Manager 
or the STS organization which would implement flight operations. For ASSESS 
II, the NASA Program Manager assigned responaibility for the MIP to JSC. The 
document summarized the objectives of the mission and responsibilities of the 
various participating organizations, but did not serve the purpose originally 
intended. 
The Payload Mission Rules were issued by the Mission Manager to spell 
out the rules for the specific mission. These rules would generally be mission 
dependent based on the type of payload to be flown. In the case of Spacelab, 
the payload might consist of pallet only, a combination of pressurized modules 
plus pallet, or other payload arrangements. 
Mission. management used the IRD information as the base for several pay-
load requirekents documents covering different facets of the mission. Follow-
ing the plan of figure 22, these were intended to relay to support groups the 
information necessary to develop operating plans. These were the following: 
Payload Level IV and Launch Site Ground Operations Requirements 
Document; 
Payload Flight Definition Requirements Document; 
Data Requirements Document; 
Payload Operator Requirements and Preliminary Training Plan. 
The Payload Level IV and Launch Site Ground Requirements Document issued 
by MSFC was really a two-in-one document, and probably should have been split. 
The requirt:ments to .handle Level IV integration and launch site integration 
were unique in many respects, and were implemented by different organizations, 
so that even though some requirements may have been the same, two separate 
documents would seem to have been justified. 
The five individu,sl documents listed immediately under the Payload Level 
IV and Launch Site Ground Requirements Document should have been included in 
the basic documents just discussed instead of being issued separately, since 
they were part of the requirements for }evel IV Integration and/or launch site 
payload processing. The first three were drawings and sketches that were 
transmitted to KSC by letter, but since they constituted important launch site 
requirements from the payload manager, and never showed up in any\~ther way, 
they have been identified as separate ASSESS II documents. 
;( 
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Support groups then issued responding documents to the mission require-
ments in their areas of responsibility. These were the following: 
Level IV Integration Implementation Document; 
Launch Site Integration Implementation Plan (Part B); 
Integrated Summary Cre,\' Activity Plan; 
Detailed Payload Crew Activity Plans; 
Integrated ~tlssion Simulation Plan; 
CV-990 Daily Flight Plans; 
Payload Specialists Training Implementation Document. 
The Level IV Integration Implementation Document was the ~lSFC operating 
document, to accomplish Level IV integration and testing, while Launch Site 
Integration Implementation Plan (Part B) was KSC's implementation plan. The 
KSC Operation and Maintenance Instruction, sho,m on table 15, was really part 
of their implementation plan, and could just as well have been included in 
the basic document. 
The balance of the CLASS B documents are generally self-explanatory by 
the titles. ~fSFC issued the Payload Specialists training implementation doc-
uments. JSC issued the document for the all-up Integrated Mission Simulation 
"'-ast that occurrred just prior to flight, and an Integrated Summary Crew 
Activity Plan which for Spacelab will integrate flight crew activities with 
payload crew operations for the overall flight mission. All of the CV-990 
Daily Flight Plans together would be analogous to a single ov~rall mission 
flight plan issued by JSC for Spacelab. 
3.6.2.3 Interna~ Working Documents (CLASS C) 
The CLASS C documents are shown in table 15 for completenesso All of 
these documents have been discussed previously in the implementation section 
of this report. They represent essentially internal documentation used by 
MSFC, KSC, and JSC to handle and track their own operational responsibilities. 
Only in a few cases, such as in the development of Test Procedures for use 
during integration, were the PIs significantly impacted by the CLASS C doc-
umentation. 
3.6.3 Evalue,tion of Documentation 
The documentation used for ASSESS II was basic to the entire mission 
and has been discussed throughout the implementation section of this report. 
Evaluation of documentation used during ASSESS II is complicated by several 
facts which became evident as the mission progressed. Lack of management 
control resulted in multiple documents, late issues, and changes of title. 
Considerable effort was expended where not justified, while areas in need of 
attention were neglected; the pis training was over documented, IRD records 
were deficiento But it should be recognized that ASSESS II was a realistic 
atii 
i'liarning experience, not an exercise of proven methods. Accot'dingly, the 
following summary observations give pe~spective to tIle documentation effort. 
1. Insufficient management attention was exercised over documentation 
identification, content, and schedule of issuance. 
2. Baseline documentation plan (figure 22) served to guide information 
flow, even though little if any overt action was taken to develop 
the base plan. 
3. 
4. 
IRD concept was implemented sufficiently to prove its validity, 
but not enough to show its f\l11 potential. 
Integrated Payload Description (IPD) of figure 22 was not: realized 
as a s1ngle document with feedback to the PIs. Rather. the several 
requirements documents from the Nission Nan8ser were developed from 
the IRD data, base as elements of an IPl). 
Certainly, ASSESS II was somewhat simpler than Spacelab is expected to be, 
but the basic approach to payload development exercised is believed valid in 
the larger context, so that the corresponding documentat:l,on pattern need not 
be appreciably expanded. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4. ASSESS II CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPACELAB 
4.1 Mission Summary 
The ASSESS II mission was a successful simulation of a total Spacelab 
mission. Management interfaces to be involved in Spacelab were deeply exer-
cised among experimenters and the ESA and NASA organizations. The Mission 
Manager concept for Spacelab is new, and, even though the early Spacelabs are 
proceeding under the Mission Manager concept the ASSESS II project was 
the first significant experi~nce in exercising this concept throughout an 
entire Spacelab-like mission with active Spacelab organization participants. 
International aspects of ASSESS II added special reality. The spectrum of 
activities for experimenters, including experiment development, payload 
integration, flight operation, data retrieval, and active participation with 
an operating POCC and MCC was a realistic. representation of similar activities 
to be experienced in Spacelnb operations. A Mission Specialist and Payload 
Specialists were selected and trained, and perforMed well in flight. 
As in any simulation, the exercise was imperfect, with some deviations 
from Spacelab planned activities. Aircraft system constraints and funding 
limitations, particularly in the U.S., limited fidelity of the simulation 
in some areas, and the very tight project schedule, coupled with limited 
manpower resources, forced some preliminary work to be done in parallel and 
seriously delayed some activities. Use of an airborne laboratory instead of 
a space vehicle reduced the cost of the project to a fraction of Space1ab 
costs so that the economic driver, even though it was significant for ASSESS 
II, was small compared to Spacelab. The overall resultant "fishbowl" effect 
of reaction to mistakes or severe problems was minimum. Also, the airborne 
payload involved a smaller number of experiments than planned for Spacelab 1, 
although the amount of equipment was comparable in volume. Payload prepar-
ation and flight were fully realistic. Safety was Mandatory. Mechanical, 
electrical, and data interfaces all had to be fully addressed. Participation 
of scientists with intense efforts to obtain meaningful data was complete, and 
the schedule was held rigid so that events could not be easily shifted. The 
entire exercise was regarded by all participants as excellent and valuable 
training for future Spacelab operations. 
Following are specific conclusions derived from the ASSESS II mission 
which are considered pertinent for Spacelab planning along with a synoptic 
discussion of each conclusion. 
4.2 Payload Selection and Funding 
4.2.1 Payload Selection 
(a) Compatibility of payload scientific discipline requirements simplifies 
payload planning and mission implementation. 
For ASSESS II the experiments chosen for the payload established require-
ments for IR astronomy, solar viewing, upper atmospheric measurements, and 
earth viewing which included some very specifically identified overflight 
targets. This immediately led to requirements for both day and night flights. 
With this mi'X of e'Xperiment objectives, there was no poss:i.bility of accom-
modating every PI's requirements. Flight planning was complicated. Night 
flights and the astronomy experiments were given priority, resulting in 
serious compromise of other experiment objectives, particularly those 
requiring overflights of earth surface targets. 
Although it may be necessary to carry interdisciplinary payloads on 
Spacelab, and some diverse requirements may be easier to accommodate than 
with an airplane, similar scientific objectives will simplify flight plan-
ning and increase efficiency of experiment operations, which will in turn 
reduce the scope of crew training, and should be expected to yield more 
usable data for an overall mission. 
(b) Payload compl ement can be formed by sel ecting from ongoi ng experiment 
development programs or existing instrumentation. 
NASA Office of Applications (OA) avoided use of an Announcement of 
Opportunity for generating its payload complelnent for ASSESS II because 
of limited time available and lack of funding to support new proposals. 
Instead, in June 1976, OA identified payload candidates among various 
disciplines tlutt were planned for future Spacelab missions and for which 
early prototype tests were being conducted using the CV-990. The five 
OA experiments ·flown on ASSESS t! were selected by this method. In view 
of planned Spn,t~elab/Shuttle launch rates in the mid 1980s, this selection 
method could hI:! used with "disc:i.pline" AnnoUllcemell.ts of Opportunity used 
to secure pr!\~lposals without regard to a specific mission (e.g., Spacelab 
1, etc.). Al.though ESA llsed an Announcement of Opportunity, all the 
e'Xperimen~s they selected were in some stage of development, which also 
supports the conclusion. 
4.2.2 Payload Funding 
Conclusions on this topic arise primarily from experience with NASA 
funded experiments on the ASSESS II program. Spacelab planners should try 
to avoid these complications which caused conSiderable difficulty during 
ASSESS 11. 
122 
-.. --------~--________ ._&_~'~t.MI._bt~_.~a ___ ~. ________ • ____ _ 
u 
Q 
B 
~ d I' 
~ 
~ 
~ 
."" 
0 
U 
0 
U 
U 
U 
U 
U 
E 
~ 
~ '" 
0 
I ~ , 
.~ 
i 
", 
~ 
I 
1 
! 
i I 
! , 
i \ 
\ 
I, 
! ,i 
\ ; 
I. 
i': 
i • 
I: 
l ~~ 
.,'1 
", 
;. 
., 
r: 
~, 
'. ,.
'I. 
(a) Timely authorization and funding of the payload is mandatory to avoid 
serious impact on mission definition and resultant compromise of 
scientific return. Analysis of payload funding schedules is of equal 
importance to payload' analytical integration. 
Full understanding and distribution of funds for several U.S. experi-
ments was not accomplished until December 1976, almost nine months after 
NASA Headquarters approval and only five months before "launch". The GSFC-
ABES experiment was not authorized and funded until February 1977, only 
about three and a half months before flight. This problem reflected 
throughout the whole chain of participating organizations and delayed pay-
load configuration decisions, interface definition, data processing software, 
and,construction of experiment support hardware. The AEES experiment was 
in a "crash" schedule mode from authorization to flight with premium time 
costs, equipment failures not properly addressed, and some loss of scientific 
data. 
(b) Funding deficiencies and multiple funding channels must be avoided to 
prevent compromising payload elements. 
The selection of five experiments comprising the baseline OA payload 
was made by the NASA HQ OA "discipline" program offices having management 
cognizance. Funding for hardware was available for all but one experiment, 
but was not adequate for integration and data analysis. Reprogramming from 
other funding sources caused delays in getting funds distributed. There 
was no central control authority established in NASA Headquarters (and; 
therefore, none at the mission management level) to work these problems. 
Multiple authorities over funding resulted in on-again-off·-again decisions. 
One experiment was dropped for lack of funding, only to reappear later 
when reprogramming actions were taken. 
(c) Funding allocations should cover all required integration and miSSion 
operations support in addition to hardware development and data analysis. 
--
Insufficient effort was made to budget for integration and support 
activities by experimenters. The analytical integration effort, in 
particular, was insufficiently supported, ~.;rith resultant detrilnent to 
mission planning, integration, and checkout. Several experimenters were 
limited by travel fund restrictions to a lower level of personal support 
than was necessary to do a minimum proper job. One PI ~"as unablE' Co 
be present for any of the critical preflight integration and testing of his 
experiment because of lack of funds. Many PIs were unable to attend the 
second IWG meeting when experiment and mission plans were firming up and an 
iterative exchange with mission management personnel would surely have pre-
vented many surprises and problems when e.quipment was delivered for integ-
ration. 
I,:' 
Nanagement Relations 
(a) Mission Manager concept is sound, but adequate staffing is essential and 
further development of the concept is necessary to insure efficient coverage 
of all program aspects. 
Implementation of the ASSESS II project under the Mission Manager from 
MSFC worked very well. There was general feeling that the concept could be 
implemented at any organization having responsibility for a payload if the 
Mission Manager had adequate resources in terms of funding and qualified staff 
to fully organize the payload, identify and track all of ·the payload inter-
faces, conduct meaningful analytical integration, identify payload requirements 
to STS, and plan and staff the POCC during flight operations. 
It must be recognized that ASSESS II was not a complete trial of the 
Mission ~mnager concept for several reasons: (1) The first appointed Mission 
Manager could not apply adequate time to the project, and the Assistant 
Mission ~mnager was not given sufficient authority or resources to act effect-
ively for the manager in all aspects of the program; (2) the eventual change 
in Mission ~nager introduced a hiatus while he picked up on the project; 
(3) the Mission Manager's staff was not sufficient to handle all of the 
assigned responsib1ities; and (4) continuity of staff assignments was not 
maintained, resulting in some learning curve inefficiencies. 
Engineering support available to mission management was not adequate 
to complete or maintain the Investigator Requirements Documents properly. The 
lack of support also affected the analytical integrations, particularly in 
the areas of physical, electrical, and data requirements. These areas 
of the analytical effort were inadequately handled resulting in subsequent 
probl~ms. Adequate analytical integration support plus continuity 
of effort to maintain the Investigator Requirements Documents on a current 
basis should eliminate these difficulties. 
The ESA/SPICE Payload ~~nager served as the single official interface to 11 
the MSFC Mission Manager for the European experiments and also manag,ed integ- U 
ration and operation of the ESA portion of the payload in Europe. The ESA 
Payload Manager took on all European experiment problems and provided strong 
ESA support to the experimenter to solve them. KSC representatives, inU 
particular, observed that this single interface arrangment for European experi-
ments worked smoothly and efficiently. ESA was able to maintain continuity of 
managment personnel throughout the project, and their arrangement interfaced J1D~ 
well with the NASA Mission Manager concept. 
(b) The Mission Steering Group proved an effective forum for solving interface 
problems and exchanging views and philosophies on the conduct of the mission. 
ESA suggests that a similar O1ultiorganizational group be used to oversee all joint Spacelab missions. 
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The Mission Steering Group (MSG) was established for ASSESS II specifi-
cally to guide the. mission and establish ground rules for the simulation in 
order to maximize results for Space1ab. As the mission progressed, the MSG, 
with key representatives from all of the participating organizations, became a 
forum for addressir.g basic mission problems. 
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of a higher level body such 
as the MSG uSed on ASSESS II as it might apply to a single Space1ab mission or 
a series of missions involving the same organizations. While the MSG was not 
established as a prototype for Space1ab, some representatives, particularly 
ESA. felt the MSG forum was their only means to interface with the total 
project, and to address basic issues which they considered important. Dilu-
tion of management at MSFC during the first half of the project period left a 
void which the MSG tended to fill, and some expressed concern that the MSG was 
getting involved in implementation decisions rather than in policy. Strong 
mission management would probably eliminate that problem, but in the case of 
ASSESS II a tendency to address implementation areas developed before effect-
ive mission management was established, and the ~lission Manager later felt his 
decision making prerogative was being usurped by the MSG. 
Ii 
" After the mission experince was completed, both ESA Headquarters and 
ESAI'SJlICE management personnel strongly endorsed such a "board of directors" 
type overseeing body for Space1ab projects where their invo1vment is substan-
tial. The MSFC ~lission Manager was just as strongly opposed. NASA Head-
quarters program level representatives finally agreed with the Mission 
Manager. 
(c) Management should clearly inform all participants early in the mission as to 
roles and responsiblities. 
It is essential that an early, deliberate effort be made by program and 
mission management to inform all prime participants as to the management struc-
ture, the various roles and responsibilities, and the manageme'nt paths required 
to obtain optimal results. This is particularly necessary for such complex 
managment arrangements as existed for ASSESS II and are planned for some 
Space1ab missions. The STS role and its relationship to other implementing 
centers was not clearly defined by NASA Headquarters at the outset of ASSESS 
II. Interviews with several participants late in the ASSESS project revealed 
that they had only sketchy ideas as to the responsibilities of various organi-
zations and of their relationships with them. 
The first IWG meeting was the only meeting that included most of the 
participants, and an attempt was made there to inform them as to the various 
roles and responsibilities. However. that was almost a year before flight 
and some roles and responsibilities were not yet fully established. U.S. 
Payload Specialist arrangements came about later. The ~assion Specialist role 
and selection were difficult to develop and finally occurred very late. The 
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second IWO meeting at MSFC, five and a half months before flight, was poorly 
attended which precluded much information exchange. No other such 
meetings were held. Thus, it is not surprising that some participants (PIs 
and pISs) interviewed during the final. weeks were not familiar with some of 
the key management personnel and their responsibilities. 
(d) Participation by PIs throughout the mission planning and implementation 
I] 
U 
(a) 
phases can enhance overall mission understanding (by both management and user) 
and thereby improve science return. PIs must recognize their leadership 
position concerning th~ir experiments. 
In ASSESS II, each PI andlor his staff participated directly in IRD 
activity, IWO meetings, System Level Payload Integration, and the real-time 
flight operations through the POCC. In addition, access to his equipment was 
relatively easy during Launch Site Payload Processing if he had such a need. 
The PIs were pleased with their degree of involvement. The intent of ASSESS 
II was both direct involvement and major responsibility on the part of the 
Pl o Responsibility for experiment success was in his domain, except for 
constraints of safety and interference with the flight vehicle or other experi-
ments. This plan for PIs to accept full responsibility for experiments was 
not fully recognized by all PIs. PI effort to aggressively identify their 
interface needs in some cases required strong prodding by mission management, 
and the need for thorough and complete testing during integration was not . 
fully achieved in all cases and led to serious experiment problems in flight •. 
The degree of his responsiblity for integrated testing, pIs training and 
operational procedures, and support of all mission operations with a suffi-
cient and effective support team, must be realized and fully sponsored by the 
PI. 
4.4 Pre-flight Planning and Payload Integration 
4.4.1 Investigators' Working Oro~ 
The IWG can be a satisfactory forum for scientific inputs and a valuable 
channel for information flow between management and th~ PIs. 
U 
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For ASSESS II the IWO concept worked very well. The two independent 1n- I 
docttination meetings in Europe and the U.S. were excel1en~. Two other full 
meetings were called, and although attendance at the second meeting was kept 
down by the unavailability of travel funds, in general. the IWO had the II 
following beneficial results: discussion of mission plans and objectives. 
science interchange among PIs. evolution of a cooperative experiment between 
two PIs, recommendations for selection of Payload Specialists. transfer of 
information about the flight carrier and interface limitations, and PI contri-
butions to mission planning. With more extensive use of the IWG, all of these 
functions can be better exercised for Spacelab. Whila for ASSESS II, one in-
doctrination IWG meeting plus two full working meetings seemed about right, 
a much longer preparation period for Spacelab flight probably necessitates 
more IWG meetings. They should start early in the mission to disseminate 
mission plans and information about experiment integration requirements. 
Appropriate additional meetings at regular intervals will permit organized 
updates of information from the experimenters, continued beneficial inter-
action among experimenters, as well as planning updates by mission management. 
A teamwork approach enhances opportunity for great~r mission success, and IWG 
meetings provide the best forum for building a successful team. 
(b) The Mission Scientist (and any IWG cochairman or vicechairman) needs to have 
clearly defined responsibilities, full support by the PIs, and be provided 
with a management overview. 
The Mission Scientist served a key role in planning and execution of 
science activity, and provided focus of science requirements and science 
tradeoffs to the Nission Manager. He worked independently with the PIs and 
with planners for flight operations to present the science case to mission 
management. This mode of operation was very effective. During flight opera-
tions, the NASA and ESA Mission Scientists were very successful in coordin-
ating and managing PI activities. 
The Mission Scientist must be carefully selected. He serves dual and 
somewhat opposing roles. On the one hand he serves the Mission Manager and 
must be realistic about management constraints, even at the expense of science 
objectives if warranted. On the other hand, if he is to represent the PIs in 
their absen~e, he must have their respect and stand hard in favor of the 
experimente*s in the face of project management resource and schedule pressures. 
Thus, a M±dsion Scientist is the bridge between mission implementation actions 
a~d the scientific objectives. He must be strong in his own right to insist 
on and maintain a solid objective position, and to do this he must be kept 
well informed on a timely basis of the overall project activity. His effect-
iveness in performing this role will depend upon his mffl stature as a science 
manager, and the degree to which all other partiCipants recognize the require-
ment for his analysis and possible arbitration of science considerations. 
4.4.2 Investigator Requirements Document 
(a) A single requirements document interfacing with each PI is desirable and 
feasible. Face-to-face discussions, with the participation of technical 
experts, are necessary to clarify interfaces. These discussions must start 
early in the mission and continue to be iterated througout the mission to 
insure proper information transfer. 
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The use of the IRDs during ASSESS II was a pre-Spacelab, trial of this 
single interface document concept. The IRD exercise was very good, and 
while improvements are in order, indications are very strong that the concept 
. desirable and workable. Several lessons become apparent from this experi-
~ ,;e and are summarized as follows: 
I: The single document plan has merit. From a mission management point 
of view, a single document which addresses all interfaces with the experimenter 
concentrates managment attention to all his needs in an organized way, and at 
an appropriately early time to identify lead time requirements before a schedule 
crisis. From the experimenter's point of view, he grew to recognize that the 
document truly addressed his needs, and provided him the opportunity to spell 
out his total requirements early. Even though the IRDs were not maintained 
current during the entire implementation period, they contained the basic 
requirements for the entire payload. Eleven such documents were employed to 
describe all PI and experiment requirements in detail. 
2,. The organization and wording of the IRD requires careful attention 
for application to Spacelab. The question and answer format was good, but 
overall organization of the questions needs very careful study and improvement 
to eliminate redundancy and to achieve maximum clarity with brevity. It is 
recognized that no single document can be comprehensive enough to elicit all 
details of all experiments in a simple predetermined format. However, the 
IRD must be~ructured to identify all basic requirements to a workable level 
of detail, with prOVision for expanding sections where more information is 
needed by management team specialists to implement requirements. It was 
found that careful wording is needed so that management and experimenters can 
understand each other unambiguously. A significant wording problem was obvious 
in the ASSESS II IRDs, where the use of engineering jargon confused several 
PIs. 
3. The IRDs mu&t be filled out during face-to-face meetings. It was 
quickly recognized that face-to-face meetings were necessary to provide an 
opportunity for discussion of background for the various IRD questions and 
to discuss interfaces with the vehicle. Without exception, PIs required 
assistance in aligning their interface requirements to vehicle capabilities. 
The discussions clarified many points and led to enthusiastic responses by the 
PIs to supply information. Both in Europe and in the U.S., a two-day meeting 
was scheduled with each PI. In general, this resulted in overtime sessions 
and a rush to finish on the second dayo A longer first meeting is necessary, 
especially for a first-time experimenter with a complex experiment. 
4. Mission management staff must be well qualified and experienced to 
attain a satisfactory rapport with experimenters in filling out IRDs. The 
ASSESS II meetings to fill out the IRDs were successful. Only a small inter-
facing group (perhaps 3 or 4) is needed to deal with experimenters in filling 
out lRDs. However, it is absolutely mandatory that experts who fully know .. the 
interfacing systems (electrical, mechanical, data, etc.) work with the experi-
menters in developing this information. Further, it is helpful if the inter-
viewing group has developed some background knowledge on each experiment, and 
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is generally familiar with the methods of scientific research and the points 
of view of experimenters. The interview team should not only codify the 
requirements of an experimeltt, but the representatives should make suggestions 
for better usage in situations where the experimenter has not taken optimal 
advantage of Spacelab facilities. 
5. Concentrated effort is required following face-to-face meetings to 
clarify information and insure completeness. A very large quantity of data 
was generated during each IRD meeting and most of the information was hand-
written. This simple informal recording proved adequate for management use 
when clearly worded and carefully written. Some hastily written material was 
difficult to decipher and should have been clarified and cleaned up quickly 
while the thoughts were still fresh. A small point, which turned out to be 
a significant problem on some IRDs, was the use of a shade of ink that would 
not make satisfactory copies. 
6. Completed IRDs must be fed back to the experimenters. It is impor-
tant that IRDs be returned quickly to each PI for his information as to inter-
face plans, and also for his concurrence that the information correctly represents 
his needs. 
7. IRDs must be maintained up-to-date by mission m.anagement since they 
become the basic reference documents for the experiments and drive t.he .,whole 
process of payload preparation, integration, flight planning, arid flight 
operation. It was intended that the ASSESS II IRDs should be the basic source 
of information about all aspects of the experiments and their interfaces, and 
that one could refer to the IRDs for all requirements for ground testing, 
installation, and operation in flight. Because the ASSESS II IRDs were not 
kept current, their use was limited after the second analytical integration. 
While the two visits to fjll out the IRDs seemed about right, subsequent updated 
information that was gathered without meetings should have been fed to the IRD 
format to maintain the documents as complete authoritative sources throughout 
the flight preparation period. 
4.4.3 Analytical Integration 
(a) The analytical integration of a Spacelab payload must be accomplished in a 
timely, complete fashion so that all participants can receive complete payload 
definition and requirements early enough to plan the payload proce~sing 
activities. 
The analytical integration effort for ASSESS II was well done and timely 
to the extent it was carried out. However, after the last organized effort 
extensive work was still required to solidify final physical, electrical, 
and data interfaces. The feedback tq. experimenters and others was excellent 
after initial analytical integration, largely because management presented 
results directly to the participants and could interact with them. Following 
the second analytical effort feedback to the experimenters was less effective 
due to poor meeting attendance, and results had to be relayed by the Hission 
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Scientist. No further organized exchanges took place between management 
and experimenters before the payload integration period. 
4.4.4 Integration of ESA Payload ill Europe 
For Spacelab payloads involving ESA experiments, testing, integration, and 
operation of those experiments under ESA management at a centralized European 
site would be extremely beneficial. 
~----~~~'--------------------~------------------------------------------~ 
The ESA sponsored integration, test, and operational activity at ESA/ 
SPICE was extremely beneficial. In most cases, the experimenters needed 
extensive support to get their equipment assembled and working properly. 
Individual assistance was supplied and many problems were identified and 
solved dur.ing the ESA/SPICE integration activity. With the support of a NASA 
safety representative, safety issues were addressed, thus avoiding major 
difficulty later. Valuable pis training was accomplished. The ESA integra-
tion activity insured that the ESA complement arrived in the U.S. as a tested 
set of experiments, thus reducing their integration time with the balance of 
the payload. 
4.4.5 System Level Payload Integration 
The value of off-line System level Payload Integration activitie~ (level IV) 
is direct'ly related to fidelity of the test facility and complete:ness of the 
, tests per/formed. 
~ ----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
For ASSESS II, off-line System Level Payload Integration activity (Level 
IV) was performed in a special ground based integration and ~heckout area at 
ARC. It was a minimum cost arrangement, which simulated the'system functions 
quite well, but was not intended to duplicate physical interfaces to any great 
degree. This first-time integration of the entire payload uncovered many 
problems --. most were solved, although some were passed on to launch site 
processingo The ability to address all problems in an off-line system simulator 
is strongly proportional to the investment in simulator equipment to achieve 
high fidelity to the carrier vehicle. Without exact cabling configuration (both 
data and power), duplicates of the flight support systems, and exact physical 
interfaces some problems cannot be identified. 
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(b) Off-line System Level Payload Integration activities (level IV) are very 
effective in crew training. U 
For ASSESS II, although the ESA PISs had participated and trained during ~, 
the ESA integration activity, the off-line System Level Payload Integration and U 
_'_M_~ ____ =_ ..... _ ......... __ ~_~.~1--'aA--~~- m 
----------------------------.. ----,----------------... ,~ 
operation at ARC was the first time all PISs had an opportunity to operate 
experiments as a complete payload. The PiSs were given basic responsibilities 
during this phase, side by side tvith the experimenters, who also participated 
directly in this phase of integration. This was excellent training for the 
piSs, and it is highly recommended that PiSs be given this same opportunity 
and assignment for Spacelab. 
4.4.6 Launch Site Payload Processing 
'o'cc(~L cEof,cJal!nchcsitELID£e.gr.ation,,--±Jinely'defalled technical definition of----'-»-~' 
payload/carrier interfaces is essential. 
Most of the ASSESS II launch site integration requirements were deliv-
ered to KSC about two weeks before start of Launch Site Payload Processing. 
As a result, KSC had inadequate lead time to prepare for their work. Inter-
faces were not totally defined. However, for ASSESS II, the pISs and experi-
menter support groups were utilized essentially full time to accomplish the 
integration, and alleviated the situation. 
(b) Effective launch site payload processing can be performed using a Single 
di rect payloild manager interface to the KSC payload process i ng management. 
A payload test team approach,. using the M/S, PISs, and PIs when necessary, 
under the jurisdiction of KSC, to directly support and par'ticipate in the· 
KSC launch site processing operations was very successfu'J and is recommended 
for Spacelab. 
For ASSESS II the KSC launch site Manager, utilized the MiS and the piSs 
full time, as well as the ,\R.C support staff representing the launch site 
support contractor, to carry out integration and testing. The Mission Manager 
was the single off.icial interface with KSC for the payload, but close liaison 
was maintained with the ESA Payload Manager and the MSFC Grounn Operations 
Manager, who had handled the Level IV Integration. 
Although KSC maintained strict control of the schedule and operation, 
they were also very receptive to participation by the experimenters. This 
team approach was v<;!ry successful for ASSESS II "lid simplified the launch 
site integration and testing efforts. While this arrangement worked well for 
ASSESS II, the STS participants seriously questioned that this procedure can 
be followed at KSC for Spacelab, for several reasons. First, the support service 
contractor at KSC will be responsible for carrying out most of the detailed 
work o Although there appear to be valid arguments in favor of this approach~ 
in the past this practice has forced heavy documentation emanating from pa.yload 
participants, mainly experimenters, to provide sufficient detail so that per-
sonnel not fully familiar with theexper:i.ments can carry out the work sarely 
and successfully. It should be recognized that direct participation by experi-
menters and piSs who have lived with the experiment hardware and know it well 
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can substitute for large, quantities of such documentation if they are permitted 
to do so and are available. The second reason put forth by STS participants 
for limiting the ASSESS II team approach is a valid concern about too many 
people participating in flight vehicle activity where safety is paramount. 
Their concern may well limit participation by the experimenter and his immed-
iate staff. However, the pISs are perfect candidates for overseeing experiment 
install~tion and testing. They are few in number, yet know all the experiments, 
and very i~portantly, they will fly so that their consideration for safety will 
be totally:~erious, yet should be sufficiently practical to permit them to do 
their job in flight. Another positive feature in favor of pIs participation is 
th~ additional training to be gained with the flight configured payload. The 
team approach with heavy and responsible use of the pISs during launch site 
payload processing is recommended for Spacelab. 
To mlnlm14.e experiment systems failure, time should be 
experimen~ functional tests on the integrated vehicle. 
these tests, at least on priority experiments, implies 
may not be conmensurate with "11ssion investment. 
scheduled to conduct 
Failure to perform 
technical risk that 
~--------------------~----------.;.;..,-. ------.. 
\. '.\ .1 
There is no fully satisfactory substitute /or test ot; the payload compon-
ents in the actual flight configuration. While' a high-fidelity test device 
for system level (Level IV) integration does allow very significant debugging 
of the system interfaces and the payload experiments, there will always be at 
least minor configuration varistions in such a test/ device from the flight 
system that can produce serious anomalies in payload operation. In ASSESS II, 
each experiment was checked out on the aircraft after final flight vehicle 
integration. A number of problems were found and solved. For Spacelab, the 
KSC integration is baselined only to insure interface and EMI compatibility. 
It is recommended that a full operational check of at least priority experi-
ments be included to insure proper data producing capability. 
';; 
(d) Past experience should be applied to insure that experiment tests are conducted 
that will indicate possible experiment hardware weaknesses or susceptibilities. 
A great deal of experience exists at both NASA and ESA centers for check-
out of experiments to be flown in space. The participation of the implementa-
tioncenters in thEo' design review and tes t planning phases of the experiments 
can assist the Pl l s rate of success through experience transfer. The ground 
rule now being considered for Spacelab puts prime responsibility upon the PI 
to insure satisfactory operation of his equipment, while the STS responsibility 
is limited to safety and interface compatibility. For ASSESS II, at the discre-
tion of the experimenters, experiments were not thoroughly tested in all cases 
before flight. One prime experiment failed; others had operational problems. 
A positive approach to marry the knowledge of experienced integration manage-
ment personnel with the experimenters' responsibility to perform critical 
experiment tests is r(!t~ommended. 
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(e) An all-up Integrated Mission Simulation is valuable and is recommended, at 
least for the early Spacelab missions. Inclusion of instrument operation 
to verify operational interfaces during the simulation enhances the probaLility 
of experiment success. 
A generally effective end-to-end Integrated Mission Simulation was 
conducted in ASSESS II with the payload flight crew carrying out experiment 
operation supported by full MCC/fOCC participation. Many problems were 
identified, some with hardware, and some with operations. This level of 
simulation offers the most realistic possible training for the total opera-
tions team (MCC, POCC, and payload crew), and should, be included during the 
final integration period for Spacelab, especially for early missions. 
(f) Time should be provided in the launch site processing schedule to allow 
for some final experiment testing in the launch vehicle and for handling 
last-minute problems, which are bound to arise. Suitable facilities 
(a) 
for handling these problems should be available at the launch site. 
Experience with previously launched space systems, as well as the ana-
logous ASSESS experience, has shown that experiment problems will inevitably 
show up at KSC during integration of the payload into the flight vehicle. 
Some final experiment testing or calibration with flight system hardware 
may be required, particularly if problems arise during integration, to assure 
that acceptable flight data will be acquired. While this could be done in 
flight, the inherently greater risks would appear to justify onground veri-
fication. Facilities for metal work and electronics operations, together 
with highly trained personnel innnediately available to the launch site integra-
tion operation to provide support for experiments, are most desirable. Equally 
important are simple procedures to use these facilities and personnel so that 
quick fixes can be implemented with minimum disruption of the integration 
schedule. 
4.4.7 Safety 
Safety considerations for ASSESS II were effectively applied with a low 
level of formality, but it was not considered that the level of detail 
applied to ASSESS II contributed materially to understanding the required 
level of detail necessary for Spacelab. 
Many safety considerations for Spacelab were not required to the same 
depth for ASSESS II (e.g., olltgassing, stress corrosion, and detailed hazard 
analyses), although design control and review were exercised in all areas 
of potential hazard to personnel OT. equipment. 
For ASSESS II payload management provided guidance in safety matters 
to'the PI and his team, starting with the initial IRD meetings, to assure 
timely development of safety-qualified experiments. Early identification 
and tracking of potential problem areas, on-site consultation, and sugges-
tions for alternate solutions to accommodate science requirements by the 
responsible management specialist greatly benefits the experimenter and can 
reduce his documentation effort. The safety specialist's knowledge of each 
experiment facilitates review and approval of experimenter supplied design 
documents, and aids in prc.paration of operational safety plans. 
Safety ~onsiderations for the aircraft systems and the payload at ARC 
were handled by the Airworthiness Assurance Office. General safety inspec-
tions were handled on a daily basis during integration and ground operations 
by the Aircraft Inspection Branch, with simple problem sheets which incorp-
orated provision for signoff on the same sheet upon corrective action. Final 
all-up mission safety approval was issued in writing by the Airworthiness 
and Flight Review Safety Board, after formal meeting(s) with review of all 
safety related items and operational procedures. All flight personnel were 
required to participate in formal safety briefings. The Aircraft Commander 
was the final safety authority during flight. 
4.5 Payload Flight Crew 
4.5.1 Mission Specialist 
(a) The MIS role in ASSESS II and the management arrangement were very successful 
and are recommended for Spacelab. 
After much controversy and delay, the arrangement for a Scientist Astro-
naut to serve as Mission Specialist (MiS) for ASSESS II \4Tas worked out. 
The MIs remained administratively under JSC but was assi!,;i1ed functionally to 
the Mission Manager at MSFC. In addition to his ground based duties, he 
served on the flights as the alter ego of the Mission Manager. As the mission 
progressed, it became apparent that he also operated very effectively as 
leader of the Payload Specialists (piSs). He assumed this added role naturally 
as a result of his experimental background, his training experience, and his 
personality. The pISs were all well satisfied with this arrangement, parti-
cularly appreciating his acting as a buffer between them and the PIs during 
their busy operating times in flight. 
(b) The MIS functions for ASSESS II were unique to that position and served a 
vital need. 
On ASSESS II the MIs had the sole responsibility to handle aircraft 
support systems that interfaced with the experiments. These were the cental 
data system, the power supply and distribution system, and the specialized 
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(c) 
instrumentation such as gyrostabilized mirrors and a water vapor overburden 
radiometer. The overall function was extremely important and necessary, and 
could not have been handled by the pISs. 
The tot/S was also very effective as the commUllicat:lons coordinator between 
the payload c1:'ew, flight crew, and the POCC. He provided the Mission Scientist 
in the POCO with a balanced ove1:'view of the paylof:\d operations, and abo 
handled many speci.Ucs in behalf of the pISs. This unloaded the pISs of the 
communications burden to a substantial degree wh:l.ch they apprec:;iated because 
they were completely occupied with thei1:' experiment ope1:'ation tasks. Further, 
the HIs kept track of the va1:'ious legs of the flights and assisted the piSs in 
timing of their llctivities with respect to va1:'ious flight tracks, and coordi,.. 
nated requests fo1:' flight plan change.s with the flight and payload crew. As a 
scientist» he could appreciate what the 11/Ss were dOing, anel frequently could 
help them in overburdened situations. As a team, the 1-1/S and the pISs operated 
vety smoothly. 
'/ }, 
The MIS should be assi:gned e",r{y in a mission so that sufficient time will be 
available for training~"'i~~'i1 aspects of activity for which he is assigned 
responsib1 ity. 
On ASSESS n the MIs was not ~wlected until Dec.ember 1976~ five and 
<l half months before the simula ted spaceflight. '1'his time was insufficient 
for training on all systems for which he was to be responsible. In particular, 
:i.t was impossible .for him to get more than cursory training on the complex 
central data system. 
4.5.2 Payload Spec~alists 
(a) Participation of the PISs (time of selection, training schedule, etc.) should 
be included as an integral part of the mission planning so that their involve-
ment begins at the optimum time COlllll1enSUl'ate with their assignments. In 
particular, PIS involvement should commence at a stage that would allow their 
inputs to the contl~ol and operations aspect of the exper'iment design. 
ASSESS n piss were selectod oight manti'll') bufor.e flight. By the time 
they got to most of the PI lnhol'lltorioB lor trnlning, much of the hardware 
design was solidifiod. As in ASSESS I, the PISs all made strong observations 
that their early input to des:lgn would have, enhanoed successful operation 
of. the h~lrdwm=t~ and obtaining of science dnta. 
(b) Effective verbal communication skills should be an important criterion for 
PIS sel ection. 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Duri~g ASSESS II, it was ~oted that some piSs were significantly less 
adept at giving and receiving information than others, and tended to communi-
cate less effectively under stress. This problem does not relate particularly 
to whether or not a pIs is a native speaker of English, but to fundamental 
communication skills and attitudes which affects the success of making 
repairs and collecting data. This aspect of competence should be carefully 
considered in making pIs selections for Spac\.llab. 
Prior to final selection, PIS candidates should be subjected to some type 
of stress, including timeline activity. 
Observations indicated that the ability of pISs to operate under stress 
of multiple activity varied considerably. In Europe, psychological tests were 
used that clearly eliminated some pis candidates and raised cOllcerns about 
others. These concerns were borne out on ASSESS II during the integration and 
flight periods. 
-, 
Any PI candidate for PIS must be nllly cognizant of the workload time 
cOl1l11itment and demonstrate his abiffty to support both roles. 
On ASSESS II, one pIs was also a PI. Some interference was- noted when 
he interrupted h1s ASSESS II activity to take care of urgent PI management 
responsiblities. Very careful: consideration should be given to any PI who 
proposes to be a pIs on Spacelab, to assure his genuine willingness to forego 
his basic PI duties or have them handled by others, and that he thoroughly 
understands the t~me required away from his home base for meetings, training, 
and operational duties associated with the Spacelab payload. 
The use of backup PISs from the mission management team is feasible, but 
practicabil ity depends upon the ba-~ance of duties required fora specific 
mission. 
For ASSESS II, the NASA Assistant Mission Manager was selected to be 
backup PIs for U.S, experiments. This plan for a single backup for both NASA 
PISs was adopted particularly to save travel funds, and was acceptable because 
the individual was considered to be well acquainted with the U.S. experiments. 
His management duties were severely diluted, but he handled pis training and 
generally represented the payload crew to management during the preflight 
phases in addition to undergoing his own limited training. The question arises 
as to whether capable candidates will be willing to accept only a backup assign-
ment for Spacelab, with historically a very low probability of flight assign-
ment, unless there is some accompanying responsible assignment (which dilutes 
both jobs), or some strong liklihood that a backup pis assignment is a step 
toward prime assignment on another mission. 
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(f) Each crew candidate should be subjected to sufficiently realistic functional 
and environmental simulation of his role early in the training period to 
permit self-evaluation of his desire to proceed. 
The pISs \vel:e vel:bally infonned about the m~dical experiment befol:c the 
ASSESS II mission, but obviously all did not realize the potential physical 
pl:oblems. Some substantial physical difficulties were experienced by one 
pIs during the 72-houl: collection of Fls pl:eflight baseline medical data at 
ARC. The pl:oblem was sufficiently sevel:e that, due to potential loss of 
medical data und/or degradation of his overall e.ffectiveness, serious consid-
eration \vas given to rt;!placing him for the flight mission. He was not 
replaced, and the medical data \vus collected \v:lth no detectable degradation of 
pIs pCl:formance. However, the situation stl:ongly illustr3ted the nepd for a 
better understanding early in thp project. 
ig) PIS training must be tailo~ed to the individual PIS selected and the 
complexity and degree of PIS understanding of any given experiment. PIs 
must devote adequate time and effort to maximize the training effectiveness. 
On ASSESS II, pIss training "'vas varied. Ini tial training was scheduled 
On a time basis per experiment without regard to pIs capability or initial 
understanding of experiments, but some adjustments \vel:e mada as training 
progressed. Discussions \vith pISs aftel: the mission indicated that training, 
in some cases 1 had been ovcrdon~ for some experiments and ,~as inadequate for 
others. Hission management judgment should b(;1 blended with PI and Pis 
appraisal of need for training time, consis tent \vi th the background and 
capability of each pIs for each expet'iment and its pl:iority. 
(h) NASA should consider special means to provide administrative support for 
inhouse as well as out-af-house PISs in order not to preclude nomination 
of highly qualified candidates. 
For ASSESS II, nonlipu.t;ons of ant' inhotlsc and one contru.ctOl: pIs candi-
date ,vere wi thdl:u'vn from the NASA porrj,ol1 of the payload. The contractor 
proposed pIs had no chance of being selected because there was no means t(,) 
pay his salary or SUPP0l:t his tl:avel. The inhouse candidate was wi thdl:a\Vl1 
for lack of administrative support. Consideration of pIs nomination fl:om 
a NASA centel: raises the question of devoting travel funds from his organ1-
2;atlon, if that organization has no basic responsibility for Spacelab 
operations. The travel fund pl:oblem is so severe under the present system 
that, without some obvious incentive, this al"eU of consideration can exclude 
qualified candidates ,. Based on ASSESS II experience, NASA salaried candi-
dates have an advantage oval: out-of-house nomineees, and even within NASA, 
unless some special meanS to pl:ovide StlPPOl:t is arranged, the best possible 
pIs candidate may not be nominated. 
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(i) PIS participation in development of experiment operation procedures contri-
butes significantly to their training and operational '.mderstanding, and 
supports their responsibility as the onboard PI representative. 
For ESA experiments, the piSs were given the responsibility to develop 
operational flight procedures for their assigned experiments. This proved 
to be a very effective method to assure their complete understanding of 
experiment operation, and caused a very deep interaction with the PI to 
iterate various modes of operation. The further hands-on operational 
responsibility assigned to the pIs during Level IV and launch site integra-
tions was an excellent combination to maximize pIs training for flight. 
NASA chose to have the PIs maintain respousibj,l i ty for all procedures 
generation, with review and iteration with the pISs. However, one of the 
pISs was a PI and the other was well acquainted with much of his experiment 
responsibility at the outset. Although little difference in PIs operational 
success could be detected between the ESA and NASA approaches, the ESA pISs 
stated that their preparation of operational procedures was of significant 
benefit in their training. 
(j) Fl~i!:1ht operations workload planning must allow for a PIS adaptation period, 
with attendant lower effectiveness for the first several days of the mission. 
Even without the effects of zero-g, for ASSESS II the pISs readily 
stated that th,ey required from one to three aircraft flights before they had 
reacheda.,high degree vf effectiveness in experiment operation. The pIs 
who bad many'rletails to ~Dn$ider, but was concerned with only one operational 
gO.f~:t.!;. ,dev'eloped operational effectiveness more rapidly than those faced with 
arn\;;ltJ.plicity of operational goals (single vs multiple experiment operations). 
E'w';'rt the MIs, with his considerable flight experience, felt that he was not 
handlir,tg his several duties with full efficiency until about the third flight. 
Increased expeJ::l,1\\ent/system level training can minimize, but not eliminate 
this initial lc:rwet: ,effectiveness. 
4.6 Flis,htIGl.'ound Operations_ Interactions 
~---------------.~--------------------------------------------------------~ (a) Adequate resources and time must be provided for training of POCC personnel, 
especially PI sci~nce teamso 
-. , '"-_____________________________ .,....~p .. '~~. _________ , .... ~!<~ ... t-/W''''' .. .--.. - _ ... 
The POCC for ASSE$Sn was fufly manned as plan1.11~d for Sp,acelab. Some 
POCC training occurred for ESA personnel during the ESA integr~tion and opera-
tion activity in Europe, but very little operational training took place at 
ARC before the start of flight operations. Total plans for trd.ning at ARf;, 
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could not be exercised d~e to minimum schedule time, total launch team work-
load, and the minimum on site PI support teams. Initial operations were 
inefficient, but improved with time. Whereas experienced management personnel 
~y man key positions for Spacelab, which eliminates their training needs, 
most PIs will be untrained. PI participation in flight conununications was 
very poor in many cases during ASSESS II, especially during the early flight 
period. Leadership of the PI group in the poee by the Mission Scientist was 
very good, but some training for that arrangement is reconunended. 
The TV text uplink is a beneficial mission operations tool. Facsimile 
capacity for transmission of troubleshooting information is desirable and 
should be incorporated into the Spacelab concept at an early date. 
The TV text uplink and its Polaroid readout in the aircraft proved its 
utility by being used increasingly as the ASSESS II mission progressed. The 
ability to send simple messages to pISs and the MIS, with a record for refer-
ence, was found to be far less interruptive of work than extensive voice 
conununicationo Inability of the link to handle facsimile precluded sending 
wiring diagrams that were needed for troubleshooting. Provision for such 
transmission to Spacelab would be very beneficial. 
(c) Periodic data samples from Spacelab to the POCC during the mission are 
essential for PI experiment surveillance and to provide for operations 
instructions to be sent back to the spacecraft. 
(d) 
Data slices were passed to the poee each day, and ground-based facilities 
were available through the poee to determine the effectiveness of experiment 
operation. This system was highly successful, and is recommended for Spacelab. 
In ASSESS II, some interface problems occurred between poee displays and the 
experiment data record, but with the quick-look information available, in 
every case a work-around was implemented so that nearly all data were retrieved. 
If backup PISs are to be used effectively in the POCC, they must be trained 
on all experiments. Also, on joint missions, Mission Scientists must be 
familiar with all experiments. 
For ASSESS II, the backup PISs served as the main poce communicators. 
This was an effective arrangement because of their familiarity with the pay-
load experiments and crew. However, because project guidelines prevented 
~ross-training by the piSs for both NASA and ESA experiments, they each had 
li.m:tted knowledge of some experiments, which was a disadvantage. This experi-
¢,:at.e empruld:r.es that for Spacelab conununication to be fully effective, both the 
j;;ender an,; receiver must be conversant to a. reasonable level of detail with 
!tll aspects of the payload. 
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The Mission Scientist must also be conversant with the payload to a II 
considerable level of detail so that he can make decisions on the best use of 
flight time. It is therefore imperative that he understand the science and 
operation of all experiments. I 
4.7 Experiment Hardware Considerations 
(a) Automation of routine tasks is recommended to reduce PIS workload and 
operating errors; however, manual bypass cao;bility is also desirable. 
Experiments that contained automation of routine tasks and did not require 
extensive adjustments or setup of controls by the pis appeared to have a 
higher data-take success ratio than those wi th extensi,ve manual setup and 
control. However, where possible, proviSion should be made for manual over-
ride of automated systems in the event of a malfunction. Two examples from 
ASSESS II illustrate these points. The infrared telescope experiment was 
highly automated with computer control. However, when the computer occasion-
ally malfunctioned, adequate manual operation by the pis was possible. Conver-
sely, one U.S. experiment was also highly automated with computer control, 
but not in such a way that the pis could easily bypass it. When the PI recog-
nized early in the mission that the ,data were badly degraded, he was unable to 
give corrective instructions to the pis because there were no suitable manual 
control provisions. 
(b) Use of off-the-shelf hardware should be considered where modificat'ions or 
testing to meet the Spacelab constraints is cost effective. 
The majority of the components that made up the ASSESS II experiment.s 
were off-the-shelf items. They seemed to perform as well as specially cons-
tructed components. The primary reason for resorting to special construction 
was the need for a uni<{ue functional capability. Reliability, low power 
consumption, etc o , were definitely secondary considerations. 
(c) Payload integration and operations management personnel, as well as the pay-
load flight crew, should have available a complete set of simplified schem-
atics. These should clearly show all interface connections and controls 
for ready reference during integration and operation when problems occur. 
In the preparatory phase of ASSESS II it was generally accepted that the 
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definition of electrical and control interfaces between the experilt;ent and U 
support systems would be adequate to perform integration and checkdJ.lt opera-
tions. Thus, except fot Spacelab rack interfaces with other experim~nt 
elements, the PIs provided intraexperiment electrical and control di~:grams 
in various degrees of detail. During Systems Level Payload Integration IJ 
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it was recognized that a greater depth of information could be used to advan-
tage, and other diagrams were developed by management in cooperation with PI 
representatives. These were of benefit in subsequent integration and checkout 
activities, and also were made part of the Flight Data File to aid pIs trouble-
shooting. 'Even though it is recognized that intraexperiment hardware is a PI 
responsibility, unless some reasonable inner visibility is immediately avail-
able, internal components can cause severe interface problems without a capa-
bility to quickly trace the problem to the source. 
408 Data Handling 
(a) Face-to-face interactive discussions between responsible representatives 
of the experimen/t and the central data system with a resulting bilateral 
interface agreement, including verification procedures, are necessary to 
fully define and establish the data handling interface. 
Interface resolution between experiments and the central data system 
is tradi"tionally a difficult area. ,Furthermore, experiment interface 
identiftcation usually comes late in the process of experiment hardware 
prepa~tion, which compounds the problem because interface limitations may 
f01r:rredeSign or compromise of the experiment. All of this dictates that 
exp rts from each side of the interface start face-to-face discussions early 
an continue interaction until firm interfaces are fully defined and agreed 
to by both parties. Attempts to define these interfaces without extensive 
discussion and0understanding will almost guarantee problems except for the 
simplest cases o 
For ASSESS II, the key data system experts were unfortunately 
into discussions with experimenters when the IRDs were filled out. 
interfacing turned out to be a severe problem area. For Spacelab, 
early expenditures of resources in this area will almost certainly 
effective to prevent later severe problems. 
not brought 
Data 
pt'oper 
be cost 
(b) Hardware and software interfaces should be standardized wherever possible 
between the experiment and the central data system, to simplify integration 
and checkout and enhance operating reliability. 
In the CV-990 central data system, analog data are generally received 
through an analog to digital converter that is sampled by standardized 
software. Thus, any analog signal that conforms to the limitations of the 
converter can be quickly and surely added to the data collection system. 
Limiting digital interfaces to a format and procedure for which the central 
computer is designed likewise reduces the need for special programming which 
is costly, prone to error, and generally makes inefficient use of all 
resources. 
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(c) 
(a) 
(b) 
Suc(,,~ssful software debugging can be accompl ished only if enough time is 
provided with all experiments being stimulated simultaneously in the planned 
flight configuration. 
Although interfaces betwe.en individual experiments and the central data 
system should be well verified by the time the total integration phase com-
mences, interaction between experiment software modules can only be reliably 
tested in a full system environment, and sufficient time must be allowed to 
identify and solve total system problems which are almost guaranteed to show 
up. The ASSESS II schedule did not provide sufficient debugging time with 
all experiments operating, and consequently some data processing problems 
occurrred during flighte Software debugging should be expected to continue 
well into payload integration, and with the real possibility that this type 
of problem is likely to show up during flight, it is recommended that the 
uplink be capable of handling data processing computer programs. 
4.9 Documentation 
Documentation should be carefully planned and scheduled for issuance. Doc-
uments should cover only specific needs, titles should be precise and inform-
ative, redundancy should be eliminated, material should be carefully grouped 
so that the number of documents is minimum, and language should be carefully 
chosen to eliminate or clarify jargon that is unfamiliar to the recipient. 
Although ASSESS II documentation was far from a perfect example for 
Spacelab, it was a realistic learning experience using the new 1-11ssion l-Ianager 
concept of payload management with the actual-Spacelab organizations partici-
pating in their planned roles. The documenr/ ~on created and used was nearly 
all newly developed, and, apart from many sh\.. :/tcomings, substantial progress 
was made as a pattern for Spacelab. With the objective of placing full 
responsibility on the PI for experiment success and simplifying his documen-
tation requirements, the Investigator Requirements Document concept was imple-
mented sutficiently to prove its validity, but not enough to show its full 
potential. 'Huch improvement of that document is needed for Spacelab. 
The documentation plan outlined by th.;,ASSESS II Mission Steering Group 
was generally valid, but insufficient management attention was exercised over 
document identification, content, and schedule of issuance. 
(, 
For joint NASA/ESA missions, both sides should have an opportunity to review 
all basic mission documents. Some form of mission implementation agreement 
should be developed and jointly agreed to by both parties. This should 
identify those documents whi ch comllli t each other I s resources or si gnificantly 
impact mission objectives and should be concurred in by both parties. 
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During the progress of the ASSESS II mission, ESA management felt they 
were bei<n8 committed without recourse to certain lines of action by NASA 
issued documentation. No formal means was developed during the program for 
NASA/ESA discussion of such documents before their issue. ESA feels that they 
must be able to discuss jointly those areas where commitments of manpower are 
to be made before detailed policies are set by NASA issued documents. 
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AnDAS 
ARC 
ASO 
CCTV 
C/O 
DCS 
DFVLR 
EKG 
EMI 
ESA 
ESTEC 
FIT 
GFE 
GHz 
GSE 
GSFC 
HF 
I/F 
INS 
IR 
IRD 
IWG 
JPL 
JSC 
KSC 
LA 
LaRC 
MCC 
MIP 
MHz 
MPI 
M/S 
MSFC 
MSG 
llm 
NASA 
OA 
~--- ~- -uSF 
PAP 
PCU 
PDT 
PI 
POCC 
POD 
pis 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Airborne Digital Data Acquisition System 
Ames Research Center (NASA) 
Airborne Science Office (NASA/Ames - n~me recently changed to 
Medium Altitude Missions Branch) . 
Closed Circuit Television (onboard CV-990) 
Checkout 
Data Communications Specialist 
Deutsche Forschungs-und Versuchanstalt fur Luft-und Raumfahtt 
Electrocardiogram 
Electromagnetic Interference 
European Space Agency 
European Space Research and Technology Center (a.n ESA facility) 
Functional Test 
Government Furnished Equipment 
Gigahertz 
Ground Support Equipment 
Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA) 
High Frequency 
Interface 
Inertial Navigation System 
Infrared 
Investigator Requirements Document 
Investigators' Working Group 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA) 
Johnson Space Center (NASA) 
Kennedy Space Center (NASA) 
Los Angeles . 
Langley Researcr Center (NASA) 
Mission Control Center 
Mission Implementation Plan 
Megahertz 
Max Planck Institute (Germany) 
Mission Specialist " 
Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA) 
Mission Steering Group 
Micrometer 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (USA) 
Office of Applications (NASA Headquarte.!'s) 
Office of Space Flight (NASA Headquarte:ts) 
Payload Activity Planner 
Payload Checkout Unit 
Pacific Daylight Time 
Principal Investigator 
Payload Operations Control Center 
Payload Operations Director 
Payload Specialist 
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QA 
SF 
SPICE 
STS 
S/W 
UHF 
VHF 
AEES 
A'''S 
CTH 
IHR 
ENl 
IRA 
LAS 
NED 
SAR 
l-IT..S 
LIDAR 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CONT. 
Quality Assurance 
San Francisco 
Spacelab Payload Integration and Coordination in Europe 
(an ESA facility) 
Space Transportation System 
Software 
Ult1:a High Frequency 
Very High Frequency 
EXPERIHENT DESIGNATORS 
Airborne Electromagnetic Environment Survey (GSFC) 
Airglo\v Wave Structure (University of Southampton) 
Ch1'omospheric Temperature Neasurement (Capodimente Observatory, 
Leece University, and Florence University) 
Inf):ared Heterodyne Radiometer (LaRC) 
ENI E}..l)Oriment (ESTEC) 
Infrared Astronomy (Paris Observatory, University of Groningen, 
Nux Planck Institute.) 
Las~l' Ab801'p tian S pee trame ter (JPL) 
Nedical gxpt~1'imeJ1t (DINLR) 
SYltthetic Aperture Radar (jPL) 
Hicro\vave Limb Sounder (JPL) 
LIDAR (DFVLR) 
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APPENDIX A 
Minutes of Mission Steering Group Meetings 
A-I 
MINUT~~S 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II Mission Steering Group Meeting 
April 9, 1976 
The NSG meeting was held at NASA/MSFC on April 9, 19760 
The NASA Program Manager reviewed the project status outlining the 
recent NASA Nanagement meetings which led to firm NASA approval of th~ ASSESS II 
mission on March 17,1976. An official NASA invitation to ESA to pest:1cipate 
was extended on April 10 
The NASA Program Manager also discussed composition and responsibili-
ties of the Nission Steering Group. The function of the !-ISG is to establish 
policy guidelines for conduct of the mission such that the project will produce 
the most nlcaningfu1 results for benefit of Shutt1e/Space1ab implementation. 
The }lSG will be co-chaired by NASA and ESAo 
Membership of the MSG and affiliation is as follows: 
NASA Program Manager, Headquarters OA - Co-chairman 
ESA Program l-lanager - Co-chairman 
NASA Headquarters Representative, OSF 
NASA Headquarters Representative, OSS 
NASA Headquarters Representative, OAST 
NASA Headquarters Representative, OA 
ESA Headquarters Representative, Spacelab 
ESA Headquarters Representative, Science 
ASSESS II }assion Manager, MSFC 
Flight Operations Representative, JSC 
Launch Site Operations Representative, KSC 
ASSESS II Manager, ARC 
}larvex Corporation (Contract Observer) 
All members are urged to ensure that their point of view is 
represented at each meeting since the mission will be implemented in 
accordance with the guidelines decided upon at each meeting. 
Management 
A management structure has been generally agreed to for implementation 
of the ASSESS II mission. Program management at NASA Headquarters will focus in 
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OA under the Program Manager working closely with representatives from OSF. 
'fhe ~tlssion Nanagement will be under HSFC supported by ESA. Payloaci integra-
tion and flight: operations will be under ARC with participation by KSC and JSC, 
respectively. 
10 Action: 
2. Action: 
3. Action: 
Payload 
Participation plans by KSC and JSC are due in 
Headquarter~ OSF by Hay 15. 
An overall Nission Plan will be prepared by the 
Hission Nanager (HSFC) by June 15. 
The Nission Hanager (NSE'C) will prepare a plan 
for documentation to carry out the entire mission -
due at the next MSG meeting. This plan will be 
consistent with the ASSESS program objective of 
mirlinlUm necess{ny documentation. 
Results of a payload meeting in NASA Headquarters on April 7 
established that night-time flights will predominate. The ESA proposed night 
option (ESA experiments 3, 4, 6, 10, 11) were accepted by NASA to assure ESA 
adequate lead time to proceed with firm contract arrangements for experiment 
hardware development. Four NASA experiments (31, 198, 500, 439) were identi-
fied by NASA as the prime candidates for ASSESS II. These experiments will 
be complementary to the ESA preference for night flights. Preliminary analysis 
by ARC indicates that all of the above experiments can be accommodated on the 
aircraft. However, final selection of the NASA experiments requires some 
further evaluation of operational requirements to include. the possibility of 
conducting some daytime flights. If daytime flights can be accommodated, ESA 
will consider adding a Solar Atmospheric Measurement Experiment, and NASA will 
consider operating an Infrared Heterodyne Radiometer (439) in the solar mode. 
NASA is also considering the Laser Absorpdon Spectrotneter (502) to complement 
the IHR. Such decisions are also contingent on the available space aboard the 
aircraft and the workload on the payload crew. 
'l'he ESA Nedical Test Experiment will require instrumentation of the 
confined personnel. While ESA has decided that this will be no problem for 
the ESA Payload Specialists, further evaluation is required to determine con-
stnlints imposed on the U. S. participants and the physical space requirements. 
Evaluation of the above and the select:f.on of U.S. experiments to round out 
the payload is continuing. 
4 ... Action: 
Action: 
Action: 
OA working with ARC will complete payload analysis 
and finalize selection by Hay 6. 
ARC will establish preliminary fUght tracks by 
Nay 13. 
Mission ~lanager (NSFC) 'will determine extent of 
implementation of the Nedical E~periment by Nay 6. 
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Action: ARC will determine by May 6 if the HSFC proposed 
experiment which ~'ould be operated only during 
non-flight periods can be accommodated. 
I 
Electromagne.tic Interference (EMI) I 
ESA would like to further their studies of EMI which were carried out 
on the ASSESS I mission. It ",as agreed that they (ESTEC) will do this. I 
8. Action: 
9. Action: 
10. Action: 
~tlssion Operation 
ESA will submit a plan for ENI measurements in 
the near future. 
ESA will send to ARC their eltperiment requirements 
to conduct the EMI measurements ASAP. 
ESA will summarize their desired "EM! Guidelines 
for Eltperiments" and submit to the Mission ~Ianager 
ASAP. 
It was decided that ASSESS II will encompass a 10-day constrained 
period versus the 7-day period for ASSESS I. A major flight is planned each 
24 hour period; however, it is l'ecognized that limitations of aircraft support 
at ARC may result in a down-period if severe aircraft operations problems occur. 
This possibility supports the need for the MSFC eltperiment which would load the 
pIs with meaningful tasks during non-flight periods. 
It was agreed that a Hission Operations Control Center (MOCC) and a 
Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) physically separated from each other 
will be implemented for the mission. 
It is planned to implement round-the-clock voice communication with 
the aircraft during the mission. 
110 Action: ARC will continue to evaluate how full time voice 
communication can best be done and report at the 
next MSG meeting. 
It was agreed not to attempt to utilize the free time expected to 
be available from the flight deck crew on Shuttle for payload operationso Since, 
in the 990 aircraft operation, neither the pilot nor the co-pilot can easily be 
taken from their stations during flight, as might be done on S.huttle, it was 
decided that it would complicate the ASSESS II mission beyond reason to sub-
stitute and train prOltY individuals to evaluate that situation. 
Centralized Experiment Controls 
Results of the ASSESS I mission showed that Spacelab experiment design 
will require careful attention to the centralization of experiment controls if 
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the limited flight crew is to have success in managing and operating many 
complex experiments. MSFC has investigated the possibility of providing some 
centralized panels so that the pis can .. better manage several experiments. It 
appears that this approach c~n be implemented if funds can be made available 
'to fabricate the installation and space is available on the aircraft to 
accommodate the arrangement. 
120 Action: MSFC will work with ARC to evaluate the centralized 
control panel approach and report at the next MSG 
meetingo 
Mission Specialist/Payload Specialists 
t>tSFC presented their considerations for possible approaches to selection 
of Payload Specialists for Spacelaba It was proposed that the ASSESS II mission 
would provide an excellent opportunity to exercise and evaluate the Shuttle pis 
selection process. ESA wishes to utilize at least one of the pis that partici-
pated in ASSESS I. It was agreed that ESA will use their. own judgement to 
select their r/s and NSFC will pursue their selection process for U.S. Payload 
Speci~lists. ESA will select two or four Pis of which one or two will fly plus 
a Mission Specialista .1SC will select the Hission Specialist subject to approval 
by ARC to handle the aircraft systems during the mission. 
Action: 
14. Action: 
15. Action: 
16. Action: 
Next Neeting 
JSC will propose a ~~ssion Specialist. 
MSFC will establish a NASA position for Payload 
Specialist qualifications. 
MSFC will present a plan at the next t>ISG meeting 
for selection of U.S. Payload Specialists. 
ESA will select and train four Payload Specialists. 
During the formative stages of the mission, many decisions must be 
made, and the discussions leading to these decisions are valuable interchanges 
which in themselves serve to support Shuttle/Spacelab planning. ESA represen-
tatives very strongly requested that the next meeting be held at ESA. The 
proposed dates are May 24-25, 1976. 
MINUTES 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II t-1ission Steering Group Meeting 
May 25-26, 1976 
The meeting was held at the ESA-SPICE office located within the DFVLR 
Laboratory at Porz-Wahn, Germany. 
The ESA Program Manager reviewed the general status of the project 
from the ESA standpoint. The SPICE organization (Spacelab Payload Integration 
and Coordination in Europe) is moving rapidly into a fully operational organi-
zation to handle their interest in ASSESS II. They will exercise their SPICE 
organization involvement with ASSESS II to the greate3t extent possible for 
application to Spacelab 1. They will do a full pre-Level III integration of 
all ESA experiments at SPICE (DFVLR) and accomplish integrated operation and 
Payload Specialist training prior to delivery to the UoS. The Life Science 
group at DFVLR is building a full scale Spacelab mockup under the auspices of 
the Institute for Space Simulation. The ESA Program Manager has requested 
installation of the ASSESS II simulation system to be put in the same building 
(perhaps a temporary inflatable building initially) to be connected to the 
adjacent existing computer facility which they plan to program to handle 
appropriate experiment stimulation and simulated interfaces. 
An ESA experimenters' meeting was held at SPICE on }~y 20 at which 
they were updated on ASSESS II plans in some detail. ESA established scheduled 
actions to the European experimenters at that time. 
The NASA Program Manager summarized the programmatic status of 
ASSESS II in the UoS. He recently briefed the Administrator of NASA on ASSESS 
Of primary interest at that meeting was the extent of training which will be 
required to fly on Spacelab and whether PIs will be interested in flying versus 
proxy experiment operators. The NASA Program Manager also summarized a recent 
briefing to the NASA Administrator for the Office of Space Flight (OSF) to 
discuss participation in ASSESS II by JSC and KSC. 
KSC is very actively pursuing their plan for participation. The 
Spacelab Project Office representative from KSC elaborated with emphasis on a 
KSC desire to use ASSESS II to help lead to simplified procedures and documen-
tation to achieve p/L integration at KSC. The following areas were identified 
for special attention by KSC: 
a) Acceptance Data Package for experiments/payload; 
b) Responsibility for experiment performance during integration, 
test, and checkout; 
c) Mission independent and mission dependent training; 
d) Long period of time between final C/O on ground and activation 
on orbit; 
II. 
1 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. 
., 
'. :; 
J 
·".1 
'i' 
.) 
>",,,,: 
,i', 
I 
, 
", 
.'1 
, "':; 
· \~ 
..! 
· ;:\~ 
'",- ~ 
.~ 
• 
e) Level IV integration completed before delivery to launch site 
(no Level IV at KSC); 
f) Organized (controlled) storage of crew equipment; 
g) Feasibility of simple document for all experiment requirements. 
A request was made by some representatives on the Steering Group for 
KSC to also give attention to direct participation of the Payload Specialists, 
if not the PI, in the integration process (in addition to experiment responsi-
bility, item b), with a view toward elimination of documentation for detailed 
proxy integration procedures. 
KSC plans to have two or three key personnel at ARC to participate 
during the ASSESS II integration process and others involved as appropriate to 
plan for integration activity and establish useful analogs between ASSESS II 
and Shuttle/Spacelab. They also plan to participate in an upcoming CV-990 
integration for an on-going mission to better establish their int.eraction in 
ASSESS II. The KSC plan for ASSESS II is in preparation. 
The NASA Program Manager reported that JSC announced at the OSF meeting 
that their plan will be presented soon. No one from OSF or JSC was present at 
this meeting to provide any details. 
Hission Management 
The NSFC Assistant Nission Manager reported on the status of ASSESS II 
mission management at NSFC. A Mission Hanager for ASSESS II has been named (he 
is also Hission Nanager for Spacelab 2) along with an assistant.. Also, a 
~tission Scientist and an assistant have been selected at MSFC. Several specific 
key individuals from the ~ISFC Spacelab Payload Project Office have been authorized 
to move out rapidly on analytical integration analysis. 
NSFC plans to establish an Investigators Working Group (I\VG) made up 
of all the PIs to enhance maximum experimenter involvement in payload-oriented 
decision making, including Payload Specialist selection, allocation of flight 
time to the various experiments, etc. While the Steering Group endorsed this 
approach, very strong concern was expressed about the formality proposed 
(meetings of the PIs). The discusison centered around U.S. Payload Specialist 
nomination and selection which must take place very soon if the Payload 
Specialists are to be effectively utilized. (ESA plans to select their pis 
by June 15.) 
The Assistant Nission Nanager also reported on the U.S. experimenters 
meeting held at NSFC on Nay 14. They Were briefed on SpaceJ.ab plans and details 
of the ASSESS II project including plans for the Investigator Working Gr.oup and 
their participation in selection of Payload Specialists. 
Documentation 
The Assistant Hission }tanager presented the NSFC preliminary general 
plan for interface documenta tion. The Mission Nlmager \~ill work with KSC/ ARC 
to generate a "Ground Operations Requirements" document and with JSC/ARC to 
generate a "Flight Operations Requirements" as a reference document. These 
will be provided to each experimenter along with the 990 Experimenters Hand-
book to provide reference material for ASSESS II. In order to provide a data 
base on each experiment, for planning use by all organizational elements, a 
standardized fill-in-the-blanks type form entitled, "Investigator Requirements 
Document" (IRD), will be developed and will be filled out by each investigator. 
These will be used to generate a (1) Payload Ground Operations Requirements 
document, (2) Payl.oad Flight Support Requirements document, and (3) Payload 
Flight Definition document. These few documents are planned at this time to 
be the basic interface documents. From all of these and other inputs, a 
generalized overall }lission Operating Plan will be produced by the ~lission 
Nanager. There will be other documents to carry aut implementation apart 
from the above interface documents. 
Discussion ensued particularly as to objectives and use of the 
~lission Operating Plan and consistency of ASSESS II documentation development 
with Spacelab documentation discussions taking place within the Spacelab 
Operations \vor'king Group. It was the consensus that ASSESS II documentation 
planning should be pursued independently, but with full recognition of Spacelab 
planning and adherence to any NASA/ESA policy agreements. 
1. Action: NSFC will review NASA/ESA documentation agreements 
and Spacelab Operations Working Group plans, further 
refine the ASSESS II documentation plan based on 
minimum documentation concept, and present status 
at next meeting. 
Payload and Accommodation 
The ESA Program Hanager and the NASA Assistant ~lission Scientist 
briefly reviewed the ESA and NASA experiments planned for ASSESS II. 
The ARC Nanager described tlH~ preliminary layout planned for the 
CV-990 and verified that all the experiments can be accommodated within the 
aJrcrnEt: constraints of physical space, power, viewing ports, etc. Preliminary 
considerations were presented of the viewing limitations of the astronomy and 
other ehlH~,riment objectives. Tht~ high demands of the ESA IR astronomy objec-
tives which must be integrated with otller experiment requirements into a 
complex detailed flight plan emphasized the urgency tu move quickly with this 
phase of analyti.cal integration analysis. NSFC plans to implement an Experi-
ment Accommodations Team as soon as possible to interface with experimenters 
to address requirements and negotiate flight tracks and timelines. 
Centralized Experiment Consoles 
The ARC Nanager alonr, "11 th the NSFC Assis tan t Nission Nanager 
reported on considerations to provide Spacelab-type racks to accommodate 
centralized controls for the e>'"p('riments so that the limited number of 
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Payload Specialists can efficiently control and operate multiple experiments. 
Configurations and layouts w~re presented. Costs and schedule were discussed. 
ESA expressed a need for the racks much earlier than the presently proposed 
availability to avoid repackaging for their pre-integration in Europe. 
2. Action: ARC will proceed immediately to provide the 
centralized control racks with stroq~~ effort 
to compress the delivery schedule. I, 
Integration Philosophy 
~ , . 
ESA will accomplish pre-Level III integration of all European experi-
ments at SPICE (DFVLR) and conduct integrated operation tests and pis training 
prior to delivery to the U.S. They plan to provide experiment input stimulationl 
simulation equipment (EIS) and the necessary GSE required to accurately simulate 
the experiments to the aircraft and central computer interfaces. 
No plans presently exist in the U.S. Spacelab Operations for full 
functional payload checkout of the integrated payload. No off-line GSE~ been 
authorized and schedule limitations during on-line integration at KSC permit 
only continuity checks and Spacelab compatibility with some time reserved to 
solve expected E~a problems. Previous airborne science experience has shown 
that system level interfaces (particularly with the data system) require deep 
attention after integration to prevent serious data loss. The ASSESS ~ mission 
also demonstrated the problem. 
Steering Group representatives voiced strong concern about this 
problem and discussed alternatives to best utilize the ASSESS II mission to 
further id~ntify and communicate ingredients in this area for Spacelab planningo 
3. Action: Perform integrated system tests of the entire payload 
on the ground after total integration on the aircraft 
and immediately prior to the constrained flight period 
using experiment stimulation data. No checkout flights 
of the experiments will be performed befor~ the con-
strained mission. Obtain detailed ASSESS project data 
to identify problem areas and solutions for each 
experiment. 
Selection and Training of Payload Specialists and Mission Specialists 
The MSFC Assistant ~1ission Manager explained their proposed process 
to have the experiment4ars nominate candidates for pis within the guidelines of 
Spacelab planning. TbIB Investigator Working Group under the chairmanship of 
the Mission Scientist would then reduce that number by negotiation to make up 
the prime and backup p/So All selected PiS will be fully trained. The prime 
and backup pis will be designated by the ~1ission Manager after initiation of 
the training pro~ess. Apart from the ASSESS mission requirements it is also 
planned to expose the selected pis to at least some activities similar to those 
which will probably be required for space flight training to obtain some data 
on individuals selected by this procedure. Such activities may include zero-g 
aircraft flights and water tank space activity simulations. Any probl.ems during 
such activities will not disqualify the selected pIs for participation in ASSESS. 
The ESA Program }mnager stated that ESA will select four pis made up 
of one PI, one from the ESA Space Science group, and two from DFVLR. 
follows: 
-_. 
The NASA Assistant }ussion Manager presented pIs requirements as 
• 
o 
• 
• 
FAA Class III medical status; 
OSF established anthropometric standards; 
Availability for ESA medical experiment; 
Available full time beginning October 1, 1976; 
Participate in S/L oriented environmental 
familiarization study; 
Report organizationally to the HSFC Mission Manager; 
Discipline expertise as defined by the Investigator's 
Working Group. 
Proposed Payload Specialist pre-mission duties were listed as follows: 
• 
o 
o 
o 
Participate in experiment development as appropriate; 
Assist in development of experiment operating procedures 
and timeline elements with PIs; 
Observe/participate in selected Level III/II integration; 
Participate in Level III/II experiment hardware checkout 
and test; 
Participate in selected mission planning activities; 
Participate in simulations; 
Serve as subjects for the medical experiment; 
Support Payload Operations Control Center (Backup PIs) '. 
Flight Phase Payload Specialist duties were proposed as follows: 
Interactively operate experiments; 
• Perform required instrument maintenance/repair; 
Communicate with POCC for experiment operations; 
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Interact with POCC for real-time mission planning; 
Interact with CV-990 flight crew for changes in 
integrated flight plan; 
Onboard responsibility for management of plL 
operations and accomplishment of FIL objectives; 
One Fls to be selected as "lead F/So" 
The Mission Steering Group asked for more details to demonstrate 
specific plans for deepest possible involvement of the rls since a basic guide-
line of the ASSESS program is to demonstrate that direct activity with respon-
sibility by the PI or his closest participating representative can both reduce 
documentation requirements (cost) and enhance experiment success. 
4. Action: Mission Manager to develop details of pIs 
responsibilities and activities for discussion' 
at next meeting. 
Discussion of }dssion Specialist selection and duties was deferred 
because the JSC representative was not at the meeting. Concern was expressed 
that the project is moving through important phases and decisions without MIs 
participation. 
59' Action: 
( 
Medical Expe~iment 
OA Program Manager will work with OSF to reconcile 
the Mission Specialist issue and to verify a plan 
to name an HIs and define appropriate functions 
and tasks. 
The ESA Pr6gram Manager explained the ESA medical experiment to 
obtain selected medical data on each pIs for 7 days prior to flight, throughout 
the constrained flight period, and for 4 days post-flight. Data will be obtained 
on each backup pIs on the ground during the flight period for comparison. Objec-
tives are to gain data relative to Circadian rhythm and workload. The project 
is highly organized. Excellent and detailed planning has already been done to 
interact and utilize the ASSESS program to gain specific data. 
The Medical Experiment PI from DFVLR has discussed the project with 
NASA Headquarters, ARC, and JSC, and it was reported that the experiment is now 
considered to be a joint endeavor between DFVLR, NASA-ARC, AND NASA-JSC. 
The NASA Assistant Mission ,Manager said that all U.S. as well as ESA 
Payload Specialists will participate in the experiment. 
~AS Requirements 
This subject was deferred until after a proposed jOint experimenters 
meeting where ADDAS familiarization and requirements will be discussed. 
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) 
il 
The ESA Program Manager reported on ESTEC's plan to conduct EMI 
studies. In accordance with an action request from the last meeting, he dis- " 
tributed an ESTEC report spelling out guidelines for hardware design to reduce, 
EM! and establish tolerances for acceptable emissions. Details of the EMI /1 
specifications and plans f~T-\EZ.lI measurements were presented to the ESA ex~eii­
menters at their meeting 0[> .h)y 14. Agreements were reached there foroES..T~C to 
serve as advisors and cons~~ants to the ESA experimenters to achieve acceptable 
EMI levels. ESTEG will visit each European experimenter's laboratory to conduct 
EM! measurements prior to delivery of instrument packages to SPICE at DF\r~R for 
pre-Level III integration and tests. Also, EMI tests will be included on the 
partially integrated (ESA experiments only) payload at DFVLR. 
u.S. experimente~s received a very ~eneral summary of the EMI study 
project at the U.S. experimenters meeting at;,' JSFC on May 14. Details will be 
presented to them at the joint experimenters meeting to be held on July 12-13. 
Some discussion ensued about the desirability of ESTEC's direct interaction 
and assistance to U.S. experimenters prior to delivery of instruments to achieve 
a maximum effort toward good design for EMI for the entire payload. This was 
deferred until discussion at the joint experimenters meetingo Mu.ch of the 
hardware for U.S. experiments already exists in aircraft flight configuration, 
and it is questionable that funi!s are available for any significant redesign.' 
ESTEC has requested that ARC isolate the power generators on ~he 
aircraft and supply power to the payload through a single bus. Also, that the 
AnDAS system be grounded through a single ground connection. The ARC Manager 
stated that these will require significant effort, expense, and time in an 
aircraft schedule already very tight. Some or all of the work might be done 
during the aircraft modification period scheduled for January 1977. 
6. Action: Investigate the possibility of accomplishing the 
ESTEC requests to modify CV-990 wiring system to 
reduce EHI levels. ARC. 
Open Actions from Past Heeting (4/9/76) 
1. KSC and JSC participation plans due 5/15 are still in process. 
2. A draft Hission Plan will be prepared by 6/15 - HSFC ... 
3. 
11. 
13. 
Documentation plan present. Further action item at 5/26 meeting -
MSFC. 
Full time voice ,communication with aircraft evaluation still in 
process by ARC. 
JSC to propose a ~lission Specialist - still open. 
15. MSFC plan to select pIs - in process. 
16. ESA selection of pIs - in process. 
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All other open actions have been completed. 
Next Meeting 
Considerations were discussed of having the next Steering Group 
meeting in conjunction with the joint experimenters meeting to be held at 
SPICE-DFVLR on July 12-13. It was. decided that more time is needed after 
that mee.1;ing occurs to hold a meaningful MSG meeting. 
Proposed dates for the next f.ISG meeting are July 28-29 at NASA-ARCo 
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MINUTES 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II Mission Steering Group Meeting 
August 17-18, 1976 
The meeting was held at NASA/Ames Research Center 
Moffett Field, California 
The NASA Program Manager reviewed the proje~t status from the NASA 
point of view and reported that the selection of U.S. experiments is still not 
solidified due to funding problemso The conununications experiment from GSFC 
has been removed from the payload. Of the remaining four experiments, another 
will probably be eliminated, leaving a U.S. complement of three experiments. 
The funding problem developed because of a) the added experiment costs for 
redesign of existing equipment to semi-automate in order to reduce the manpower 
requirement to operate the experiments, and b) the costs to support experimen-
ter's staffs through the ASSESS period. These areas of cost were identified 
almost a year ago, but the reality of specific cost impact pointed out that this 
has been an important "lesson learned" from ASSESS for OA because the same 
ingredients will apply to Spacelab and can b~ an extremely severe problem 
especially with a larger Spacelab complement of instruments. 
The representative from ESA Headquarters suggested that ESA WQuld be 
interested in expanding their experiment complement to replace cancellation of 
U.S. experiments. Subsequent discussion precipitated a decision that it is now 
too late to add new experiments, but it may be possible to expand the activity 
on ESA experiments already selected. 
1. Action: The NASA Program Manager will interact with OA management by 
Aug. 27 to reconcile the U.S. experiment support and selec-
tion problem. 
The ESA Program Manager voiced a mild plea to retain the IR Hetro-
dyne Radiometer fr.om Langley based on the cooperation that developed at the 
recent Investigator's Working croup meeting between that experiment and the 
Solar Physics experiment from Italy. 
2. Action: The Mission Manager will notify the ESA Program Manager 
by S~Pt. 15 of any additional payload capability that may 
develop so that ESA can consider expansion of activity for 
existing ESA experiments. 
The ESA Program Manager summarized the ASSESS II status ~rom the ESA 
standpoint. All contracts with the various experiment groups have been completed. 
Work on the experiments is progressing on schedule. SPICE representatives plan 
to visit all the European experiment laboratories within the next month to check 
progress and iron out any difficulties o 
An agreement between ESA and DFVLR to carry out integration of the 
Eur.opean experiments at Porz-Wahn, Germany is essentially complete. Only minor 
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considerations remain to be clarified. Drawings are nearly complete for a 
9-meter long wooden mockup of the 990 cabin to be used for the integration. 
3. 
SCHEDULE 
Action: The ESA Program Manager will notify the Mission Manager 
by Oct. 31 of any desired expansion of activity for ESA 
experiments which may result from action item #2 above. 
The ASSESS II Assistant t-iission Hanager discussed the plan for ~lSFCI 
ARC to solidify the aircraft layout of experiments immediately after the NASA 
experiment decision. He expects to arrange for visits to all experimenters 
during a 3-week period beginning Oct. 1 to update Investigator Requirements 
Documents (IRDs)o This will be followed by an updated analytical integration 
effort during a 3-week period beginning Nov. 1 leading to a freeze of the 
integrated payload requirements by Dec. 1. A decision was made to begin the 
constrained "Spacelab flight" on Nay 15,' 1977. NASA Headquarters representatives 
expressed concern that the schedule of e.vents leading to the launch date are 
not sufficiently hard to delineate which decision points are critical to the 
launch date. For instance, they questioned how much longer the decision on U.S. 
experiments can be delayed before the launch date is impacted. 
4 .. Action: 
,EMI MEASUREMENTS 
Mission Manager will develop an overall hard schedule as 
soon as possible with emphasis on critical paths and identi-
fication of critical milestones leading to launch of the 
constrained mission on Nay 15, 1977. 
The requests by the ESTEC representatives to modify the 990 electrical 
system to reduce EMI, and for design modifications of the U.S. experiments to 
provide single-point grounds has been considered. The NASA Program Manager 
announced that, nothwithstanding the good work done on ASSESS I to identify 
design features to reduct; EHI and the opportunity to further refine the results 
on ASSESS II, the funding problem within NASA precludes modifying either the 
aircraft or the experiments. The ESA Program Manager said it is not feasible 
for ESA to fund these items. As a result ESTEC will continue their work with 
the European experiments and will carry out EMI measurements during the integra-
tion of those experiments at DFVLR. They would stj.ll like to fly the EMI meas-
uring equipment during the flight mission to obtain general data, but they will 
not conduct detailed tests aboard the aircraft during level II and I integration 
as earlier planned. 
AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE AND EXFERIHENT RACKS 
The ARC ASSESS II Manager presented a goneral schedule of 990 flight 
activities showing that the flight scheouJr! "I'1ll. accommodate a May 15, 1977 launch 
date for ASSESS IIo He also discussed thl~.schedule for delivery of experiment 
racks to the European experimenters. Standaru racks will be shipped by Sept. 1. 
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Low-hoy racks and the new "Spacelab" racks will be shipped by Nov. 16. Some 
European experimenters need low-boy racks before that dateo The problem cannot 
be alleviated easily because all of the available low-boy racks are scheduled on 
a previous mission and cannot be made available until that mission is completed. 
5. Action: ARC will immediately provide low-boy rack designs to ESA 
to permit them to build mock-ups for use until the actual 
racks can be shipped. 
SCHEDULE OF UNCONSTRAINED FLIGHTS 
The number of unconstrained flights to be provided during the period 
following the constrained Space lab flight simulation was the subject of extensive 
discussion. During the unconstrained period, the PIs will be allowed to operate 
their own equi.pment, and this period will provide the opportunity to insure 
satisfactory data return for the PI. Naturally, the PIs would like many flights. 
However, ASSESS I proved conclusively that if the unconstrained flight opport-
unity is too generous, there is a strong tendency to unload the Payload Specia-
lists during the simulation in favor of the PI getting the desired data when he 
flies later. The ESA Program Manager preferred a ratio of two to one which 
would allow four unconstrained flights. Two have been tentatively scheduled. 
It was agreed by all the the PIs should not reduce their goals during the simu-
lation in favor of later attention by themselves. 
6. Action: 
Action: 
The Mission Manager will insure that experimenters under-
stand that objectives during the follow-on unconstrained 
period will be the same as for the simulation period, and 
that their effort during the unconstrained flights will be 
for the purpose of refining or obtaining data which was 
planned for the simulation. 
The Mission Manager will report to the Program Manager by 
Sept. 1 the implication and recommendation for the number of 
unconstrained flights within a maximum limit of four. 
PAYLOAD SPECIALIST SELECTION 
The ASSESS II Assistant Mirdon Manager and the ESA Program Manager 
reviewed progress on Payload Special±~t selection. Nominations for PIs were 
submitted to the IWG during their meeting on July 130 As a result, the U.S. pIs 
nominations were to be submitted to the Mission Manager by Aug. 1 and the ESA 
pIs by Augo 60 DFVLR is doing some medical and psychological tests for ESA. 
ESA is planning a meeting for Augo 25 at which time they will decide on four pIs 
to provide two prime and two backup PIs for the mission. 
In the UoSo, the funding problem is driving a decision toward only the 
two pIs with one backup selected from someone already involved in the project who 
would receive limited training to serve as a pIs if required. Thi.s will save 
travel costs and training costs. The U.S. pIs selection is closely tied to the 
experiment selection problem and cannot be fully consummated until experiment 
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decisions are made. However, the Missi.on Manager expects to submit P/S candi-
dates to the Program Manager by Sept. 1. 
The ASSESS II procedure for pIs nomination and selection using the IWG 
for inputs has been an interesting and enlightening process which was considered 
by the Mission Steering Group to be of immediate importance to Space1ab planners. 
ESA considered eight nominations, some of which were submitted by DFVLR directly 
and will be supported by them. In the U.S., 30 nominations have been considered, 
mainly from JPL who advertised throughout their Center and who are viewing this 
as a significant first step toward selection of candidates they may wish to fly 
aboard Shutt1e/Space1ab. 
8. Action: ARC will prepare an interim ASSESS II report by Oct. 1 
covering the selection of Payload Specialists. 
PAYLOAD SPECIALIST TRAINING 
The ASSESS II Assistant Mission Manager presented the present status of 
planning for pIs training. A training plan has been drafted, but must be re-
worked depending upon the final decisions on U.S. experiment and p/S selection. 
No cross-training of ESA and U.S. p/S is planned except for one session of the 
U.S. pis with the ESA Life Science experiment. Partial training will be provi-
ded for the one U.S. backup P/S. ESA will fully train all of their four pis. 
Those selected for backup will serve in the POCC during the mission. 
Some discussion ensued about the procedure to be followed if a pis 
gets sick during the mission. Should the p/S be replaced or should he be removed 
and the remaining pis attempt to pick up the load perhaps using a preplanned 
time1ine? It was decided not to address the more complicated of .the alternatives 
for this mission, but instead merely replace a sick pis with the appropriate 
backup individua10 
GROUND OPERATIONS 
The Launch Site Operation representative from KSC presented charts 
showing the schedule of ground activities leading to the May 15, 1977 flight date. 
Copies of the overall ground operations schedule, the integration and checkout 
time line , and the integrated payload checkout configuration are attached. This 
schedule calls for U.S. ,experiment Level IV integration beginning March 14 with 
the ESA/SPICE acti"Hy by April 1, 1977 in preparation for integrated payload 
checkout with the l,'(:.i.J:'craft simulator system. All j.nstruments will be installed 
in the aircraft beginning April 5. The integrated P/L checkout will represent 
the use of the Core Segment Simulator at KSC by connecting the plL to an external 
power supply and an external ADDAS data system. Each instrument will be exce'X'-
cised as fully as possible using appropriate experimenter provided sensor stinlu1i. 
Final checkout will involve use of onboard power and the onboard data system and 
will be limited mainly to interface plL compatibility and EMI checks. No flight 
test checkout of the P/L will be performed commensurate with the Orbiter/Space1ab 
1imitationQ KSC expects to obtain detailed checkout procedures from each PI 
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in order to be responsible for plL checkout. It is planned to use the pIs 
during the integration and checkout process to operate the experiments, and 
they will need to be totally available during that period for that purposeo 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS 
The Flight operation representative from JSC presented a preliminary 
Flight Planning Integration schedule together with some details of an Integrated 
Mission Implementation Plan to be issued by JSC. Other documentation and activi-
ties leading to the flight period were identified and discussed, including the 
Crew Activity Plan, Payload Support Plan, and a pre-mission rehearsal to check 
out conununications and interactions between the }tOC, POCC, and aircraft. 
DOCUMENTATION 
The ASSESS II Assistant Nission Manager discussed the general approach 
to documentation. As a result of an earlier time, he and the ESA Head-
quarters representative prepared a summary of ASSESS II documentation and its 
relevance to Spacelab documentation. This is attached. The Launch Site Operation 
representative from KSC emphasized that, apart from the interface documents, 
the ASSESS program has prompted action at KSC to reduce internal implementation 
documentation with commensurate delegation of responsiblity. He said that KSC 
wants it understood that their requirements for Spacelab are going to be minimal 
compared to the past. 
CREW ASSIGNHENTS 
The NASA Program Nanager explained that, apart from pis selection 
activity, duties and responsibilities particularly for the t-lission Specialist 
are not yet reconciled. The NASA Headquarters representative stated that the 
Commander/Pilot combiuation have now been identified to handle interface duties 
between the Orbiter and Spacelab which leaves the ~lission Specialist totally 
available for Spacelab activitiesu A lively and extensive discussion followed 
in an attempt to identify a satisfactory role for the l-lission Specialist which 
led to an impasse between the principal representat:l.vos involved. The Chairman 
deferred the problem to separate negotiation between managements of the affected 
organizational ent:l.ties to settle on a solution. 
TRAJECTORIES 
The ESA Program Hanager pOinted out that as a result fo the IWG meeting, 
some PIs changed their viewing objectives and are concerned that they are 
expected to harden their requirements soon. They want flexibility. The ASSESS 
II Assistant Mission Manager, the Flight Operations repres'antative for JSC, and 
the ASSESS II }tanager from ARC explained the problems of handling changing 
requirements a After the IRDs are updated in October, there will still be some 
flexibility as the mission approaches, but any major change will be difficult 
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to implement. Small deviations can be handled into the flight period if they 
are justified, but it was strongly emphasized to provide hard requirements 
during the October period. New trajectories for the combined payload will be 
presented at the next IWG meeting which will probably be held in early or 
mid-December after the IRD update and the resultant second phase of analytical 
integration effort. 
USE OF ADDAS DURING SPICE INTEGRATION 
ESA has investigated the problem of constructing an ADDAS system for 
use during the integration of the ESA experiments at DFVLR. The ESA Program 
Manager explained that while most of the equipment is available at DFVLR, some 
of the unique U.S. manufactured equipment has been modified for ADDAS which 
they would have to procure and similarly modify. In addition, they need the 
software program for the internal ADDAS system. Consequently, he requested that 
the ADDAS equipment to be used off-line during the integration at ARC be shipped 
~o DFVLR for their use. 
9. Action: ARC will determine by Aug. 31 the possibility of sending 
the ARC-ADDAS hardware together with a software engineer 
to SPICE at DFVLR. 
Following review of previous action items, a meeting date for the 
next MSG was established for Dec. 7-8 at KSC. 
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MINUTES 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II Mission Steering Group Meeting 
December 15, 1976 
The meeting was held at NASA/MSFC on December 15, 1976. 
Some confusion developed regarding the meeting when the Co-chairman 
from NASA Headquarters called to explain his inability to attend the meeting, 
and to request that the MSFC Mission Manager act in his place as Co-chairmano 
The MSFC Mission Manager was absent, and it was not clear that he would be 
available to co-chair the meeting o Several alternatives developed which 
resulted in the representatives from OSF in NASA Headquarters, KSC, and JSC 
being notified of a possible delay in the meeting. On the morning of 
December 15, the MSFC Mission Manager arrived and agreed with the ESA Co-
chairman to proceed with an official MSG. As a result, official representa-
tives from the above organizations did not attend. 
Several summary presentations of material given to the Investigator's 
Working Group just concluded were shown to the MSG starting with the MSFC Ground 
Operations Manager who described the ground operations plan for ASSESS II. He 
discussed the guidelines and assumptions, procedure preparation with scheduled 
needs of input particularly from the experimenters, GSE, and status of opera-
tions documentation. The overall ground operations schedule was discussed in 
some detail. Whereas ESA had earlier planned to deliver their experiments to 
Ames on April 1, the ESA Program Manager agreed to advance delivery by two days 
to March 30. It was also agreed to start the constrained period on the evening 
of May 160 An earlier consideration to start the constrained activities on 
Sunday, May 15, was relaxed one day to avoid difficulties and added overtime 
costs necessary to begin on a Sunday eveningo 
Some diSCUssion ensued regarding the extent of direct involvement by 
the PI and his staff during the integration. It was agreed that the PI will 
have full responsibility for his equipnlent and will be fully and directly in-
volved during Level IV integration. He will be expected to operate his equip-
ment in accordance with prepared procedures. This will be his last chance to 
stimulate his experiment to insure fully satisfactory data response before it 
is "launched." 
A guideline was accepted that the experimenter will not go aboard 
the aircraft during Levels III, II, and I integration except in very special 
cases where there is concern that the experiment will not operate properly. 
The Mission Specialist and Payload Specialists will assist in the integration 
aboard the aircraft in behalf of the experimenter and the installation and 
checkout will be done according to prepared procedures as if the experiment 
were being installed aboard Spacelab by the integration contractor at KSC. 
The ESA Program l>lanager presented a summary of pre-integration 
activities relative to the ESA experiments to be conducted at SPICE in Porz-
Wahn, Germany during February and Marcho He showed a flow of experiments 
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into the simulation system, which is being constructed by DFVLR, along with a 
sched~le of events leading up to a constrained period of operation to be run in 
their ground facility using the ESA Payload Specialists to operate the experi-
ments with management control in a re~ote Payload Operations Control Center. 
A DFVLR representative showed details of the facilities to be used 
for the SPICE pre-integration operation including layout of the ESA experiments 
in a CV-990 mockup, the conununicatio.n system, and their plans to handle data 
through a system they are building ~o very closely resemble the ADDAS system 
on the CV-990. 
The ESA Program Hanager invited U.S. observation anq participation 
in the SPICE activity. 
The MSFC pl.an to carry out an off-the-aircraft integration of the 
complete payload using a separate Payload Checko\1.'; Unit was thoroughly discussed. 
TIle MSFC }tlssion Manager described the rationale for conducting the off-line 
integrationo t~ile recognizing the extensive effort on the part of ESA to do a 
pre-integration of their experiments in Porz-Wahn, he wants to use ASSESS to 
slmulate to the greatest extent reasonably possible a pre-integration test of 
the entire payload as it will occur at any Level IV integration site and deliver 
to KSC the payload with zero experiment test requirements. He recognized that 
there will always be some exception to such an ideal case, and while the air-
craft program does present some unique problems that prevent exact reflection 
of the Spacelab approach, it does allow a very high degree of opportunity to 
tryout the basic approach. 
The ESA Program Manager presented in chart form (attached) the ESA 
analysis of the MSFC proposalo In summary, while he showed a number of reasons 
for disagreement with the MSFC plan, as outlined in his presentation, he stated 
that he will accept the MSFC proposal to do off-line pre-integration without 
using the aircraft as shown on the MSFC schedule if the other participating 
NASA Centers who were not officially in attendance agree. This was accepted. 
The MSFC representatives presented the POCC and data handling 
concepts for ASSESS II including the physical and organizational arrangements 
and responsibilities of the various participants. 
Since the last meeting, substantial progress has been made regarding 
the role of the Mission Specialist. The Mission Manager presented the proposal 
made by the NASA Program Hanager for JSC to assign an MIs to functionally 
report to the Mission Manager at MSFC, for him to act as the alter ego of the 
Hisdon Mana~er during flight, to be the interface between the payload crew and 
the "STS" flight crew, to be responsible for aircraft-experiment support systems, 
to be trained as a PIs at the discretion of the Progra.m Manager, and to work 
directly with the POCC during flighto This proposal has been implemented, 
through NASA Headquarters to JSC and the Mission Manager expressed satisfaction 
with it. There was general agreemento 
The ESA Program Manager invited participation by the MiS in the SPICE 
activity, and also suggested that the MIs should handle the EMI experiment 
during flighto The Mission Manager agreed to look into the possibility of 
the HIs handHng that ass:i.gnment. 
~lSFC representatives briefly reviewed the flight operations planning 
that had been presented to the IWG including the agreements reached and the out-
standing action item. Seven night flights and two day flights are planned with 
one possible additional optional flight track. The preliminary timeline plan 
for the HiS and U.S. PiS for one flight has been delivered to ESA representatives 
for their use in preparing compatible timelines for the ESA P/Sc 
Deep concern was expressed regarding the tardiness in obtaining optical 
pat~ information from the ESA solar experiment. The ESA Program Manager said they 
are worldng with the experimenter to solve the problems, but the responsibility 
must remain wj.th the experimenter. They are helping all they can. 
Participants adopted the report of material which had been presented 
to the IWG. 
The [SA pis training plan was transmitted to MSFC. 
A previolls action item regarding ESA support for taking the CV-990 
with the ASSESS payload to the Paris Air Show is still openo ESA is receptive, 
but a formal requE-st from NASA is still awaited in order to respond. This action 
was transmitted to the NASA Program Hanager for attention. 
The ESA Program Manager announced that an ESA-IWG will be held in 
conjunction with the SPICE pre-integration, and he suggested that it would be 
aJ.ipropriate and timely for the last meeting of the HSG before "launch" to be 
held at Porz-Wahn at that timeD No specific action was taken on his suggestionD 
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MINUTES 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II Mission Steering Group Meeting 
March 9, 1977 
The l-fission Steering Group meeting was held at ESA/SPICE in Porz-
Wahn, West Germany. 
Since the last l-lission Steering Group meeting a new individual was 
appointed ASSESS II Mission Manager at MSFC. This change became effective 
January 19, 1977. 
The philosophy of Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) staffing 
was discussed in depth to establish and clarify the guidelines under which the 
ASSESS II POCC will be handled and the relationship and application of the 
ASSESS II a.ppI'oach to that being considered for Spacelab. The poce activity 
for ASSESS'II is essentially a complete reflection of that planned for Spacelab 
including all of the identified operating positions. However, the discontinuity 
of aircraft flights presents some anomalies with respect to real-time flight 
planning and POCC operationo 
POCC Mission Scientist Position Staffing 
The l-tlssion Manager pOinted out that for Spacelab, MSFC plans to have 
the Mission Scientist sit in a staff position with the l-lission Manager as an 
off-line activity with respect to the on-line POCC operation. In that position 
he will handle overall science-oriented mission planning. The science position 
in the POCC will be staffed by the Deputy Mission Scientist to participate in 
daily real-time ~xecution of the mission. 
This concept was relatively new, but ESA expressed concern that while 
the off-line science planning function might be applicable to Spacelab, for 
ASSESS II this would place the ESA Mission Scientist in a shared role with the 
U.S. Deputy Mission Scientist in the POCC. If an off-line mission science 
activity is to be implemented, it is the desire of ESA to use their prime ESA 
Mission Scientist to participate in that: activity with the prime U.S. Mission 
Scientist and to appoint an ESA Deputy Mission Scientist to serve in the POCC 
in conjunction with the U.s. Deputy Mission Scientist. However, ESA expressed 
concern that science judgements will be compromised in ASSESS II by removing 
the prime Mission Scientists from the real-time active execution activities 
in the POCC. 
A negotiated settlement of the issue was reached by agreeing to 
eliminate the off-line science planning function for ASSESS II and concentrate 
the prime U.S. and ESA Mission Scientists' efforts in the poce on a shared 
schedule basis during the most active periods of POCC operation and to use the 
Deputy U.S. and ESA ~[ission Scientists during the less critical periods. A 
specific schedule of participation was established as follows: 
T-a hours Pre-flight 
T+6-1/2 hrs Flight Peri,od 
T+9-1/2 hrs Post-flight de-
briefing and PI data 
evaluation 
14-1/2 hrs 
9-112 hrs 
DAY 1 DAY 2 
u.s. ESA 
Nis. Sci. His. Sci. 
u.s. ESA 
Dep. Mis. Sci. Dep. Mis. Sci. 
This schedule of POCC manning by the ~1ission Scientists was based on 
a typical day plan, and would repeat throughout the mission period. 
The ASSESS II Mission Manager reserved the right to reevaluate this 
arrangement after the first two days of operation; however, it was agreed that 
changes to this plan would be discussed with ESA before implementation. 
POCC Operations Position Staffing 
Detailed discussion also took place regarding POCC staffing of the 
Operations position. It had been previously agreed that this position will be 
staffed by the backup Payload Specialists since they have been deeply trained 
on experiment science and operation and will have established a strong working 
relationship wi,th the payload flight crews. However, the U.S. philosophy of 
providing only one backup pis from the mission management staff to back up the 
two initially selected U.S. Payload Specialists for operation of the U.S. 
experiments differs from the ESA approach where two backup Payload Specialists 
fully trained on the ESA experiments will be available. This imbalance of 
backup Payload Specialists between ESA and NASA raised the question of guide-
lines for shared responsibility in the POCC operation position assignments. 
It was generally recognized that the U.S. backup pIs had developed 
a deeper overall interface and understanding of both the ESA experiments and 
the UeS e experiments through his mission management activities in developing 
the investigator requirements for all the experiments as opposed to the ESA 
pis who have worked only with the ESA experiments. Thus, it was agreed that 
the U.S. backup pis will be assigned the key periods of operation in the poce 
during the first two days for the initial flights followed by rotation with 
ESA backup Payload Specialists for flights 3 and 4. Subsequent days will be 
a repeat of the assignments. 
Days land 2 
Day 3 
Day 4 
4 hours 
Preflight 
ESA III 
NASA 
NASA 
8 hours 4 hours 
Flight Period Post Flight 
NASA ESA 112 
ESA III ESA 112 
ESA ff2 ESA III 
The Mission Nanager also reserved the right of reevaluation of this 
arrangement after initial operation similar to that stated above for the }lission 
Scientist assignment. 
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POCC Activity Planner Position 
It was agreed that the poce Activity Planner position will be manned 
by NASA throughout. HO,"Tever, an ESA representative will assist the NASA 
Activity Planner for the purpose of gaining experience ~n this activity. 
}tlssion Implementation Plan 
Approval of the }~ssion Implementation Plan (MIP) being prepared by 
JSC has continued to be delayed due to lack of acceptance by the participating 
organizations. Another recent attempt to reach agreement during a telephone 
conference was not successful and a new round of rewrite is in progress. 
A key point generally accepted during discussion at the MSG meeting 
is that the present document as written differs substantially from the original 
intent. TIle initial understanding was to have a document which would summarize 
the plan for operations emanating from the Flight Operations Plan, the Ground 
Operations Plan, and the Flight Support Plan. The ESA Program Manager pointed 
out that it is inappropriate for ESA to be expected to approve the document 
since ESA is not involved in the present version. 
The NASA Program Manager proposed that statements be included in the 
document to the effect that arrangements lvi th ESA are covered in the ASSESS II 
NASA/ESA Letter of Agreement and other existing NASA/ESA documents so that ESA 
concerns and approval of the document can be dropped. This proposal was 
accepted thus leaving a continuing need for agreement and approval of the docu-
ment within NASA. 
Documentation 
The NASA Program Manager postponed discussion of documentation since 
most of the documentation is yet to be identified and prepared. 
}tlssion Schedule 
The }~ssion Manager briefly reviewed the mission schedule as attached. 
He emphasized that some changes have been required to delay integration of the 
U.S. experiments due to their late availability. Particularly, the EES will be 
late, specifically due to late authorization by NASA Headquarters. The first 
two weekends, originally planned for real-time contingency need, are now fully 
scheduled. 
The ESA Operations }tanager reviewed the ESA status of their simulation 
of the pre-Level III activities at SPICE using the ESA portion of the ASSESS II 
payload. He described the 990 mockup and living quarters used for their simu-
lation including an ADDAS simulator, POCC, Payload Specialist selection, and 
their flight planning actiVities. The ESA Operations Hanager pointed out that 
their simulation activities will end on March 13 after which they must change 
~:;;v, "'l, ". ~,~ .-::.-:~! .·~'~':4 :-",.1. i, 
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all experiments to operate on U.S. electrical power and check them for satis-
factory operation to be followed by packing and shipment beginning March 21. 
They plan to make delivery of the ESA experiments to Ames by March 30. 
ASSESS II Debriefing 
It was agreed t:.hat the Dlajor debriefing meeting for the ASSESS II 
project will be held at Ames the day following the constrained mission. All 
significant participants in the mission, including the PIs and Payload 
Specialists, will be held over for that meeting and will be expected to 
contribute. 
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NASA/ESA ASSESS II Investigators' Working Group Meeting 
July 12-13, 1976 
The Investigator' s l~orking Group (IWG) meeting was held at the 
ESA/SPICE Office located within the DFVLR Laboratory at Porz-Wahn, Germany. 
The meeting was conducted by the NASA ASSf..SS II Mission Scientist as 
Chairman of the IWG, with the ESA Mission Scientist as Co-chairman. This was 
the first opportunity for the ASSESS II investigators to meet together. Functions 
and responsibilities of the ItvG and the Chairman and Co-chairman are shown on the 
attached charto 
Objectives of the meeting were (1) to obtain first-hand information 
abou.t details and objectives of each experiment, (2) to gain an appreciation of 
the mutual requirements and interfacing compromises necessary in mission plan-
ning in order for each experimenter to obtain meaningful data, (3) to identify 
and plan interfaces and data exchange for mutually supporting experiments, 
(4) to update the experimenters regarding the overall mission planning status 
with the opportunity for Mission Management to get reactions and suggestions 
from the experimenters, and (5) to submit nominations by the Principal Investi-
gators for Payload Specialists for the missiono In addition, ~lission Management 
representatives had the opportunity at this meeting to expand and clarify inter-
face i.nformation contained in the Investigator Requirements Document (IRD) 0 In 
fact, some of the IRD's had not previously been received from ESA experimenters. 
The process of developing an easy-lo-comp1ete, yet adequate IRD has been an 
important learning process, both for Hission Management and for the experimenters 
as it will apply to Space1ab. Face to face discussions have proven highly 
efficient and are considered essential to expose the experimenters to the 
interface alternatives and obtain hard answers from the experimenters to solidify 
mission planning. Such face to face discussions have also proven highly useful 
in informing the inv('stigato1' and his team of the details of mission planning 
and the characteristics of carrier hardware. 
Also in conjunction with the meeting, and as part of an ongoing 
CV-990 flight project to Iceland, the aircraft was flown to the Cologne/Bonn 
airport which j.5 adjacent to DFVLR. Arrangements were made for the experi-
menters to visit the aircraft and observe installed and operating experiments 
and to di.scuss their own experiment situationu A special effort was made to 
acquaint them with the data system (ADDAS) and :f.ts interfacing requirements. 
The ESA Progr,'1m Nanager welcomed the group and described the ESA/SPICE 
organizational arrangement as it applies to ASSESS II and Spacelab management in 
Europea The NASA Assistant Hission Manager from NSFC discussed the overall 
ASSESS Program, the particular emphasiS of ASSESS II, and the involvement of all 
the actual Space lab management elements. It was explained that the IWG, which 
is intended to be implemented for Spacelab as well as ASSESS II, serves in an 
advisory capacity to Mission Management. However, it was emphasized that 
inputs from the investigators individually, as well as the IWG as a whole, will 
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be carefully recognized and strongly supported within the limits of cost and 
manpower resources. The ESA Program Manager stated that the ESA Mission 
Scientist will be the ESA representative for all European experiments for 
ASSESS II, and will be the channel for experiment information and critical 
decisions. 
The Principal Investigators each presented details of the various 
experiments. 
The NASA Assistant Mission Manager introduced the operational 
planning activi ty being carried out by Mission Management with a brief explana-
tion of the importance of getting a complete and accurate input from each 
experimenter through the IRD. He pointed out that the integration analysis 
effort to consolidate the entire payload requirements is based on the IRD 
inputs, and that they also serve to formulate the total ~tission Plan including 
both ground and flight operations. The ARC Manager described plans for 
location of the equipment aobard the aircraft including the central control 
racks for the various experiments. He explained the constraints imposed by 
viewing port availability and grouping of experiments to permit operation and 
control by the Payload Specialists. 
MSFC representatives presented details of the flight operation 
planning, the plan for integration and checkout of the experiments at ARC, and 
briefly discussed the ~lission Control Center (MCe) and the Payload Operations 
Control Center (POCC) concepts to be implemented at ARC during the mission. 
The experimenters were infornled that there are to be no check flights for the 
experiments prior to the constrained flight period; instead, experiment flight 
readiness will be verified by tests to be performed during the ground operations 
activity. 
The NASA Assi.stant Mission Manager concluded the f.lission r-Ianagement 
presentation to the IWG on mission planning activity by discussing the crew 
functions and training. Payload Specialist training will be essentially a 
full-time activity beginning September 1. Two schedule options are still 
under consideration leading to starting the constrained mission either on 
May 15 or June 9, 1977. 
An executive session of the IWG was conducted by the Chairman mainly 
to submit candidates for Payload Specialists. Much discussion ensued regarding 
pis qualifications which ranged from capable technician/engineer with expertise 
in electronics and optics to a scientific background particularly for interpre-
tation of star fields o It was generally agreed that the PiS must have intuition 
with respect to the data quality. In Europe, the pIs opportunity had been 
widely advertised. Many applications had been received, and so far, only very 
coarse screening had been done. The EtiA Mission Scientist volunteered a dead-
line of August 1 for submittal of their candidates. In the U.S., some experi-
menters were still pondering the question of pis candidates, but the lack of 
funding definition to the experimenters had basically prevented submissions. 
T~e Chairman established a deadline of August 6 for pis nominations. 
The CV-990 data system specialist from ARC described the capabilities 
and operation of the ADDAS ~iata system together '\lith the experiment interfacing 
requirements. 
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Throughout the meeting there was extensive di.scussion and suggestions 
relative to all aspects of the mission. Many requirements were clarified; several 
new ones we.re iden tiHel;!. n"o experimental group s (one U. S. and one ESA) de-
cided to c.o11aborate on solar measurements. The interchange was very beneficial 
both for the experime.nters and missi on planners. 
SigniHcoilnt points made regarding the e}..-periments were as follows: 
1. Hi c,rowave Limb Sounder (JPL) 
" 
.... 
an Needs 4 to 5 hours of integration time. 
b. Has flown on the 990, but is a relatively 
new instrument. Intend to fly on Spacelab. 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (JPL) 
a. Has flm·m on 990, but will require some 
redesign to simplify control and reduce 
pIs time, 
b. Present instrument is being developed for 
sea-satellite in 197~. 
3. Imaging 180c:on (University of Southampton) 
a. They flew on ASSESS I which was their first 
flight opportunity and a significant learning 
experience. 
bo They have improved their data gathering 
approach and \dll also improve their 
equipment. 
c. PI requested provision for a second camera 
to per!1lit observations from either side of 
the aircraft. 
d. The IRD from this group had not been received 
prior to the meeting due to a foul-up in 
international mail. 
4. Life Sciences Experiment (Dlo'VLR) 
H .. 
h. 
c. 
cl. 
They will instruF0nt both prime (in-flight) 
and backup (on-the-ground in the POCe) 
Payload Specialists. 
Expect to get continuous measurements; 
3 days pre-flight, 10 days confined flight 
period, and 3 days post-flight. 
63 minutes per day required in the F/S 
timeline to obtain and record measurements. 
Two freezers required, one on thE' aircraft 
and one in the living quarters, to store and 
free3e 3-hour urine onmplcs. 
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50 IR Heterodyne Radiometer (Langley) 
a. This instrument also aimed toward Spacelab. 
b. Upon learning of the ESA solar physics 
e,xperiment details, there appears to be 
a strong collaborative opportunity. 
c. PI prefers more daytime flights to permit 
experiment coordination. 
60 Airborne Electroffiagnetic Survey (GSFC) 
a. Almost unlimited opportunity to obtain data 
since very little exists in the emergency 
bands being covered. 
bo Large data rate -- 100 kbs continuous. 
7. IR Astronomy (University of Paris) 
IR Astnmomy (Hax Planck Institut) 
a. Both groups will usc the same telescope from 
Heudon Observatory that ,vas flown on ASSESS 1. 
b. Many improvements being made in telescope 
system. Improved tracking through improved 
torque controL, 
c. Improved computerized data handling and cont>rol 
to reduce pIs task load Q 
d. Planning to install sensors for both experiments 
on the rear of the telescope with possible split 
beam arrangement so that easy switching from one 
experiment to the other may be possible o 
e. PI presented new viewing requirements from those 
earlier discussed as a result of the information 
presented at the meeting rel~tive to flight track 
possibilities as integrated with tqtal payload 
experiment requirements. 
f. PI requested water vapor measurements. 
g. Illl for this experiment also not received prior 
to the meeting clue to internationnl mail 
problems. 
H. LIDAR (DFVLR) 
a. Must not operate the laser below 3 km altitude 
for safety. 
b. PI presented new requirement during the inte-
gration unci chuckout. period for time to align 
the lnser. This requires positioning the 
aircraft relative to a distant target. 
9. IR Isotropometer - Solar (Capodimonte Observatory) 
a. Have used instrument for ground-based 
measurements. Will require redesign 
for airborne installation. 
bo IRD not yet completed and the experimenter 
familiar with the hardware details could 
not attend the meeting. Key questions 
were posedo He will visit ARC and MSFC 
in August to discuss I/F and operational 
problems and complete the IRD. 
cO Need significant interface with the ADDAS 
to drive their instrumento 
In addition to the scientific experiments, several points came up 
regarding the engineering experiment to measure EMI from ESTEC as follows: 
ao Experimenter voiced concern regarding the distance of their equipment 
rack from the aircra.ft inverters where measurements are to be made. 
b. Requested single-point ground on the ADDAS system. 
c. Requested that all experiments be powered from a single inverter to 
reduce EMIo This is not possible with the existing aircraft system. 
d. Requested that the aircraft grounds be terminated at a single point 
in the forward cargo bay of the aircrafto 
eo Requested that NASA experimenters modify their equipment to provide 
single-point groundingo 
\ 
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ASSESS II INVESTIGATOR'S WORKING GROUP (IWG) 
o Scientific and technology advisory group to managemen~. 
o Optimization of payload requirements to assure maximuDl payload return 
"'ithin established n~'ission constraints. 
o Recon~end Payload Specialists to mission management. 
o HIe chaired by NASi\ Nission Scientist and co-chaired by ESA Nission Scientist. 
o IWG composed of one PI for each facility or each experiment not part of a 
facility 0 
CHAImlAN RT~Sl'ONSrBILITn.S: 
o Coordinate all PI activities (European and U.S.). 
o ,Establish meeting dates and agenda. 
o Act as single point of contact to management. 
o Support all investigators in meeting their objectives. 
o Act as Co-chairman for Payload Specialist nominations. 
CO-CHAIRNAN RESPONSIBlLITIES: 
o Act as single point of contact to Chairman for European PIs o 
o Support European investigators in meeting their objectives. 
o Coordi.nate European PI activities. 
o Co-ch.;J.ir n/e meetings for Payload Specialists nominotions • 
... __ ........ _ .... ____ ..... w_. ____ ,., ___ ......... fl' ... '... U .... lIIl ... W .... __ ..... _ ..... ___ • __ I,j~~ ____ • __ "'O""'-~_ .. _._ ---- ~ .-~---- -_. 
MINUTES 
NASA/ESA ASSESS II Investigators' Working Group Meeting 
December 13-14, 1976 
The Investigators' Wo~king Group (IWG) meeting was held at NASA/MSFC. 
The previous meeting minutes were discussed and approved. However, the ESA 
Program Manager noted that the last minutes had not been sent to ESA for perusal 
before distribution. The Chairman stated that he will send the minutes to them 
for approval in the future. ~, 
The NASA Assistant Mission Manager from MSFC reviewed the project 
status and reported that the mission is on schedule with a launch date for the 
constrained flight of May 15, 1977. (This date was later moved to May 16 by 
general agreement to avoid difficulties and extra overtime costs to start the 
mission on Sunday evening.) A round of visits to all the investigators was 
completed in late November to solidify information regarding experiment require-
ments and interfaces. Each Experimenter Requirements Document (IRD) was fully 
updated with some exceptions where the experiment design and/or operational 
considerations had not progressed far enough to complete the information. A 
final formal session of analytical integration had just been completed at MSFC, 
the results of which formed the be,sis for the IWG presentations. 
The IWG meeting was broken up into a first day of presentations 
followed on the second day by several working sessions and a summation meeting 
of conclusions and actions required. 
ARC representatives reviewed the aircraft configuration for the 
mission. Several changes had been made sin~e the last IWG~ but the configura-
tion presented was essentially final reflecting the latest inputs from the IRDso 
The optical tracking art'angement for the ESA solar phys:Lcs experiment is still 
due and will probably require movement of their racks, but only slightlyo They 
also presented the layout of the living quarters, configuration and contents of 
each of the "Spacelab" central consoles, and a summary of electrical power 
requirements. Additional information was requested from some experimenters 
regarding electrical power as shown on that chart. Experimenters were also 
requested to submit any special data display requirements to be shown on the 
closed cj,rcuit TV display in the aircraft during flight. This request was 
made in the lRO, but perhaps was not fully understood. 
It was explained that, as opposed to Spacelab, the aircraft experiment 
support systems are not intended to be unattended. Therefore, some non-confined 
personnel (ghosts) will fly on the mission to maintain the aircraft electronics, 
AnDAS system and stabilized mirror system, plus an ASSESS observer. The PI from 
NASA/Langley requested an additional "ghost" to hf'ndle laser maintenance since 
his ell:periment has not bec~ funded to improve the'~r laser to Sp<i('.elab quali ty. 
It was agreed to support this request. 
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HSFC representatives presented a detailed schedule of ground operations 
to take place at Ames showing activities for every experiment and for functional 
checkout of the entire payload. An off-the-aircraft pre-integration (Level IV) 
of th~ entire payload to be managed by MSFC was shown, which will employ a 
special payload checkout uni t (PCU). Tl:lis will be followed by integration of 
the payload on the aircraft to be carried out under the jurisdiction of KSC 
(Level III, II, I). The Level IV payload checkout represents off-line payload 
checkout of the Spacelab payload before it reaches the orbiter. Final agreement 
for this plan for off-line checkout of' the ASSESS II payload had not been 
reached with ESA, but this was the MSFC plan. A final decision was to be 
reached at the upcoming Mission Steering Group meeting. 
MSFC also presented a number of charts giving the guidelines for 
ground operations with a request for experiment operations procedures from each 
experimenter with due dates. They strongly emphasized the need for these procedures 
since that information is the basis for much of the integration document prepar-
ation. In addition, GSE requirements were identified and discussed. 
A summacy was presented of the integrated payload mission planning 
including th~ guidelines used, a summary of experimenter requirements and 
cons.traints taken from the IRDs, and some details of each of the proposed 
flight tracks to accommodate the requirements. The ensuing discussion uncovered 
some potential problem areas where some instruments would be turned on and off 
as their periods of opportunity become available in the integrated flight 
planning for the entire payload. For instance, it was proposed that the JPL-SAR 
would operate only over specified targets, and timelines would be built around 
this plan. However, it was pOinted out that during previous flight experience 
with that instrument, it was never turned off during flight which raised questions 
about its operation. An action was taken to determine the ramifications of this 
problem with the JPL PI who was not at the meeting. Also, the Langley PI must 
identify tis specific interactive ground stations in the immediate future to 
permit solidification of flight track patterns. The DFVLR clarified a desire 
for continuous measurements versus measurements only over specific truth sites. 
Although it was recognized that flight tracks may be altered in real 
time during the mission for a variety of reasons, the constrained flight period 
will begin with a hard schedule and very specific plans and timelines for each 
flight. PIs were encouraged to study the details presented at the meeting to 
assure that their requirements are appropriately accommodated. 
A preliminary detailed payload crew activity plan had been prepared 
for one flight by the Mission Specialist and the U.S. Payload Specialists. It 
was presented and discussed to show the detailed individual timelines which 
will be used to guide each individual efficiently through the entire awake 
period. Specific time allocations were scheduled for all experiment operations 
including pre aircraft flight warmup and calibration, interactive flight opera-
tions of the various instruments, shutdown after landing, and the debriefing 
period. A similar complete timeline for the entire payload flight cr~w will be 
prepared for each flight, and will be used by the POCC as well as the onboard 
~rew as the baseline schedule. 
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The preliminary sample payload crew activity plan was submitted to 
the ESA representatives so that the timelines for the ESA Payload Specialists 
can be developed in a similar manner. The ESA and NASA plans will then be 
merged into a complete composite plan probably during the pre-integration 
activity at Porz-Wahn when the total payload flight crew will be together. 
The ARC Manager announced that arrangements look very favorable 
that the U.S. Air Force will support the mission by providing relay of HF com-
munications from the aircraft to the POCC at Ames throughout the flight period. 
This will siwulate voice communications with Spacelab and permit real-time 
interaction with the payload crew. However, the MSFC Assistant Mission Manager 
pointed out that all communications with the crew will be shut down about 25 
percent of the time to simulate the black-out periods applicable to Spacelab. 
This has not yet been scheduled but will apply to some of the HF communications 
during flight as well as data and TV transmission when the aircraft is on the 
ground--which is considered to be part of the "Spacelab" mission flight period 
and will be fully constrained. 
MSFC presented and discussed the Payload Operations Control Center 
(POCC) concept and arrangement including guidelines, organizational concept, 
individual responsibilities, and the proposed physical layout. These plans 
are yet to be hardened with the JSC arra.ngement and interaction with the 
Mission Control Center (MCC), and with Ames who will provide the facilities. 
Handling of data during the constrained period was discussed and a 
typical POCC mission timeline for one day was presented showing how data will 
be .. retrieved from the aircraft, the interactive use and scheduling of data 
terminals to permit PIs to analyze and scan the data output, interactive 
p1anning for the next aircraft flight period utilizing inputs from the PIs 
and the Mission Scientist together with mission management and the professional 
flight planners, and also how external information such as weather satellite 
inputs will flow into the system. A schedule of data requirements milestones 
was presented along with the guidelines and ground rules which 'will apply to 
data handling during the constrained period to be properly compatible with this 
Spacelab flight simulation. A list of problem areas where more information was 
needed from some experimenters was discussed along with open items yet to be 
finalized 0 
During discussion of the various open items and requests from the 
PIs for more information, the Langley PI observed that since mission management 
representatives had actually filled out his IRD some time ago during discussion 
wit.h him, it was difficult for him to remember the details, and he has never 
received a copy of t!::e completed document. He recommended that a copy of the 
IRDs be sent to the PIs so they will have a baseline from "tlhich to submit 
further information. It was quickly agreed that this should have been done. 
MSFC will send a copy of each IRD to the respective PIs as soon as possible. 
A variety of action items and decisions, in addition to those shown, 
developed during the presentations as follows: 
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1. The LIDAR Experiment (DFVLR) needs space for PI-provided ground 
equipment and general concern developed about space for the PIs to 
prepare their experiments at Ames. The ARC Nanager will furnish 
a proposed plan to HSFC to handle this problem. 
2. An unresolved problem as to whether a tinung signal must be added 
on one channel of the CP-100 recorder was discussed. This would 
elimir,ate a channel to be used for EHT measurements. The ESA 
Mission Scientist will resolve this problem. 
3. 
4. 
ASSESS Nission HanageITlen t will in terf ace wi th ground si tes in real 
time during the mission to assure full coordination and realignnlent 
if and when schedules may change. PIs can and probably will interact 
with the sites as required for planning and data interchange. MSFC 
will solidify and coordinate the real time flight interaction. 
Some changes \\lere given during the meeting for developing the flight 
track planning for the analytical integration phase and jt was agreed 
that as a result of the baseline requirements in exjstence as a result 
of the IWG meeting and the specific action items on this subject, MSFC 
will perform one more iteration of flight planning to refine the 
flight tracks. 
5. The ESA Mission Scientist specifically requested that the NASA 
Hission Scientist attend the ESA pre-integration activity in Harch 
in Porz-Hnhn and particlpate in an ESA I\~G to be held at that time 
to fully resolve ESA/US interactive experiment problems. 
6. All experiment support equipment except some cryogenics will be 
assembled for loading prior to the mission flight. There will be 
no exceptions. However, mission management may decide not to carry 
all tapes and reels aboard the aircraft during specific flights if 
the specific flight is weight critical and some data taking impair-
ment \~ould result, but the tapes and reels will be held in bonded 
storage as if they wer~ on the aircraft. 
7. Concerns \'1ere expressed that full adherence to requirements of the 
Nedical Experiment may interfere with ability of the flight crew 
to fully handle other experiments. Specifically, the attachment of 
electrodes as an interference to get a full measure of rest was cited 
as an example. The ESA Hission Scientist will work out with the 
Nedica1 Experiment PI a proposed set of gUidelines to be applied to 
this problem during the missionu 
8. In general, prepared food will be made available to the constrained 
flight cre\\I to eliminate encroHchment on their time to attend experi-
ments in order to prepare food. 
9. DFVI.R has offered through SPICE to have a medical doctor available 
throughout the t"lission to work with Ames to assist in any problem 
which may arise. The ARC Nanager \vill coordinate this offer with 
the medical office at Ames and notify ESA. 
1 ' 
i, 
I. 
10. Subsequent to the actual meeting, a point came up which indicated 
that the water vapor meter, to be furnished through Ames as a 
general mission support item, can be quickly reprogranuned from 
water vapor measurement to ozone measurement. The NASA Mission 
Scientist requested that ARC explore this possibility for quick 
change during flight as it might apply to the solar flights where 
there is a desire for both measurements. 
Following workin£; sessions on the second day of the HIG meeting, 
conclusions and open items \·dth actions were summarized by the session leaders 
in the areas of (a) payload configuration - ARC, (b) ground operations - MSFC, 
(c) mission planning and flight operations - ~1SFC, and (d) POCC and data 
handling - MSFC. 
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APPENDIX C 
Experiment Problems During Flight 
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This appendix lists by experiment and flight the major recognized deviations 
from expected experiment operat:i.on including interfaces with the aircraft and 
experiment support systems. 
LIDAR The LIDAR experiment performed well during the first seven flights 
excepting flight two when a blown fuse was mistaken for a dead battery. The 
fuse was blown prior to flight two when the pis attempted to charge the battery 
pack while the experiment was turned on. All data from that flight were lost. 
This circuitry should have been tested during the Mission Simulation Test, 
since daily battery charging was included in the pis timeline. However, it 
was not tested until after the first aircraft flight which resulted in the 
blown fuse. Unfortunately, the problem was not discovered until preparations 
for the next flight were fully underway with no time available to solve the 
problem. During the last two flights, when the laser fired, the experiment 
frequently did not see any laser light reflected from aerosols in the beam. 
It was not clear at the close of the mission what caused that problem. 
The LIDAR experiment was never fully mated to the central data system. 
Serious interfacing problems tv-ere encountered throughout all phases of payload 
integration, and the problem identification vacillated between the central data 
system and the experiment. Just before launch a defective experiment component 
was identifi.ed. Correction was made, but intermittent data transmission 
persisted during flight. Fortunately, data was r~c~rded on an internal experi-
ment recorder so that no data was lost, but because of the interface difficulty 
with the central data system, ability to obtq~~ quick-look data during the 
mission was impaired. 
CTM The CTM experiment achieved. good results operating in the night-sky-
brightness mode, but, because of a serious design deficiency, it did not do 
well viewing the sun. This basic dlff:l.cuJ ts was due to the fact that the 
experiment included no positive m~ans of guiding on the sun. 
At the IWG meeting 1n July 1976 the CTM 'PI in discussion with the IHR 
PI (who used the sun as a light source for ozone detection) conceived a plan 
of mating IHR stablized mirror orientations to the independent CTI1 stabilized 
mirror and thus eliminated need for a CTM sun tracking addition to his experi-
ment. Since the IHR experim~nt did include sun guidance optics, and its mirror 
could follow lho sun, this idea should have, in theory, put CTIl on the sun 
whenever the IRR was on the sun. However, the CT~l instrument, which viewed in 
the far IR, could not "see" the sun from tht. ground so that, although an attempt 
was made, the two experiments could not be boresighted prior to flight. Thus, 
the first attempt by CTM to guide on the sun (flight eight) ended in complete 
failure. Early in flight nine the stabilized mirror operators attempted a 
crude mirror boresight by se~ting both azimuth and elevation to zero, as indi-
cated by benchmarks on the mirror support structures, and comparing values fo~ 
those parameters as computed by the central data system for both mirrorf.; and 
displayed on closed circuit TV. The~e were initial difficulties in i~plement­
ing this unique fix in real-time, but concentrated effort on the part of the 
mirror operators and the central data system operator as the flight progressed 
achieved a satisfactory slaved operation of the CT~1 mirror through th~ computer 
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system. The CTM experience demonstrates especially well the imporj:ance of 
careful mission planning and of carrying out proper preflight testing if such 
problems are to be avoided in flight. 
A CTM lock-in amplifier failed ea+ly in flight four. The PI was informed 
via radio link, and, while no spare had been put aboard, management treated the 
situation as though there had been a spare in stowage and allowed replacement 
of the amplifier instead of having the PIs attempt repairs. 
AWS An earlier single-camera version of the AWS experiment had been 
flown successfully on the CV-990 during ASSESS I without significant problems. 
However, during ASSESS II focus and/or sensitivity problems were encountered 
on every flight for reasons not identified at the end of the mission. The pIs 
spent considerable time in flight attempting to improve the focus~ but he had 
little usable ground time to troubleshoot the problem during the first five 
days of the mission, since camera operation required low ambient light levels 
at night. Finally, prior to flight six he was able to bring both cameras into 
excellent focus, but an undiagnosed cause defocussed the right viewing camera 
immediately after takeoff for the next flight, and during the flight the left 
viewing camera lost IR sensitivity. He was unable to remedy the problem with 
either camera during that flight. The backup pIs brought aboard after flight 
six (see section 3.5) was considerably less familiar with the AWS experiment, 
and no attempt was made to operate the left viewing camera during flight 
seven. The AWS was not operated during the last two flights, in accordance 
wi th flight plans, since these were daytime flights. 
LAS The LAS experiment had been flown previously with good success at 
relatIVely low altitudes and in an open port configuration on a small aircraft, 
but it operated at considerably less than expected sensitivity throughout the 
ASSESS II mission o Calibration mode operation during various integration 
phases was satisfactory, but no means were included to make a direct check of 
sensitivity because the experiment relied on forward motion of the aircraft to 
produce a doppler shift in the laser beams reflected back to the aircraft from 
the ground. The lack of sensitivity was immediately apparent on the first 
flight. After the second flight, suspecting that the intermediate frequency 
lay outside the experiment pass band, the pIs shimmed the laser packa~e 
so that the transmitted laser beam forward angle was i.ncreased by one 
degree. This angle, which was directly proportional to the doppler shift of 
the reflected laser beams, was never accurately determined. The PI originally 
specified that the angle was to be 3.0 + 0.5 degrees in flight and requested 
verification, but that request for verification was withdrawn. The shift in 
laser beam angle produced no dramatic improvement, so the pIs (PI), systemati-
cally checked out alignment of elements in the LAS optical package during 
flights five, six, and seveno Some minor adjustments were made and by the end 
of flight eight some measurable return was being recorded at or above 31,000 
feet. However, the rettlrn 'signal never did become as great as expected. 
IHR The IHR experiment was flown on the CV-990 about nine months prior 
to theASSESS II mission. It was found then that the laser frequencies were a 
function of cabin air pressur~. The PI, by dilige.nt a ttention, could keep the 
frequencies properly adjusted, but it was recognized that the operation would 
require far too much time for a pis to maintain adjustments and handle other 
duties on the ASSESS II mission, soOthe laser package was redesigned. This 
redesigned package produced less reference laser power than was desired, and 
was the only part of the experiment which continued to perform poorly through-
out the flight mission. The pis readjusted parameters controlling the laser 
power on each flight, but could not increase it. 
While all data was somewhat degraded as a result of low laser power, 
on only two occasions (flights six and eight) did other significant opera-
tional problemR occur. On flight six the pollutant las~r ceased to function 
for a short period for an unknown reason and had to be restarted, and on flight 
eight the sun track monitor lost contrast so that sun tracking was degraded. 
In addition, all data from one flight was lost when an instrument mirror cover 
was not removed. 
IRA (Heudon/Groningen/MPI) The MeudonlCroningen por'tion of the IRA 
experiment had been flown on the CV-990 during the ASSESS I mission in 1975. 
On that mission the pis was severely overworked to operate the experiment. 
For ASSESS II, the telescope stabilization systr,tn was much improved and system 
redesign provided more automation. Also, the t-lPI sensor was added to the 
l-leudon/Groningen system for ASSESS II. NFl had had experience flying similar 
equipment, but their ASSESS II instrumentaHop had not been flown before. 
Internal experiment control of the telescope and optical aUgnment diffi-
culties were responsible for most IRA problems. The IRA computer problem 
was related to software, but was so subtle as to remain partially undiagnosed 
throughout the mission even though computer manufacturer technicians were 
called in during the Level IV integration. A dropout problem was encountered 
during all phases of integration and during flights one, four, five, and seven. 
The pIs was usually able to br.ing the computer back up in four to five minutes. 
On flight four only partial operation was restored, and no recovery was achieved 
011 flights one and seven. On flight five full operation was restored. 
An optical problem on the IRA was the most serious. Optical alignment of 
the telescope was checked in the peu during Level IV integration, and was 
found to be satisfactory. Hm.lever, the collimated source required to check 
alignment was not designed for use on the aircraft after flight integration 
and a final optical check could not be made. A large offset signal was apparent 
on the first flight. Exact source of the problem was not determined, but 
asymmetry in motion of the secondary mirror seemed likely. The large offset 
signal had to be subtracted out, and unfortunately it was of much greater 
magnitude than the small signal of interest. Amplitude of the offset signal 
at the Groningen detector could be reduced by moving~the detector in the plane 
of the proper telescope focus, but this diminished the IR signal of interest. 
The MPI detet\tor could not be moved. During flight two, the pIs, on his own 
initiative, managed to almost eliminate the offset signal, but in doing so, he 
reduced amplitude of the detected IR from the astronomical targets by a factor 
of two to three. A judgment was then reached with the PI to compromise in 
~educing the size of the offset signal only to a point where the signal did 
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not saturate the lock-in amplifier. The pis spent as long as 15 to 20 minutes 
during each of the next two flights adjusting the position of the Groningen 
detector to obtain an optimum combination of offset signal and IR astronomical 
signals. 
AEES The AEES experiment had operational diffic~ties throughout the 
mission because of an antenna grounding problem which was not discovered until 
after the actual Spacelab simulation period when the PI could personally inspect 
the equipment without violating mission guidelines. The installation drawings 
did not show that the mounting plate on which the 121.5 MHz antenna was mounted 
was to be grounded to the frame of the aircraft. As a result, the plate was not 
grounded, and static electric charges built up on the antenna during flight. 
The resulting intermittent discharges, sometimes as often as every 20 seconds, 
produced noise bursts on the 121.5 MHz signal channel. They were also picked 
up on the adjacent 243 MHz antenna, and interfered with aircraft radio signals. 
The problem had little serious effect on experiment data return, but was a 
continuous source of annoyance and lost time to the pis who tried to identify 
the problem by looking for interference from other electrical systems. This 
seemed logical at the time. 
A more serious AEES problem was instability of the noise generator used 
to calibrate all four receivers. Fortunately, the PI had included sufficient 
spares and instructions so that the pIs was able to keep the instrument in 
operation. 
MLS The MLS operational problems were minor and by themselves produced 
little-Ioss of data. However, the low level of instrument sensitivity associated 
with the more automated mode of operation designed for ASSESS II was a serious 
problem and resulted in very limited data return overall. There apparently 
was insufficient time and manpower available to thoroughly develop the automated 
system, and it was not until after the constrained "Spacelab" flight that 
the PI, using a more complex operational mode, accomplished sensitivity improve-
ment. 
SAR The SAR had been operated successfully many times aboard the CV-990. 
It wa;-taken directly from a previous CV-990 program to the peu for Level IV 
integration, and was modified only to the exten.t of introducing pIs centralized 
control. This only involved regrouping of experiment components and rewiring. 
Installation drawings were not complete, and two independent dc power sources 
were used to supply different parts of the experiment because the two sources 
were convenient. The power sources were of reversed polarity and bucked each 
other, which resulted in insufficient voltage to drive the experiment data 
recorders. Operational checkout after flight vehicle integration was satis-
factory, because, unlike the flight conditions, only one recorder was operated 
at a time using independent power sources. Neither in the FCU, nor after 
installation in the aircraft was the whole experment operated as it was to be 
operated in flight with both recorders operating simultaneously. 
After the recorder problem surfaced on the first flight, efforts were 
made to identify the difficulty, but the SAR remained inoperative through 
~···ttiB· tl'w.w~. 
flights three and four. Finally, prior to flight five, the experiment was 
declared a failure by Spacelab standards. Flight mission rules were relaxed 
and the senior SAR technician went aboard and found the problem. One power 
supply was bypassed and a cable was added between the Spacelab control rack 
and experiment racks to feed both recorders from the same dc power source. 
Mission guidelines were relaxed on two other occassions for SAR, a circuit 
diagram was up linked in an attempt to help solve the recorder problem, and, 
when an integrated circuit in the SAR failed, a replacement was carried aboard. 
MEDICAL The medical experiment performed satisfactorily. In two cases 
discharged batteries were replaced from storage during flight, and a mechani-
cal tape recorder problem was resolved by simply exchanging the bad tape 
recorder for a spare in stowage. One pIs forgot to turn on his encephalograph 
for five hours between flights two and three. Subsequently, the pISs each 
received reminders from the MIs just before going to bed. 
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